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In the fall of 1983 the Technical University Eindhoven aryd Tilburg
University started a oo-operative project on the "fabrication of
coppe,r sem.i-products in developing wimtries". The project is an in
depth case-study of resource based i.ndustrialization in developing
countries. The copper sector was selected because copper is a very
iliq~ortant mineral export product of the developing countries and
because a copper fabricating industxy. Producing semi~nufactures,
can clearly be identified.
Particularly in the large oopper exporting ootmtries (Peru, Chile,
Zambia, Zaire) copper ore goes through several stages of processing
and is mainly being exported in the form of blister and refined
co~er. Until the present time, however, these countries export
very limited amounts of copper semi-manufactures. The objective of
our research is to investigate if and under what oonditions the
copper exporting developing countries could produce and export cer-
tain copper semi-manufactures on a larger scale. The research con-
centrates on primary fabrication of copper and oopper alloy semis.
Four groups of products can be distingrn~;shed: wire rod; rocls. bars
and sections; plates, sYbeets and strips; tubes.
In order to detezmine the viability of export~riented cop~per fabri-
cation in developing countries, be it for regional or overseas
markets, one has to investigate: the production processes and pro-
duction costs in the industrialized cotmtries, the i~ort barriers
in potentional export markets (including developing countríes),
marketing rec~~irements arrl transport costs, and finally the feasibi-
lity of efficient production in developing countries. The general
set-up of our research project has been a first stage with an inves-
tigation of existing international trade patterns and trade barriers
(desk research) arid of production and marketing of copper setnis in
Western Europe (through intensive contacts with a nunber of ca~a-
nies). This research is partly still going on at present. The second
project stage is to investigate the feasibility of export~riented-1v-
copper fabrication in Zambia and in Peru. These two oountries have
been selected because they are at different levels of industriali-
zation.
This report is a review and analysis of the available statistics
on international production and trade patterns and of the litera-
ture that tries to explain the changes in the geographical location
in the copper sector (mining, metallurgy and semis fabrication)
that did take place during the past decades. Thanks are due to Jo
Meending for his assistance in collection and ocRq~ilation of stati-
stics and to Jan Marijnissen, Ph.D. (Eindhoven University of Tech-
nology) for his valuable o~rents an an earlier draft of this re-
port.
Jan Vingerhoets ~
~ Dr. Jan Vingerhoets is senior lecturer in Developnent Eoonanics
at the Eooncmics Faculty of Tilburg UniversityINI'RODUCI'ION
Over the past 15 to 20 years the developing oountries have easily
maintained their traditional role in the world oopQer irtidustYy: sup-
pliers of raw materials for the industrialized countries. Contrary to
the expectations of several analysts, the developing oountries have
increased their share in world mine production of oopper. The wave
of nationalizations in the sixties did not result in the developing
countries becaning marginal suppliers of last resort. On the eontra-
ry, the share of the developing countries in ttze oo~pper mine Product-
ion of the market eoonomies has increased spectacularly in recent
years.
In the traditional copper producing oountries the exp~aivsion of the
production of blister and refined copper oould keep pace with the ex-
pansion of the mine production. iiawever, the metallurgical stages of
the industry have not (yet) been developed in Indonesia and Papua
New Guinea and only very recently in the Philippines.
Over the past decades, the developing countries have started to piay
another role in the world copper industYy: a number of tiiem have be-
cane significant producers of copper semis. The initiation and expan-
sion of the production of copper and copper alloy semis has been von-
centrated in the socalled Newly Industrialising Countries (the NIC's).
Wire rod (continuously cast) is the single most important product.
The share of the developing cotmtries in refineci oonsurt~tion has in-
creased from less than 5 per cent in 1960 to over 12 per cent at pre-
sent.
A thisrl tendency over the past decades has been the increasing share
of the developing oountries in the werld i~orts of copper semis.
Available data indicate that the share of the developing oountries in
the imports of the market eoonani.es increased from about 10~ in 1969
to more than 25~ in 1981 1).
1) Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics-2-
This substantial increase occurred desAite the very rapid increase in
imports of refined oopper by the developing oountries and despite
the rapid expansion of world trade in cop~pe-r semis. Particularly in
recent years, the oopper semis sector has becane m~re internationa-
lize3 arr3 the developing countries have beo~ an i~orkant market
for exporters fran the EEC (Western E~rope) and Japan.
A fourth i~ortant phenarenon of the recent past is rather a non-
event: the mpper producing developing oountries (like Chile, Peru,
Zambia and Zaise) did not beoa[ie i~ortant producers arxi exporters
of oopper semis. The expectations and the aspirations of the count-
ries concerned - articulated, for instance, at the Cipec Conferences
of the late sixties and early seventies - have not been realized 1).
Chile has traditionally been and reinaine3 an exporter of limited a-
mounts of copper semis. ~cports frcm Peru are small (but increasing)
and only reoently Zambia started to export a vexy small atrount of
wire rod. For these and other oopper countries, this sector has not
(yet ?) beca~ a basis for resource based industrialization.
Ttie present paper is intended as a review of evidenoe both of the
facts and of the explanations of these facts as given in the litera-
ture:
- A review of the past tsends by analysing statistical time series.
Up to and including the refining stage, statistics are ca~lete
and detailed. For semi-manufactures, however, the data are limited
and inocxnplete and sometimes they oover only a short time span.
- A critical review of the available literature that tries to ex-
plain why things ha~ as they did happen. For the mining and
metallurgical sect~or the literature is rather extensive, but for
semi-fabrication this is not the case.
Apart from serving as a data base on the international oopper indus-
try, the objectiv~e of this paper is to get an overview of the state
of the art in the analysis of factors that dete~tttine the location of
production of copper setnis in (copper producing) developing countries.
Such an overview seems particularly useful in identifying the factors
1) C~ieronik S.R.: "Cipec and Semis", in Metal Bulletin, Special is-
sue on capper, 1974-3-
that have to be investigated m~re intensively.
The paper follows the four phenanena that have been observed above.
As regards the first pherianenon - the traditional role of the copper
countries - care will be taken to deal with this subject only to the
extent that it is relevant for the fabrication of semis. The structu-
re of the izidustry and the relations between host gov~err~anents arrl
multinationals in the oopper industry, are relevant for the location
of the fabrication of c~pper. Besides, smelting and refining are
frans of processing a raw material. Factors influencing their location
in producer countries could therefore be of sane relevance for the
local processing of semi-n~nufactures. Subsequently, in the third
Chapter, attention will be given to the fabrication of oopper semis,
starting with the (changing) characteristics of the international se-
mis sector. iiowever, the e~hasis here will be on the increa.se of re-
fined oonsu~tion and the consequexlt rapid growth of the semis sector
in a nim~ber of developing oountries. The fourth Chapter deals with in-
ternational trade in wpper and copper alloy semis. Not only the in-
dustrialized oountries are in~ortant markets. ~ere is also a signifi-
cant long-dístance trade fran industrialized oowztries to developing
ones. It seems highly relevant to analyse the magnitude and oa~q~osi-
tion of this trade. Besides, an atte~t will be macie to describe the
(recent) developments in the exports of oopper semis fran developing
cotmtries .
In the final Chapter the threacls of the ax~gLSnent are being brought to-
gether and sane additional points are being added while addressing
squarely the question of the still ve~.y limited degree of processing




Over tt~e past 10 to 15 years the developing countries have increased
their share in the world copper mining output, particularly when re-
lated to the production of the market ewncmies. This happened in the
context of a general slow-dawn in the e~sion of production, and it
was acoa~anied by significant shifts in the geographical distribut-
ion of production. The phencmena can be explained by changes in the
relations between host countries and foreign oa~aanies, changed prac-
tices in the financing of mining ventures and - not unrelated to the
other two factors - changes in the structure of the international mi-
ning sector.
I.1 The geographical distribution of production
The world mine production of oopper (in terms of C1i-content) increased
from twn and a half million tons in 1950 to eight and a quarter mil-
lion tons in 1983. Over the long run (1950-1980) 1) the average annual
growt-h rate was just over 4 per cent per year. Fiow~ever, the grawth
rate has declined over time. In the fifties, world production increas-
ed at a rate of over 5 per cent per year and in the seventies the
growth rate averaged 2.5 per cent per year. Besides, the rate of growth
in the Centrally Planned Eoonanies (CPE) has been about double the
gsr~wth rate in the market econanies (Table 1).
Within the group of the market econanies 2) there have been i~ortant
and interesting discrepancies between the grawth rates ín the develop-
ed market eoonomies (I~E) and the developing oountries (LDC) (Table
2) .
1) Figures for 1950, 1960, etc., are three year averages for 1949-
1951, 1959-1961, etc.
2) Only very little attention is being given to the Centrally Planned
Economies, because they are nat integrated in the '~rld market"
of the market eoonanies-5-
TAHLE: 1
Growth rates of world cop~per mine production (1950-1980) and production
in 1983 (x 1,000 tons)
1950-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1983
World 5.2 4.3 2.5 8,255
CPE 9.6 7.1 4.0 2,010
ME 4.5 3.7 2.1 6,245
Source: Statistical Annex, Tables l.l, 1.2 and 1.3
In the nineteen fifties production in the developing countries expanded
very rapidly, at a rate of almost 6 per cent per year, almost double
the qrrx~th rate realized in the industrialized countries. In the sixties
the situation reversed. On average, production increased much faster in
the developed market econanies than in ttbe developing oountries. In the
seventies and early eighties, the situation changed drastically, back
to the pattern of the fifties and mr~re than that. While in the indus-
trialized countries the production of the copper mines stagnated and in
the 2arly eighties even declined, production in the developing countries
increased at rates of 3 to 4 per cent per year.
~rr~r3s.~: z
Grawth rates of copper mine production in t}be market econanies (1950-
198q and roduction in 1983 (x 1,000 tons)
1950-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1983
ME 4.5 3.7 2.1 6,245
DME 3.1 4.3 0.7 2,513
I,DC 5.9 2.7 3.6 3,732
As a oonsequence of the divergent growth rates, the share of the deve-
loping oountries in the copper mine production of the market eoananies
has been going up, down and markedly up again over the past c1ecades.
1) Throughout this paper, tons means metric tons-6-
Around 1950 the share of the developing countries was at a level of 45
per cent (Table 3), but increasing and passinq the fifty per cent mark
around 1960. In the sixties, their share drop~ped to cv~ll below 50 per
cent again, but in the seventies the situation changed appreciably and
in the world economic crisis of the eighties even drastically: in 1983
the share of the developing oountries reached the 60 per cent level.
The developing countries are, more than ever before, the major pro-
ducers and suppliers of oopper ore in the market econanies.
TABLE 3
F~r:entage shares of developin countries and develo market economies
in the mine ro~iuction of the market ecc~nomies
Developing oountries Dev~eloped Market Economies ~
1950 45 55
1960 52 48
1970 47 53 ~
1980 54 46
1983 60 40
The declining share of the developed mzrket econanies over the long
run, is ocmpletely due to the stagnation and recently even the de-
creasing production in the Unit.ed States of America. The share of the
USA in the production of the market econcmies clropped fran 35 per cent
in 1950 to less than 17 per cent in 1983. In the fifties the declíning
share of the USA oould partly be ca~ensated by a rapid growth of pro-
duction in some other countries, particularly in Australia. In the
sixties production increased again fairly rapidly in the USA and very
rapídly in South Africa. Consec~iently the share of the industrialized
countries increased. In the seventies and early eighties, neither
South Africa nor Australia oould oa~ensate for the declining produc-
tion in the USA.
The increasing share of the developing oountries wer the long run, is
due to a more than average e~ansion of production in Chile and Peru,-7-
and in Mexico in the seventies, while Indonesia, the Philippines and
Papua New Guinea - starting from (a]most) 2eró - became i~ortant
producers in recent years. The share of Chile and P~eru in the pro-
duction of the market ecor~ues increased fran a]most 18 per cent in
1950 to more than 25 per cent in 1983 and the share of Indonesia,
the Philippines and Papua New (~uneea reached a level of more than 8
per cent in 1983. However, marked differences in performance during
this period can be observed. This hr~lds particularly true for Africa
(Zambia, Záire) on the one hand and Latin America (Chile, Peru) on
the other.
In the nineteen fifties production expanded (relatively) rapidly in
Africa, particularly in Zambia. Since then production grr~wth in Zam-
bia has been (far) below average. Consequently the sharn of develop-
ing Africa in mine production has first increased from 21 per cent
in 1950 to 26 per cent in 1960 and subsequently decreased to 19 per
cent in 1983.
The share of Latin America in the mine production of the market eco-
nomies oscíllated around 20 per cent in the fifties and sixties. In
the early seventies, production started to grow very rapidly in Chile
(post-Allende period). Consequently the share of Iatin America has
reached almost 30 per cent in 1983. With an output of one and a c3uar-
ter million tons, Chile has - with a share of 20 per cent in the pro-
duction of the market economies - become the largest oopper producing
country in the world with more production than the USA or the USSR.
I.2 Nationalization, changing structure and accotnmdation
A preoondition for a lasting large share of the developing countries
in the wnrld copper production is to have a oorresponding share of
reserves that can be exploited at oo~etitive costs. The available es-
timates of exploitable reserves vary acoorc3ing to the definitions
used and the long-run price that is being assumed. Hawever, se[ne re-
cent estimates indicate that the share of the developing countries in
the reserves of the market economies is in the order of magnitude of-8-
two thirds 1). Despite the uncertainties inwlved, it seems therefore
clear that even the present high share of the developing oountries in
mine production (60 per cerit) is in line with their share in reserves.
Besides, one has to take into account that the territories of the in-
dustrialized oountries have been explored more intensively than the
developing aountries.
F~cploitable reserves can range frrxn rather marginal ones to ore bo-
dies that can be exploited at low cost. i~awever, information on costs
of production is very limited, based on different assumptions and re-
lative cost positions of oountries seem to change appreciably over
time 2). It is certain, however, that many of the high cost producers
are to be found in the developed oountries. Without regard to the
costs of production, it is impossible to understand two of the major
phenanena in the recent changes in the location of copper mine pro-
duction: the almost continuously declining share of the USA and the
rapidly increasing share of Chile since the early seventies. The USA
is a high cost producer. Without protection and~or subsidies, many of
the mines caru~ot oarg~ete with inq~orts. Chile is a low cost producer,
with presently perhaps (apart frotn Bougainville ?) the lowest product-
ion costs in the w~rld. The ore grades and the geological conditions
are major detenninants of the costs of production.
Ttbe case of Chile, with a declining share in production in the fif-
ties and sixties, indicates, however, that low production costs are -
at least in a developing country - not a sufficient condition for a
high and increasing share in world production. The country has to be
considered a reliable supplier and must have good relations with the
major private oa~anies in the industry. In other ~rds: given the
1) Deduced frcm Gluschke, W., J. Shaw and B. Varon: "Copper: the next
fifteen vears", Fei~3e1, ?-TOllanrl, 1979, n. ?nCIi1 anri Mikesell, p.:
"The World Copper Industsy", Johns Hopkins, Balturore, 1979, p. 12
2) Mikesell, R.: "The World Copper Industry; structure and eoonomic
analysis", Johns iiopkins, Baltitrore, 1979, p. 122-124; Resources
Policy, March 1984, p. 21-22. The exchange rate policy of a oountry
s~~ns very import.ant in this respect, because in oost estimates ap-
pax~ently no adjustments are made for overvalued currencies-9-
reserves and costs of roduction, the structure of the sector arxi
the relation of the develo ing country concezzied with foreign private
mining ies are decisive for the level and r~te of graath of
production in that country.
Structure of the sector
The structure of the world market for refined oapper (the major inter-
nationally traded product) has in 1980 been characterized as a"hccm-
geneous oligopoly with a large ~etitive fringe" 1). ~re has not
always been such a"large oo~q~etitive fringe". Until around 1950 the
industry was dominated by seven North American and ~.an ca~anies:
Kenneoott and Anaconda (both active in Chile), Phelps Dodge, the Rnan-
Am~erican Metal Groups and Anglo American in Zambia (Northern Rhode-
sia), Union Minière in Zaire (Belgian Congo), arbd International Nickel
of Canada. These coa~panies are, apart fran International Nickel, real
"copper ocxnpanies" and together they produce at that time around 70
per cent of the mine production of the market econ,anies 2).
The position of the established oligopolists was - arr3 this started
already before the Second World War - being threatened by the disoo-
very of ore bodies in several places in the world artid by the "lure of
profits similar to the 40g per year realized by Kennecott in Chile"3).
The oligopolists defended their positions in several ways, one of thesn
being a strategy of low refined copper prices and another one a fon.rard
integration into the fabricatíon stage. The first strategy is most
clearly observed in the period 1964-1966 when low producer prices pre-
vail througout tY~e Western World. These low prices were an atte~t to
counteract tendencies towards backwand integration by oopper fabrica-
1) Labys, W.: "Market Structure, Bargaining Pr~wer, arxi Resource Price
Fbrmation", Lexington Books, I.exington, 1980, p. 87
2) Moran, Th.: "Copper in Chile", Pririceton University Press, Prince-
ton, 1974, p. 30
3) Nbran, op.cit., 1974, p. 29-lo-
tors. Fá~.~ver, this policy met with heavy resistance frcm developing
oopper countries (particularly Chile) and had to be abar~ned after
a short while 1).
Already in the nineteen twenties Anaconda and Kennecott embarked on
a strategy of forward integratio~n. "In the United States, the same
pattern was repeated by Phelps Dodge, American gnelting and Refining,
and Cerro; in Canada, by Noranda; in Europe by the Un.ion Minière-So-
ciété General du Belgique C~oup; and in Japan most prominently by Su-
mitam, Mitsubishi, and Nippon" 2). In the United States at least,
policies of forward integration were not vigorously continued after
1945. This was partly due to the anti-trust policy of the government.
Besides, and this factor has trore general validity, "the technologies
associated with the fabrication and manufacturn of copper Products be-
came standardized" 3). The number of more or less independent fabri-
cators increased.
~ defensive policies of the traditional oligopolists were not oom-
pletely successful and the factors working towards a dilution of the
copper oligopoly daninated. The five major factors at work in the
fifties and sixties have been listed by hbran 4):
- The, already mentioned, discovery of large new sources of copper
in the Americas, Africa, Asia and Australia.
- The stitnulation of production by c~vexnments of industrialized
countries. The USA started such measures in the forties and Ja-
pan and West Germany in the fifties. The subsidies served as fi-
nance capital for small and new ventures.
- Backward integration by smelters, refiners and fabricators. This
applies both to American, European and Japanese coir~ariies.
- The willingness of fabricators and cons~rs of copper to finance
the growth of new (small) copper mines and be paid back in copper
output. Not only Japanese but also German firms have been very ac-
tive in financing new mines.
1) Producer prices have persisted much longer in the USA, but the de-
viatíons from the LME-prices have been more limited
2) Moran, op.cit., 1974, p. 38-39
3) Mardones, J.L.; E. Silva and Ch. Martinez: "The copper and alumi-
nium industries", in Resources Policy, March 1985
4) Nbran, op.cit., 1974, p. 32-37-11-
- Horizontal diversification of natural resource oatq~anies into
copper.
Nationalizations
The four large oopper exporting developing oountries wholly or part-
ly nationalized the oopper industry in their oountries. In 1967 Za-
ire nationalized the properties of Union Minière du Haute Katanga.
In 1969 Chile nationalized the large mines of Anaoonda for 51 per
cent and announced plans to nationalize Kennecotts' E1 Teniente mine.
In 1971, under President Allende, all large Chilean oopper companies
were nationalized, including a 70 per cent subsidiary of Cerro Corpo-
ration. In 1969 Anglo American and Amax were irivited to transfer 51
per cent of the shares of their Zambian subsidiaries to the state.
The partial nationalization in Peru Hras quite ocnq~licated. The pro-
cess was started by the new rewlutionary government in 1968. Major
events w~ere the state monopolization of all refining and marketing
activities in 1971 and the final agreetnent regarding the take~ver
of several ocnq~anies, including Cerro de Pasco from Cerro Corporation
in 1974.
The developing copper producing oountries had the intention to becane
the daiunant force in the wr~rld oopper industry. Zb this erd they al-
so established CIPDC (the "Conseil Intergouvernmental des Pays Ex-
portateur de Cuivre") Chile, Peru, Zambia and Za3re foxmed CIPEC in
1967 1). The objective of the organization was (and is) essentially
to co~rdinate the price and production policies of the memUers. In
the early seventies it uras obvious that CIPEC could never becane as
pawerful as OPEC, not even temporarily, but the oountries thanselves
had at that time the aspiration of beoaning a strong oountervailing
poyaer vis à vis the private oligopolists.
Al.ready around 1960 it vras evident that the Latin American copper
oountries not only vTanted a larger share of the profits resulting
1) Later on Indonesia and Papua New C~inea joined CIPDC-12-
fran oopper exploitation, but that the pressure for indigenous parti-
cipation in the local subsidiaries of the copper multinationals was
likely to increase. By the time of irtidependence of the African cop-
per countries, the threat of natíonalization (not only in Africa but
also in Latin America) became obvious to all the Western cor~anies.
With the expectation of a continued rapid increase in world copper
demand as an additional i~etus, these oa~anies started a massive
search for diversification of the sources of supply. Both the fabri-
cators and gavernm~azts of oonsumer oountries (among them the Federal
Republic of Gercnany, France arri Japan) became more interested in "se-
cure" sources of supply. On ti~e one hand they turned to the mineral-
rich industrialized oountries and on the other hand to developing
oountries that wese oonsídered less of a political risk. As a result
of this diversification strategy the share of the developed countries
in the production of the market econrxnies increased substantially in
the sixties. Production expanded very rapidly in South Africa with an
annual average grawth rate over the decade of almost 11 per cent.
Above average graath rates wexe also reooí~ded in the USA, in Canada
and in Australia. Outside the traditional o~pper exporting developing
oountries, production and exports exparr3ed very rapidly in the Philip-
pines. D~e to time lags between initiation of a project and actual
production, Indonesia and Papua New G~inea became only itt~ortant pro-
ducers in the seventies. For the nineteen sixties it is striking
that the decline in the share of the developing countries was can-
pletely concentrated in the four original mr~nbers of CIPDC: Chile,
Peru, Zambia and Zaire; their share declined from 44 per cent in
1960 to 39 per cent in 1970. Besides, the share of Peru, the oountry
that follawed the most modest course in nationalization, did not de-
cline. The nationalization measures taken by Chile, Zambia and Zaire
and the subseguent reaction from the Western oligopolists are evi-
dently the major explanation for the relative stagnation of product-
ion in these countries in the sixties.-13-
Referring to atte~ts to use the "monopoly power" of CIPDC, Nbran
expected that the new 'independents' - when oontinuing their poli-
cies of aroimd 1970 - would make thanselves to suppliers of last re-
sort. The major reason being given is that "there has been a trencl
for major constmiers to try to oaver the bulk of their needs fran
the s~i-integrated system of wrporate producers as fast as the
ca~anies can expand output, while treating the CIPDC prodwction
more and more like a spill-aver market. In this way, by the end of
the decade the CIPEC share oould be less than 30~ of wr~rld product-
ion" 1).
Aaoanmdation
Actual develoFcnents were contrary to this pessimistic autlook: the
share of the developing oountries in the production of the market
eoonomies increased fran 47 per cent in 1970 to 60 per cent in 1983.
Zb avoid any misurxierstanding, the actual developments were certain-
ly not excluded by Nloran. Nbre than 12 years ago he formulated the
precondition for this to happen: "It rec~~iras, in effect, joining
the oligopoly and playing according to its rules" 2). This is essen-
tially what happened arr3 what explains the trore thans average pro-
duction grawth in the developing oountries over the past 10 to 15
years.
In the nineteen seventies the private oligopolists regained a posi-
tion of strength vis á vis the govertur~e.nts and state oa~anies of
the developing oountries. The structure of the sector o~ntinued to
change. Mineral projects are - starting around 1965 - being financed
in different ways. There has been a tendency taaards de-nationalizat-
ion. The governments of developing oountries have been accc~nrodating
the private oligopolists. tiawever, whe-n reviewing these ~a,
it must be kept in mind that the oopper market has been depressed
since 1979. Lo~w prices arid stagnating demarxi have considerably weaken-
1) Nbran, op.cit., 1974, p. 239
2) Moran, op.cit., 1974, p. 242-19-
ed the econcmic and financial position of the exporting countries,
particularly those heavily depeix3ent on copper, like Zaire and Zambia.
Bec~ ,ause of stagnating oonsisnption, many copper mining projects have
been shelved or postponed. In 1973-1975 this was the case with 25 pro-
jects. "This backlog of potential new sites obviously weakens the po-
sition of any single developing country trying to attract foreign in-
vestment on favourable terms" 1).
The major factors explaining the strengthened position of the private
oligopolists, appear to be:
1) Horizontal diversification, resulting in widely diversified na-
tural resources ca~anies. Particularly after 1974 (higher oil
prices) large oil oompanies have been taking over hard-mi.rierals
ca~anies. For instance : Atlantic Richfield buys Anaconda and
Sohio takes ov~er Kenneoott, while Socal aoquires a 20 per cent
share in Amax. This tendency was strongest in the USA: seven of
the ten major oopper prociucing o~anies were aoquired by oil-re-
lated ~anies ~) These mergers and takebvers have greatly
strengthened the financial positions of the liquidity-starved
haí~r]-minerals ooRqaanies .
2) Mutual linkages between the private olic~polists of the copper
sector have strengthened their individual and oollective posi-
tions in the world market. It is mt rnusual that cot~anies hold
small amounts of each others' shares 3) . Asarco, for exa~le, awn.s
or has owned a share, varying between 5 and 10~ of the outstanding
shares in Anaoonda, Kennecott and Cerro. Phelps Dodge to give an-
other exanq~le, owns 3.5 per cent of the l~nax shares 4f. Besides,
interlcoking directorates seem to oocur rather frequently in the
copper industry 5). In this way the ca~anies are at least better
informed reqarding the actions of their coitq~etitors. It also hap-
pens quite often that ar~q~anies supply loan capital to each other.
1) United Nations, Centre on transnational oorporations: "Transnati-
onal corporations in the cop~x industry", New York, 1981, p. 62
2) Resources Policy, March 1984, p. 26
3) Becker, D.: "The new bourgeoisie and the limits of dependency",
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1983, p. 76
4) Mezqer, D.: "Copper in the world econany", Heinemann, I,ondon,
1980, p. 175
5) Becker, op.cit., 1983, p. 77; Mikdashi, Z.: "The international po-
litics of natural resources", Cornell University Press, Ithaca,
1976, p. 94-ls-
Finally, through sales agency agreements ocmpanies can assure
themselves of market outlets through other oligopolists in the
business: Asarco markets part of the production of Duval and
the share of NeFmnnt in the production of Southern Peru is being
sold by Amax 1) ; Anglo AmPxican sells a oertain atrow'it of copper
that has been refined by Amax 2).
3) New mining ventures, both inside and outside developing oountries,
have increasingly been undertaken as joint ventures of two or
more private corporations. Joint ventures are an e~ccellent device
to spread financial risks, which have increased with the scale of
mi.ning operations. In most cases, one large integrated mining
cc~any takes the lead in a joint venture~oonsortiun. But smaller
mining coRipanies, custan refiners and fabricators also partici-
pate in such ventures. Besides, refiners and fabricators also
"participate" in such projects through long-term sales oontracts3).
The phencmenon of joint ventures~oonsortia means that groups are
being formed of central oligopolists and firms fran the "ocxrg~eti-
tive fringe". 7.bgether in one project, they form a pawerful enti-
ty with respect to technical and managerial knaw how, finance,
processing and marketing.
4) The formation of joint ventures~oonsortia of producers has been
stimulated by changes, since about 1965, in the financing of min-
i,ng projects. There has been a shift from ec~ui.ty financing to
debt financing and frcan oc~aany financing to project financing 4) .
Large mineral projects are nawadays usually being financed by a
consortium of banks. In the financing package are nortnally also
included suppliers credits and custaners credits, the latter
linked to long-term oontracts. The financing oonsortitan can have
much influence on a mining project 5). ~vo conditions usually be-
ing stipulated are: long-term sales oontracts for the bulk of
pmduction and the participation in the project of an experienoed
international mining ocag~any 6). Particularly ths latter oondit-
ion can enhance greatly the position of the carg:anies qualifying
as such.
1) Becker, op.cit., 1983, p. 77
2) Mezger, op.cit., 1980, p. 174
3) Becker, op.cit., 1983, p. 77; see also United Nations, op.cit.,
1981, p. 47, arid Mezger, op.cit., 1980, p. 173-181
4) United Nations, op.cit., 1981, p. 38 and 47-49; Radetzki, M.:
"Has political risk scared mineral investment away from the de-
posits in developing countries ?", in World Develogre.nt, Vo1.10,
No. 1, 1982, p. 46
5) See e.g. Mezger, op.cit., 1980, p. 12o-142
6) Mi.kesell, op.cit., 1979, p. 254-255-16-
With the strengthening of the position of the private oligopolists,
the position of the developing oountries with regard to national con-
trol over their ooppex industry has w~eakened in a situation of a con-
tinously depressed oopper market since 1974. In the developing count-
ries, there has been a tendency tawards de-natíonalization. In the
"new" copper oountries - mainly Irrionesia, the Philippines and Papua
New ~inea - the national interest in the mining ventures (through
private investors or state enterprises) - is typically at a level of
between twenty and sixty per cent of equity. In the "old" copper
oountries, new projects have been started by foreign oo~anies in
Chile, Peru and Za3re 1). In Chile the foreign irivestment law of
1975 permitted 100 per cent foreign ownership of new mines; E~ocon ac-
quired the Disputada Mine and Anaconda the Los Palambres. In Peru
the oonsortium Southern Peru (Asaroo, Phelps Dodge, Newm~nt, Cerro
and Billiton) has developed th~e C~ajone mine and is by far the larg-
est producer in the oountry. "Thus, the industry has ewlved fran fo-
reign awnership through partial or ocaiplete nationalization to one
of sharerï control" 2 ) .
Starting frcm the wea)mess(es) of the developing countries, a major
reason given in the literature for the acoanrodation ("shared oon-
trol") of the private oligopolists is that the state enterprises of
the developing countries are not able to exparri capacity (develop
new mines) without foreign participation 3). May be this argument
holds true for most developing countries, but it does not seem to
have general validity for the Latin American countries. One of the
major theses of Becker is that Minero Peru has the technical oo~npe-
tence to develop new mines 4). Besides, state ca~anies in Brazil
and Mexioo have succ.~essfully developed new large scale mines without
any foreign equity participation 5).
1) May be it is even more illustrating that in all plans for major
new ventures (most of which have been shelved) the private oligo-
polists were heavily invr~lved, not only as project managers, but
also with equity participation
2) Labys, op.cit., 1980, p. 97
3) Fbr instance by Labys, op.cit., 1980, p. 98
4) Becker, op.cit., 1983
5) Radetzki, op.cit., 1982, p. 43-17-
A more general factor weakening the posítion of developing countries
and their state oong~anies wer the past 10 to 12 years, has been the
depressed copper market, causing losses (or very low returns) for tire
state oa~anies and declining or stagnation export proceeds. "Develop-
ing coimtry governments have probably arrived at a more sober assess-
ment of the benefits which nationalization of mineral assets can
bring: it does not bring them, for example, an automatic flow of pro-
fits to finance re-investment" 1). F~1.1 ownership can bring in hand-
scme profits at times of a thriving oopper mzrket, but in a depression
the state also has to suffer all the losses. Major expansions of exist-
ing mines, let alone the developnent of new ones, oould rr~t be finan-
ced by the state caig~anies nor by the treasuries of the developing
countries ooncerned.
The most general reason for the failure of the natiomalization-ctan-
CIPDC strategy of the sixties and early seventies, is that the state
ccx~anies had to becane "good" oligopolists. A relaxation of prevail-
ing financial constraints in the years to cotne would not change this
basic pre-requisite. In the prevailing structure of the world copper
industry there is no place for state oligopolists that would like to
go it alone 2). Al1 the major private oligopolists, be they vexy old
ones like Kennecott or rather new ones like the Japanese consortium
of Dcxa-a etc. oo~perate quite frequently with each other, but m~st in-
tensively with the "ocx~q~etitive fringe" of the oopper iridustry. The
oligopolistic structure of the industry is such that the interests of
all the participants can be ta}cen care of and that they are respected
by the other parties. Mines need assured outlets for the excess pro-
duction they caruiot refine theniselves. Custom refiners need assured
supplies of blister. Fabricators need assured supplies of refined
eopper. All of them are - inter alia for reasons of ca~etition with
~~ 1) Toye, J.: The recession, the thi.rd w~rld and base metal indus-
tries", in World Develo~anent, Vol. 12, No. 9, 1984, p. 931
2) see Table 1 of the General Annex listing the major caYipanies en-
gaged jSl Cppper mininq-18-
(potential) substitutes - opposed to the "exploitation" of scarcity
situations by means of monopoly-prices.
The practices and customs in the industry have ewlved in such a way
that there are mechanisms permitting each participant to safeguard
his interests. These are the mechanisms of co~peration in projects,
co~n-iination of action and long-term agreements that have briefly
been described above. The ologopolists are and remain ca~etitors,
but they all appreciate the value of the mechanisms to avoid ruinous
ca~q~etition .
The state ca~anies of the developing oountries enjoy the advantage
of easy access to the ore bodies. Therefore they do have the potential
of becoming central, integrated oligop~lists. In order to achieve
this, they will have to build up the reputation of reliable oligopo-
lists. Reliable suppliers, not exploiting scarcities to the limit and
giving private oligopolists the chance to safeguand their interests.
This implies also that they will have to co-bperate with thesn in con-
tractual market arrangements and in projects. In this way the state
cxenpanies oould become h~ealthy and strong oligopolists and in this
sense they would beccRie i[nre independent. However, it F,ould also mean
that they hartily could be distinguished from the private oligopolists
because they have to act in the same way. In this sense they could be
considered less indeper~dent.CHAPTER II
3nelting and refining
9nelting arid refining are usually the first stages in processing cop-
per concentrates 1). 2bgether they form the metallurgical stage of
the copper industry. Over the long run, a sa~what greater share of
mine production of most developing countries goes through the metal-
lurgical stage before being exported. As regards the factors influ-
encing the location of smelting and refining, a distinction is being
made between technical factors and institutio~nal factors. The techni-
cal factors are those inherent in the characteristics of the pm-
ducts, like production costs, value added, specifications, etc.. The
institutional factors are those amenable to hunan action, like txade
protection and the structure of the market.
II.1 Geographical distribution and resulting trade patterns
Geographical distribution
Already around 1950 allmst ninety per cent of the copper ore mined
in the developing countries was being smelted locally. This percen-
tage has remained about oonstant for a large number of years (Table
4) . In the nineteen seventies, haw~ever, the part of the cx~per ore
that is being smelted in the developing oountries of origin, decliried
and reached a level of 77 per cent in 1979~81. At the same time, the
oopper smelter production of the industrial countries reacYred a level
of about 120 per cent of their mine production around 1980 2j.
The recent decline of smelter production in the developing oountries
relative to their mine production is oc~letely due to the fact that
in the seventies Indonesia, the Philippines and Papua New C~xinea be-
1) Only oxyde ores, presently about 5 per cent of total production,
are being leached and not smelted
2) The figures relate to primaYy smelting only; total smelter pro-
duction in the industrialized countries is about lOg higher, be-
cause of secundazy smelting of scrap-zo-
TABI.E 4
Srnelter production as percentage of mine production in devel ing
oountries (LDC), developed market econcmies (I~hIE) and market eco-
nr,xnies (ME)
1949~51 1959~61 1969~71 1979~81
7~C 89 89 86 77
L1ME 110 110 111 119
ME 100 99 99 97
Source: Tables 1.1 arrï 2.1 of the Statistical Annex
came imgortant ore producers, while around 1980 still no smelting
(nor refining) is taking place in these countries 1). Ebccluding these
countries, 91 per cent of the muie production is being s-~nelted in the
other producing countries in 1979~81.
As regards the industrialized oountries, the tsao most i~ortant facts
are a stagnation and subsequently a decline of smelting in North Ame-
rica and a spectacular increase in Japan. In North America (Canada
plus USA) over 100~ of the mine production was still being smelted in
1959~61 and in 1979~81 this percentage had declined to just over 80~,
mainly because of exports of ooncentrates from (Western) Cana~da. In
Japan, with a negligible mine production, primary stnelting increased
very rapidly in the sixties and, despite a more modest growth in the
seventies, approached a level of one million tons in the early eight-
ies 2).
Over the long run, the pmduction of refined oopper has been growing
m~re rapidly in the developing oountries than their mi.ne production
of oopper ore. In the period 1949~51 to 1979~81, the production of
ore increased at an average annual rate of 4.1~ and the production
1) In 1983 both smelting and refining was started in the Philippenes;
provisional figures indicate that production reached a level of
100,000 tons in 1984
2) For details see Table 2.3 of the Statistical Annex-21-
of refined at a rate of 4.9~ 1). Consequently, refined production as
a percentage of ore production increased frcm 52~ in 1950 to 60~ in
1980. I~owever, first refined production declined slighty relative to
mine production in the nineteen fifties. In the sixties refined pro-
duction as a percentage of mine production increased vigorously,
fran almost 50~ in 1960 to almost 608 in 1970. In the seventies the
last mentioned percentage ranaíned about constant (Table 5).
This simple picture is, hawever, ooi~licated by twr~ fact,ors: seconda-
ry refining and primaxy refining in nonbre producing developing
countries and secondly by the fact that the "new" oopper countries -
Indonesia, the Philippines and Papua New C~inea - do not (yet) have
any refining capacity around 1980.
TABLE 5
Production of refined copper in developing countries as percentage of
mine production
Refined prod. as per- Idetn ( 1) adjustetl Idem ( 2) adjus
centage of mine prod. for seooixjaiy and for Irx~nesia,
nonbre prod.oounts hilippines and
(1) (2) Papua New G. (3)
1949~51 52 52 52
1959~61 49 49 49
1969~71 59 58 62
1979~81 60 55 65
Source: Statistical Annex
In the nineteen seventies primazy refining gained scme importance in
South Korea and TaiGran (over 100,000 tons aroiuid 1980) while seoonda
ry refining (fzczn scrap) was started in Brazil and Mexioo. Taking
these factors into acoount, refined production as a percentage of
1) Statistical Annex, Tables 1.3 and 3.3-22-
mine production declined frrxn 58~ to 55~ in the seventies (Table 5).
In the traditional oopper c~untries, however, the level of refining
increased in the seventies, but the increase was tmich m~re limited
than in the sixties.
As with smelting, the situation in the industrial countries is the
in reverse picture of the one in the developing countries. Around
1980 the production of primary refined copper is at a level of 140~
of the mine production.
In E.~rope there is a wide discrepancy between mine production and
primaYy refined production. In 1979~81 primaiy refined production
(a]most 950,000 tons) was more than three times as high as mine pro-
duction. Belgium and The Federal Republic of C~ny are the most im-
portant producers (together 60~ of the total).
In North America the production of primary refined copper increased
at a very modest rate in the nineteen sixties and stagnated ocxnple-
tely during the seventies. In the early eighties the production de-
clined by a]most 400,000 tons. In 1979~81 primasy refined production
was at a level of only 90 per cent of mine pn~duction, while it was
still equal to mine production in 1969~71. This developnent is large-
ly due to declining primary refining in Canada.
Like in the case of smelting, Japan has been the decisive factor in
the developments of the last decades. In 1959~61 primary refined
production from i~rts was less than 100,000 tons. In 1969~71 this
figure had increased to 450,000 tons and in 1979~81 to aLrost 850,000
tons. The relative stagnation of refining in the developing countries
in the seventies is for a large part due to the continued rapid in-
crease of primary refining in Japan 1).
ZYade--~atterns
Frrm the readily available statistícs it is riot possible to draw up
a ooa~lete and oonsistent picture of the international trade flows
1) Also in South Africa refined production increased rapidly in the
seventies (7.58 per year or 80,000 tons ov~er the decade)-23-
that matches the picture of the international allocation of oopper
production. There is a problem of more or less significant discre-
pancies between imports and exports of the market ecorxmies within
the same categories of products 1). Iraoking at the situation around
1980 (1979~81) the divergence between total exports arxi i~orts is
limited to 5 per cent (Table 6). Pbr "blister and anode copper",
1-iowever, the discrepancy is significant.
TABLE 6
F~~orts and imports of the market econcmies in 197~~81 (x 1,000 me-
tric tons)
E~cports Imports
Ores and ooncentrates 1,322.0 1,228.0
Blister and anode
copper 748.4 559.2
Refine3 oopper 2,778.3 2,816.6
4,848.7 4,603.8
Source: Statistical Annex, Tables 5, 6 and 7; figures for ores arrl
oonoentrates are in C~-oontent
The major shortcoming of the statistics is most probably that too
small a number of countries are being cavered in the statistics. The
export side seems generally more ccx~lete than tk~e it~ort side and
this is particularly true for "ores and concentrates" arr3 "blister
and anode copper". In these cases, a]nast all exports are being co-
vered when one adds up the list of "oopper countries". With a very
short list of importing countries, one probably averlooks part of
1) Fbr the centrally planned econcmies data are available on East~
West trade in refiried oopper; sirbce these i~orts and exports
are not far apart, exclusion of these trade flaws redresses the
divergence only to a limited extent-24-
the imports 1). Because of these arr3 possible other shortcanings,
th~e statistics should be interpreted with care. Nevertheless, they
are oonsidered guod enough to provide a general understanding of the
global picture.
Of the total exports of tmre than 4.8 million tons, 65 per cent ori-
ginates in the developing countries and only 35 per cent in the in-
dustrialized oountries.
24~e international orientation of the oopper industry is once more de-
monstrated by the fact that the total exports of 4.8 million tons
are equivalent to 78~ of the mine production of the market eooncmies or
to 68g of their refined production (including secondary refined). Hoca-
ever, the oopper sector is much more outward oriented in the develop-
ing oountries than in the irtidustrialized countries. In 1979~81 the
total exports of the developing oountries are egual to 94 per cent
of their mine pmduction, while in the irr3ustrial countries the ex-
ports are only equivalent to one third of their refined production 2).
Another difference between developed and developing oountries is the
oa~osition of their exports (Table 7). Fbr both groups of countries
the exports of concentrates are relatively at about the same level;
in both ca.ses these exports are just under 30 per oent of total oop-
per exports. The major difference is to be found in the categories of
blister on the one hand and refined oopper on the other. The e~orts
of blister of the developed countries are altmst negligible (5~ of
the total) and oonsequently 65 per cent of the exports consists of
refined oopper. Fbr the developing countries m~re than 20 per cent
of total exports oonsists of blister and only just over 50 per cent
is exported in the form of refined copper.
In the absence of matrices for trade in oopper, the best we can do to
1) Inclusion of the i~orts of the centrally planned eo~nanies fran
the market econcmies, could of oourse also help to close the gap;
this oould particularly be the case with respect to ooncentrates
and blister
2) In both cases we relate the exports to the stage with the highest
output-25-
TASI~E 7
E}cports and imports of of the devel ing countries and the de-
veloped countries; averactes for 1979 81 (x 1,000 tons)
Developing countries E~cports Imports Net(minus-export)
Ores and concentrates 822.7 105.9 - 716.8
Blister and anode cop. 622.4 - - 622.4
g,efined copper 1,683.9 309.2 - 1,374.7
Tprpps, 3,169.0 415.1 - 2,753,9 1)
Developed market ~ports imports Net(minus-export,)
Econanies
Ores and conoentrates 499.3 1,122.1 t 622.8
Blister and anode cop. 86.0 559.2 t 473.2
g,efined copper 1,094.4 2,507.4 t 1,413.0
~p~, 1,679.7 4,188.7 t 2,509.0
Source: Statistical Annex
get a global picture of international trade is to calculate the net
exports and net it~orts of respectively the developing oountries as
a group and the developed econcmies as a group (Table 7). In doing
this, it is tempting to think in terc~s of exports as going to the
other group and imports caning fran the other group. In reality this
is of course not the case;exports of one developing country can be
imports of another developing coimtry. Iiowever, for the net position
of a group it does not matter whichever way one looks at the stati-
stics; net exports go out of the group of countries and net i~orts
come into the group.
Table 7 indicates that the developing countries as a group export
roughly 2.5 million tons of copper per year and that the iridustrial
cotmtries i~ort about the same amow'it. A oa~q~arison between the net
1) Around 1980 China inq~orted on average a]irnst 100,000 tons of re-
fined copper per year-26-
exports of the developing countries and their mine production indi-
cates that these oountries around 1980 had reached a consw~tion
level of primary refined copper of about 750,000 tons 1).
II.2 The factors influencing the location of smelting and refinin
'Itao phenomena are to be explained. The first one is the fact that in
the nineteen sixties primary refining as a percentage of mine pro-
ductíon reached a higher level in the developing o~untries (roughly
frotn 50~ to 60g) but that this increase stagnated in the seventies.
The second and major issue is the fact that in the developing count-
ries copper smelting has for many years been at a much higher level
than copper refining; already around 1950 about 90 per cent of the
mine production was being smelted locally and only 50 per cent being
refined.
The rapid increase of refining in the sixties and the subseque.nt
stagnation in the seventies is likely to be explained by differences
aver time in the growth rates of mine production and changes in the
relations between developing countries arr3 foreign investors. In the
nineteen sixties mine production in the developing oountries in-
cre.ased very slowly when a~pared with the grawth rates realized in
the fifities (respec,-tively 2.7 and 5.9 per cent per year on average).
Refined production, with long gestation periods to expancl output,
could "catch up" with mine production. The expansion of refining ca-
pacity in the sixties is moreo~ver li}cely to be related to deliberate
policies of developing countries aiming at higher levels of local
processing and this policy could partly succeed due to rather good
host country~investor relationships in the fifties and early sixties,
particularly relevant in the case of Chile 2). In the seventies, haa-
ever, there was a general decline in the growth rate of mine product-
ion, but the grvwth rate in the developing countries accelerated. Re-
1) In Chapter III we return to the subject of copper consurt~tion
2) Fbr the African countries, oolonial rule and the transition to
political indepe~nce was most relevax~t-27-
fining in the developing countries oould on average only just keep
pace with mi.ning, likely due to limi.ted capacity exp~ansion related
to the ger~erally strained relations with foreign oa~anies in the
sixties arid early seventies. Besides, with very low growth rates in
the developed countries, the industry started to suffer fran overca-
pacity. In this situation there was of course handly any roan for
expansion of capacity in the developing oountries.
The díscrepancy in developing oountries between the levels of smelt-
ing and refining deserves - as this is the most striking ~enanerion -
a m~re detailed analysis. Why is there such a substantial difference
between local production of blister copper and refined copper ? In
analysing this question we look for the similarities and differences
between the two products. Besídes, a distinction is made between
technical factors and institutional ones. The relevant technical
factors are the character of the products and the production techno-
logies, the transport oosts and the envirornt~ental impact of product-
ion. The relevant institutional factors are: trade barriers and the
structure of the industry.
The technical factors
The economic characteristics of both the prodwct and the production
technology - henceforth being referred to as the technical factors -
are rather similar for blister and refined oopper. Both blister (98-
99.5 per cent purity) and refined oopper (99.9 per cent purity) are
hr.x~iogeneous products. Fbr refined copper there are different brarlds
with differences in quality. fiowever, there is a"high degree of
substitutability among refined copper in many uses" 1).
The metallurgical processes to fabricate blister and refined copper
are mainly based on freely available starrï?~ized technologies.
Both in smelting and refining significant econcmies of scale can be
realized. A smelter must have a minitmun annual capacity of 40,000
1) Mi.kesell, op.cit., 1979, p. 79-2s-
tons and a refinery of 60,000 tons. A larger scale of production
could reduce production oosts even further. Nawadays econanies of
scale seem to taper off at a capacity level of 100,000 tons per
year, both for a smelter and a refinery 1). 'Ihis means that it would
not be warranted to attach a smelter or refinery to a small mine 2).
Econanies of scale therefore make smelting~refining prohibitive or
questionable in scme developing oountries. This is, for instance,
the case in Indonesia with a present mtne output level of 75,000
tons per year.
Both smelting and refining are capital and energy intensive proces-
ses with a relatively low value added per ton output. Estimates of
some basic data on production o~sts are given in Table 8.
Value added per ton is saresahat higher in smelting than in refíning.
With a refined copper prioe of ~ 1,600 per ton, the value added in
smelting is about 20 per cent and in refining (taking blister as the
base) about 15 per cent. With a higher international copper price,
the relative value added is lower and vice versa 3).
Investments per ton of annual capacity are about three times as high
for smelting as for refining. In case capital intensive production
is considered less suitable for developing countries, refining is,
opposite to the actual situation, a better candidate for location in
a developing country than smelting.
Energy (included in "other costs" in Table 8) is a very important in-
put in both smelting and refining, oonstituting roughly about 25~ of
the total production costs 4) . It is therefore oarmonly aclmawledged
that the availability of cheap energy is an i~ortant locational fac-
tor.
1) Takeuchi, K. and Ch. Ching: "Export-oriented processing of prima-
ry ~rodities in developing countries", World Bank, Sept:ember
1979 (Mimeo), p. 105
2) Assuming, of course, that it is too e.xpensive to derive additional
raw materíals from other (foreign) mines
3) Both Zorn, op.cit., 1985, and RQemer, M.: "Resource-based indus-
trialization in the developing countries", in The Journal of De-
velopnent Econcmics, 6, 1979, set the raw material costs (of con-
centrates) at 60 per oent of the value of refined oopper
4) Zorn, op.cit., 1985, p. 64-29-
TABLE 8
Data on production costs of smelting and refining of copper
S;nelting Refining
Value added per ton ~) S 250 ~ 2Q0
Investment per tc~~n of
annual capacity ) ~ 1,50o-2,000 ~ 40~600
Capital costs in value
added ~`~~) 60 8 35 - 40 ~
I,abour costs in value
added 20 ~ 25 - 30 ~
Other costs in value
added 20 ~ 35 - 40 ~
UNCPP,D: "Processing and marketing of copper: areas for inter-
national co-operation", New York, 1982, p. 56
[7NCPAD, idegn, p. 40
Calculated from Zorn, S.: "Mining and mineral processing in
developing oountries", UNIDO, 1985 (Mimeo), p. 70
Iabour costs in smelting and refining are also in the order of magni-
tude of 25 per cent of total costs (apparently based on production
in a developed country). They are about as it~ort~-uit as the energy
costs. Fíowever, nawhere in the literature it is mentioned that this
factor oould possibly - with high labour efficiency - oonstitute an
advantage for location in a developing country.
So far no significant differences in the technical factors were iden-
tified between smelting and refining of copper. This is n,ot the case
for the transportation costs. Through the smelting process 3 to 4
tons of concentrates are reduced to 1 ton of blister oopper 1),
while the weight reduction in refining is negligible. The resulting
cost saving because of smelting deperrls of oourse on the freight
rates for the different products and the distance. Radetzki estimated
1) Concentrates typically have a C~~ontent of 30 per cent-30-
these savings prior to the increase in oil prices of 1973-74 1).
Based on a reduction in weight of three to one, shipping oosts of
~ 5 per ton and smelting costs of ~ 220 per ton, he calculates a
oost saving of 4.58 of tYee smelting costs. Zorn works with a weight
reduction of 4 to 1(a high ratio), shipping costs of ~ 12 per ton
and (also very high) smelting costs of ~ 440 per ton, resultíng in
a oost savíng relative to smelting oosts of 8.2 per cent. "One
should note, however, that this latter saving may not be realized
in practioe, because of a differential in freight rates which sets
lower chargers for bulk materials like bauxite, altmtina and o~pper
ooncentrate, as oa~ared to metal shapes. There may also be a pos-
sibility that shipping services will be a~railable only from a limit-
ed number of suppliers, especially in the case of cargo liner ser-
vices for handling smelted or refined metal, and that shíppers may
use their monopoly or oligopoly position to capture some of the
transport savings achieVed through processing" 2). On the basis of
these estimates and oonsiderations it may be concluded that savings
on shipping oosts are probably in the order of magnitude of about 7
per cent. This oost saving may oonstitute an inducanent for smelt-
ing of concentrates within the oopper mining developing countries,
but its signi.ficance should nat be exaggerated 3).
There is a secorrl technical differenoe between smelting and refin-
ing. ~nelting is a buiYàen for the environment and refining is not.
The major problem in smelting is air pollution resulting fran the
emission of S02 gases 4j. Could this problem explain the "dumping"
of copper smelting to the developing oountries ? The answer is ne-
1) Radetzki, M.: "Where should developing oountries' minerals be
processed ? The oountry view versus the multinational cor~any
view", in World Development, Vol. 5, 1977, No. 4, p. 327
2) Zorn, op.cit., 1985, 61~62
3) The situation is different when ooncentrates ~,ould have to be
transported over long distances to sea ports like in Zambia and
Za3.re. In that case smelting at the mine-site is about i~era-
tive
4) Mikesell, op.cit., 1979, p. 67-31-
gative. First of all, 90 per cent of the mine production of deve,
loping counties was already smelted locally in 1950, at a time when
there was hardly any awareness of envirorm~ental problems. Besides,
both in E.Urope and Japan normally more than 908 of the S02 gas is
reoovered and oonverted into sulfuric acid that is sold in local
markets 1). May be environmental oonsiderations contribute present-
ly in preventinq the set-up of new production installations. In
E.lirope smeltinq of ores has about remained oonstant over the past
ten years; in Japan the exF~ansion has slowed dawn, particularly
since 1977.
Su~arizing the technical factors, the first general observation is
that the similarities between the eoonomic characteristics of smelt-
ing and refining dominante the differences. The wellkno~m differ-
ence pertains to the saving on transport costs due to smelting of
copper ooncentrates. These savings turn out to be of limited signi-
ficance. On the other hand, refining is sanewi~at more labour inten-
sive than smelting. Also in this case, the induc~nent to locate re-
fining in a developing wuntry because of low wages could only be
of limited significance 2).
The institutional factors
~irning to the institutional factors, the subject of trade barriers
is being dealt with first. In the industrialized countries the ta-
riffs on concentrates, blister and refined oopper are, as might be
expected, generally low and non-tariff barriers are, officially at
1) In the USA S02 is a greater problem for the smelters, because
of the availability of law-cost Frasch-sulfur and higher trans-
port oosts; Mikesell, op.cit., 1979, p. 67~68
2) iiawever, with a share of labour costs in value added of 30g,
wages at a level of one third of a developed countxy and la-
bour efficiency at a level of 50~, the saving on total pmduct-
ion costs would be 10~-32-
least, non-existent. In the EEC the tariffs are zero 1). In the USA
a specific duty still exists of 0.8 US ~ cents per pound both for
concentrates, blister and refined. The tariff will be removed by
1987 as part of the Zbkyo Found líberalization. in the past, haw-
ever, it possibly had an i~aact on the oanposition of the develop-
ing oountries' e.xports, despite a general exe~tion in the frame-
work of the Generalized S~stem of Preferences (GSP). The reason is
that the duties have been applicable to imports fran Chile and Peru,
because these countries passed the ceilings that are part of the
GSP-system of the USA 2j. In Japan the tariff on ooncentrates is ze-
ro, on blister 8.58 and on refined oapper 5.6 per cent 3). This
means effective tariffs of about 50 per cent on blister and of 20-
25 per cent on refined oopper (going frcm concentrates to refined).
Also in Japan the tariffs are in principle suspended for i~orts
fran developing countries. However, in Japan duty free ceilings are
extremely low. In this way the exe~tion under ti~e GSP is meaning-
less 4 ) .
In the industrialized countries non-tariff barriers like qu~ta, etc.
do not exist for ooncentrate, blíster or refined oopper. Hawever,
the less tangible barrier of stimulating smelting and refining in
Japan (and to a smaller degree in West Germany) could be regarded
as such. Particularly in the fifties and sixties Japan stimulated
an engagement of its industry in overseas mining ventures that re-
sulted in the ship~nt of concentrates to the country. With increas-
ing energy and transport costs (oaning on top of environmental oon-
siderations) it was expected that Japan would probably change this
1) Information on tariffs is derived fran UNTC,TAD, op.cit., 1982
2) Kirthisingha, P.: '~liability of processing in oopper~nining
areas", in Resources Pr~licy, Dec~nber 1982, p. 298~299
3) As a result of the Zbkyo ~und, these tariffs will be reduced
to 7.3 arxi 4.9 per cent respectively
4) In 1982, for instanoe, the ceiling for each individual develop-
ing oountry was set at 4,371 tons only for blister and refined
oopper-33-
policy and that at least the metallurgícal stages would be left to
the mining countries 1). May be this is going to happen in the fu-
ture. Presently, how~ever, Japan seems to continue the protection of
its oopper smelting and refining industry, as is indicated by the
very limited tariff reductions in the Tokyo Rourbd.
The incidence of protection of the metallurgical industries in de-
veloping countries, is many times averlooked. I-iowever, "the danestic
market is usually protected from foreign oaiq.ietition by tough quotas
and~or high tariffs. (E~imples include Brazil, South Korea arxi Tai-
wan)" 2). Brazil protects its copper irr3ustry very heavily. I~orts
are only allowed when Caraiba Metais (a high cost integrated operat-
ion with a refining capacity that is 2.5 times its mining capacity)
is unable to meet the demand 3). This is just one example. A syste-
matic overview is not available. fiawever, the extent and degree of
protection in the oopper i~orting developing oountries warrants
more intensive investigation, particularly because these countries
are beco[ning more i~ortant oopper consumers .
The main conclusion with regard to trade barriers is that there is
no significant difference between blister and refined copper. Conse-
qia~ently, trade policies of the importing oountries do not explain
the different levels of smelting and refining in the mineral-export-
ing developing oountries.
Turning next to the institutional factor of the market structure, it
should be noted first that mining oce~anies are generally reluctant
to process minerals locally in developing oountries. Apart frcm pure
cost considerations, the factor always mentioned is tt~ one of poli-
tical risk 4). Another advantage of location of processing in oonsu-
ming oountries, but one that is mentioned less often, is greater
1) See, for exanq~le, Prain, R.: "Copper, the anatomy of an industry",
Mining Journal Books, London, 1975, p. 77
2) Toye, op.cit., 1984, p. 932
3) Copper Studies, March 1984, p. 9
4) See, for instance, Radetzki in World Developme~zt, 1977, p. 329-34-
flexibility due to the possibilitíes of world wide sourcing 1).
Hawever, these factors pertain equally to smelting and refining and
therefore do not oontribute to an explanation of different levels
of smelting and refining in ore producing developing oountries.
The most i~ortant technical difference related to the location of
smelting and refining is, as we have seen, the saving on transport
oosts that is realized in the case of smelting but not in the case
of refining. For Japan this difference has clearly not been import-
ant in the past. For E~rope and the USA, however, it was apparently
of importance 2). Conoentrating on these countries, the problem at
hand must be rephrased as follows. Developing countries would like
to increase the level of local proeessing in order to maximize lo-
cal value added. Frcm the point of view of costs of production,
there is no particular oost advantage of locating refining close to
the mine in developing countries, but also no particular oost disad-
vantage. This being the situation, why are the multinationals in-
volved rather reluctant to locate refining in the producer develop-
ing oountries ? Could they, or a number of them; safeguarci their in-
terests in a situation in which a large part of smelting and a smal-
ler part of refining takes place in the ore producing developing
oountries ?
An already quite sophisticated answer to these questions is being
given by Becker 3). He first states that "no eooncmic incentives
that Third World oountries can provide will suffice to encourage
transnational investment in local refining".
Three reasons are being qiven to explain this state of affairs:
- location at the mine sites is not more efficient than location
close to the major markets;
- much of the refining capacity in the irrlustrial oountries is
fully depreciated already; there is no need for further amorti-
zation;
1) UNIDO: "Transnational oorporations and the pnxessing of raw
materials: inq~act on developing oountries", ID~B~2o9, 1978,p.13
2) In the USA i~orts of blister have declined in recent times
3) Becacer, op.cit., 1983, p. 88-35-
- the mining ocx~aanies do not wish to threaten the custom refiners
with new campetition, because they need t.t~etn to finance new mines.
We do not ounsider this a carq~letely satisfactory answer. The seoond
arg~rnnt is of a"temporary" nature 1). The third argument has only
becare valid rather recently. However, it gives an indication that
in particular the interests of the custan refiners are at stake.
The nine largest custom refiners account for about 25 per cent of
the refinery capacity of the market econanies 2). A major characte-
ristic of these custcm refiners is that they are integrated with fa-
brication (production of semis and cables) 3). Only a part of the
output of the large custan refiners is sold outside the own group
of oompanies.
Zt seems logical tYiat the custan refiners are very reluctant to re-
locate their activities (partly) to ore producing developing count-
ries. When relocating activities to a develaping country, a custa~
refiner ceases to be a custom refiner. The refinery would be attach-
ed to the mine (major mining caripanY) in the developing coimtry. The
custan refiner would lose all the flexibility of world wide sourcing.
In this oonnection it must be kept in mind that traditionally blis-
ter produced in developing countries eould only be sold to large re-
fineries in five oountries 4). The custom refiners have always been
in a strong position in the blister market.
The integration of a custom refiner seems tYye more important when
the refinery originated from backwan3 integration. In these cases
a major reason for integration was security of supply 5). Fbr many
1) However, in this case "t~q~orary" can mean: several decades
2) See Table II of the General Annex; a custan refiner is defined
as a caiqxzny refining blister (or conoentrates) frcm others
3) Becker, op.cit., 1983, p. 74; Radetzki, M.: "Market structure
and bargaining power; a study of three international mineral
markets", in Resources Policy, Jime 1978, p. 118
4) Radetzki, op.cit., 1978, p. 118; recently this situation has
chanqed slightly due to refining in developing countries like
Brazil
5) When integration started primarily fran refining, the resulting
situation becomes the same when later on fabrication beootnes im-
portant within the group of oa~anies-36-
years already, these supplies have been secured by long-term con-
tracts. Besides, the custcm refiners~fabricators could (and can) ma-
nage to get disoounts on tt~e IME-price, thus securing advantages
over fabricators that are integrated with refining 1j.
It seems justified to conclude that it would be disadvantageous for
the integrated custom refiners~fabricators to relocate refining to
the ore producing developing oountries. The supply of blister has
so far been secured by long-term contracts and participation in min-
ing~smelting ventures. There has been no necessity to forego the
cost saving resulting from local smelting.
Could this situation change in the future ? Is Japan willing to
give up smelting and refining of oopper ? Are the custocn refiners~
fabricators in the USA and Western Etit~ope, once their existing in-
stallations beca~ obsolete, going to rely more heavily on refined
oopper oaning fran the developing countries ? In general: are the
industrialized wuntries going to cede to the developing countries
this inciustry with standardized technology ?
Fbr Japan it is a national decision to reduce the capacity of this
polluting and energy-intensive industry 2). The custan refiners in
the USA and Western Ehrope would need econanic incentives to relo-
cate (part of) their refinexy production. Above all, hc~wever, the de-
veloping countries would have to be considered as very reliable sup-
pliers and the Western oa~anies would have to be given the opport-
unity to beocme inwlved in refining in the developing countries in
order to be able to safeguard their interests. In this way the out-
oome could be as expected by Toye: "The base metals industries are
follawing textiles through the 'product cycle' " 3).
1) Becker, op.cit., 1983, p. 118-119
2) On the "Japanese contradiction" see Becker, op.cit., 1983, p.
79-81
3) Zbye, op.cit., 1984, p. 934QiAPTER III
The fabrication of oopper semis in th,e irr3ustrialized countries and
in the developing countries
In the fabricatingindustry unwrought metal is being transformed into
wrought copper products. The fabricating sector is internationally re-
cognized as a separate sector between refining on the one hand and
the manufacturing sector on the other 1). The four major product
groups of the semis sector are wire (incl. wirerocl), plates, sheets
and stríps (rolled products), rods, bars arid sections (~ pro-
ducts) and tubes (extnided or pierced). The most important alloy is
brass (oopper~zinc).
III.1 The geographical distribution of production
The available statistics on production of copper and oapper alloys in
the market eoonomies indicate that total production reached a level
of 9.2 million tons around 1980, but that production declinecl in the
eoorxxnic crisis of the early eighties (Table 9) 2). Besides, according
to these figures, the developing countries increased their share in
fabrication from less than one per cent in 1970 to about 6 per cent
in 1982.
TABLE 9
Production of cor~per semis in the market eoonomies (x 1,000 tons arrl
percentage shares)
1969~71 1979~81 1982
Volume Percentage Volume Percentage Volume Percentage
DME 7,106 99 8,721 95 7,868 94
I.CC 64 1 475 5 497 6
ME 7,170 100 9,196 100 8,365 100
Souree: World Metal Statistics; the final year in the Table is 1982,
because data on production in developing countries for 1983
are not yet available
1) The i~ortant ODC9-fabricators (with those of the USA as the major
exception) are organized in the International 4Vrought Capper Coun-
cíl (IWCC)
2) No data are available for the centrally planned econanies-38-
~I7~e treryds revealed by the statistics on production are correct,
but the absolute level of the figures is wrong and particularly so
for the developing countries. Fbr these countries the figures appear
to be far frcxn oct~g~lete. Consequently their total production and
their share in the production of the market eoonr.xnies are heavily
underenimierated.
Zb get a better picture of the production of copper semis in the de-
veloping oountries, one has to look for an approximate figure. The
basis for this approximation is the fact that all refined oopper
(both primary and sec~mdary refined) is being used (constared) for
the production of semis. Zb t12is tonnage one would have to add the
major part of the direct scrap used. It is estimated that of all
the direct scrap used in the ODCD~ountries, between 25 arr3 35 per
cent is being consianad by foundries. Exact figures are un]Qxxan, haw-
ever. On the other hand, to the figure of refined oonsumption plus
direct scrap used in the production of semis, one would have to add
the tonnage of alloy materials being used. Again, exact figures are
urilcnown, and estimates ocRie up with figures between 20 and 25~ of
the weight of oopper alloy semis. Given these uncertainties, we do
not deduct a tonnage for the direct scrap used by foundries and we
do not add a figure for the use of alloy material in the production
of semis. In the absence of data for the developing countries, the
production of copper and o~pper alloy semis is estimated by adding
ttte oonsUrt~tion (use) of refined oopper and the use of direct scrap.
By ocagaaring Table 9(data on semis production) and Table 10 (esti-
mated semis production), it is shown that, for the iridustrialized
countries at least, the two sets of figures are pretty close.
These data indicate that in 1970 the production of copper and cop-
per alloy semis in the developing oountries was still at the very
low level of 380,000 tons, less than 5 per cent of the production
of the market eoonomtes. In the seventies, Yr~ver, their production
aLrost trebled and reached a level of about 1 million tons. At the
same time, pmduction increased very slowly in the industrialized
countries, on average at a rate of 1.5 per cent per year. 2he equi--39-
TABLE 10
Refined consw~tion plus use of direct scrap in the market eoorianies







1949~51 3,557 97 114 3 3,671 100
1959~61 5,161 97 182 3 5,343 100
1969~71 7,565 95 382 5 7,947 100
1979~81 8,796 90 1,003 10 9,799 100
1982 8,032 88 1,061 12 9,093 100
Source: Statistical Annex
valent growth rate in the developing ooimtries, hawever, was 11 per
cent per year. Consequently, the developing cotmtries increased
their share in the production of the market eooncmies to 10 per
cent around 1980.
The presented figures confirm the fact that the developing count-
ries are the major grawth-market for oopper semis. The markets in
the industrialized oountries seem more or less saturated. The de-
veloping countries, or at least a n~anber of them, are catching up.
Airong the irydustrialized oountries, ~rope has traditionally bec~.n
the most important producing area of copper alloy semis. Its share
in the pr~oduction of the industrialized oountries has over the past
15 years remained about constant at a level of just over 45 per
cent (Table 11). The Federal Republic of Gern~any is the most i~ort-
ant E~ropean producer ootmtry with a production of well over 1 mil-
lion tons per year.
The share of North America in the production of the industrialized
countries declined from 36 per cent around 1970 to 30 per cent in-40-
TABLE 11








~rope 3,287 46 4,004 46 3,772 47
Alorth
America 2,530 36 2,828 32 2,459 30
Japan 1,190 17 1,790 21 1,783 22
Australia 100 1 99 1 89 1
TOTAL 7,107 100 8,721 100 8,103 100
Source: World Metal Statistics
1983. In the USA, the production of oopper semis declined by m~re
than half a million tons between 1977 and 1983. Nevertheless, the
USA still is the largest producer oountry in the world.
In the nineteen seventies, Japan realized the highest growth rate
among the industrialized countries and its production share increas-
ed to 22~ in 1983. Witk a production of 1.8 million tons it approach-
es the level of the USA.
Arourxi 1970, when pn~duction of oop~per semis was just starting to
expand rapidly in the developing oountries, the share of Africa was
very small: less than five per cent (Table 12). With a very limited
expansion of pmduction sinoe that time, this situation did riot
change. Production of oop~per semis in developing Africa is at an ex-
tremely law level of 25,000 to 30,000 tons per year 1).
Around 1970 the production of oopper semis of the developing ooun-
ries ~ras heavily concentrated in Iatin America. Production in this
continent increased quite rapidly in the seventies, doubling in one
1) The figures on refined oonsunption are mt oa~lete, for in-
stance in the case of 7.ambia; oorrection for such anissions
would, however, not basically change the picture-41-
decade (Brazil, Mexico). However, production in Asia (incl. Taiwan
and South Korea) increased five-fold during the same period. In the
world econcmic crisis of the early eighties, production declined
substantially in Latin America, but o~ntinued to grow in Asia. Pre-
sently this region is the most i~ortant or1e.
TAffi~E 12
Production of r semis in the developing ootmtries as indicated by








Africa 18 5 29 3 25 3
Asia 84 22 413 41 582 57
Latin
Ameri 279 73 561 56 408 40
TpTAL 382 100 1,003 100 1,015 100
Source: Statictical Annex and World Metal Statistics
The very limited production in Africa, the mentioning of Brazil and
Mexico in the case of Latin America and the recent prani.nence of
Asia all indicate that in the developing countries fabrication of
copper is first of all linked to industrialization in general and
not to the mineral and metallurgical production of coppex 1).
1) See Paragraph ZII.3-42-
III.2 The characteristics of the copper semis sector
The~roducts
Copper semis are being produced by wire mills, brass mills and found-
ries. Because foundries are typically producing for small local mar-
kets, producing tailor-made products for their customers, this sec-
tor will mt be analyzed here 1).
The production of the wire mills and brass mills oonsists on average
for about 65 per cent of products made of pure copper, the remainder
being oopper alloy semis (Table 13). Wire oonstitutes about SO per
cent of total production. Rods, bars, etc. and plates each account
for about 20~ of output and tubes, with a share in production of just
over 10 per cent, form the smallest category.
TAB~LE 13
Coitg~osition of the prnduction of wire and brass mills, 1983 (percenta-
ges)
Pure copper Cop~x alloys Total
Wire 47 2 49
Rods, bars arx~
sections 2 18 20
Plates, sheet and
strips 7 12 19
Tubes 9 3 12
65 35 100
Source: International Wrought Copper Council, Annual Report 1983-4,p.8
Figures are for apparent da~st consumption in all major Wes-
tern oountries, excluding the USA
1) In the USA foundries oonsume 10 per cent of the refined copper
and copper alloy ingots; Copper, 1983, Bureau of Mines, Washing-
ton, p. 10-43-
The production of the wire mills oonsists for about 958 out of pro-
ducts made of pure copper. This is different for the brass mills,
as the name already indicates. About 65 per cent of their output con-
sists of semis made of oopper alloys. Rods, bars, etc. are their
most it~ortant product category, with a share in total output wlume
of almost 40 per cent. Plates, etc. oane close in seoond plaoe and
tubes are, with a share of about 25 per cent, the smallest catego-
~, 1) .
~pper semis are being used in a wide variety of final products,
from valves and fittinqs to transfornrers for the railways and many
other products, like air-conditioners, refrigerators, powerca-
bles, teleoatcm~nication equigrrent, la~ caps, roofing, rarlios, va-
cuum cleaners, radiators, propellers (for ships), electric mot.ors,
etc., etc.. Only in the United States data are systematically being
oollected on the end-use of copper products by sectors (Table 14).
About 50 per cent of the end-use is, as might be expected, for e-
lectric purposes.fiowever, a large part of this consumption d~oes not
take place in this industrial sector as such, but for about 208 in
building~construction and for amther 20~ in other sectors. About 60
per cent of the end-use of copper takes place in the two just menti-
oned sectors.
The wide variety of final products does of oourse have certain reper-
cussions for the ooaq~osition of the output of the copper and oopper
alloy semis sector. Hawever, the situation is different for the wire
mills as ccRgiared to the brass mills. Therefore, the two subsectors
will be dealt with separately.
The-processes
only fifteen years ago the production of copper wire started with
the fabrication of hot rolled rod from wire bars. Nowadays the most
ccnmon process is the fabrication of continuously cast rod (CCR) di-
1) Calculated from Table 13-44-
TABI,E 14
Copper oonsumption in the United States by end-use sector, 1981
E~d-use industry
sector













4) Transportation 8 12
5) ConsumQx and
general prod. 6 12
100 100
Source: Copper 1983, Bureau of Mines, Washington, p. 10
rectly fran cathodes. Sub.sequently, wire is drawn to the desired
diameter. Wire is being traded between firms, with the producers of
electrical apparatu-s, using tYae wire for windings, as the main buy-
ers. Fíov,~ver, a very large part of all wire produoed is being used
for the production of insulated wires and cables. IK~st of the wire
these manufacturezs use is being fabricated by themselves: "cable
makers are increasingly able to draw their own wire from wirerod"1j.
Consequently wire rod is the only semi-manufacture of i~ortance in
this sector. Wire rod is a standardized, hcnngeneous product 2).
1) Balon, R.: "The oopper semis industry", in Copper 1983, London,
1983, p. 3.2
2) It should be noted that with additional itmiediate drawing of
the wire rod after continuous casting, the distinction between
wire and wire rod is being blurred-45-
Of course there are differences in quality, due to the quality of
the refined copper that is being used.
Production of continuous cast rod (CCR) is relatively riot very ca-
pital-intensive arxi the technology to be applied is not very sophis-
ticated, but a rather si~le one. The it~ortanoe of econranies of
scale is not very clear.
Compared with mining~ smelting and refin;r,Q, the productlon of CCR
is not very capital-intensive. Required capital investments are es-
tiunated at ~ 7o-100 per ton annual capacity 1), to be oat~ared
with ~ 5,OOo--6,000 for mining, S 1,SOo-2,000 for smelting and ~ 40o-
600 for refining. The value added in CCR-production is also not ve-
ry high, as OCR fetches a premium over refined copQer of about
~ 100 per ton; value added is at a level of about 6 per cent over
refined. Fk7wever, taking into account the higher value added in re-
fining, it turns out that investment per unit of value added in
CCR-production is less than half the investment in refining.
The desicTn and developnent of the technology of continuous casting
is to be considered as a sophisticated accatq~liskmient of modern
technology. Different production systems have been developed, like
Southwire, Contirod, Lamitref and Outoku~u. fkrwever, the operation
of the installation is not very cocnplicated and has been referred
to as "the relative si~licity of the rod-inaking operation" 2).
No studies are available on the eoonanies of scale in OCR-product-
ion. A prel~mis~~xy estimate indicated that for a very small Outo-
kumpu installation (6,000 tons annual capacity) the investment
costs per unit of output are considerably higher than for a large
Southwire plant (150,000 tons). Hawever, it seems also vexy likely
that these diseconanies of scale of a small Outokumpu installation
crould substantially be redressed at a sotnawhat larger scale of pro-
duction (e.g. 18,000 or 24,000 tons). This issue clearly requires
further investigation, particularly because it is highly relevant
1) Balon, op.cit., in Copper 1983, p. 3.8
2) Copper Studies, December 16, 1975, p. 3-46-
for the feasibility of production in developing countries.
Required investments per ton of output for a brass mill (extrusion
of shapes, rolling mill, tube mill) are definitely higher than for
CCR. For a tube mill they have recently been estimated at ~ 800-
1,000 per ton of annual capacity and for a rolling mill at ~ 1,000-
1,500 1j. This does not mean that also the investments per unit of
value added are higher than for OCR. The contrary seems to be the
case. Value added per ton is easily 15 times higher for brass mills
than for continuous casting of rod 2). Brass mills are mr~st likely
less capital intensive per unit of value added than continuous cast-
ing.
No studies are laiown regarding eoonanies of scale in brass mills.
It seems to us that eoor~ies of scale start to taper off at a rather
low level of capacity. In some developing oountries, rolling mills do
exist with an annual capacity of less than 5,000 tons and tube mills
with an even lower capacity 3j. As with CCR-production, the issue
of eoonomies of scale for brass mills requires further investigation.
An á~ortant issue with respect to the character of the brass mills
industry concerns the harogeneity of the products and the sophisti-
cation of the tecYu~ology. Are we dealing with heteroqeneous pro-
ducts, produoed with a canplicated technology or with standard pro-
ducts and qu.ite si~le techniques ? The literature is not giving a
clearcut answer to these questions.
It is a fact that the basic technologies of extrusion, rolling and
piercing (of tube) are "old", quite simple and universally kno~~ 4).
On the other hand, it is being stressed quite often that brass mill
1) Balon, op.cit., in Copper 1983, p. 3.8
2) i.lt~C.TAD, for exartq~le, sets the price for sheet at 185 per cent
of the price of refined oopper; IJNCrAD, op.cit., 1982, p. 58
3) Vingerhoets, J, and A. Sannen: "Fabrication of oopper semi-manu-
factures in Zambia", Tilburg, 1985, p. 73-79
4) This is not the case with new (experimental) technologies like
oontinuous casting of shapes and welding of tubes-47-
products are highly specialized and have to be made to cu-stcmer ~~~-
cifications 1), and that tube manufacturers, for instance, "develop
areas of specialties" 2). Consequezltly, it is asserted that "pro-
duction of tube, especially alloy tube, is an extremely specialized
process, requiring a high level of expertise" 3).
It is beynrxi any doubt that the brass mill industry produces a wide
variety of products. Many of these products, however, are standard-
ized 4 ) .
One exanq~le is Industrial Tube (halfhard -harddrawn) with about 25
standard measures. Another exa~le is Brass Sheet (soft, deep draw-
ing quality) with 16 standard measures. On the other hazr3, mills
produce specialty products (for instance copper alloy industrial
tube, or specialty alloy strip for the electronics industry).
Recent developments in the industzy seem to acoentuate the distinct-
ion between standard products and specialty products. In the USA
sare large mills have recently shifted their attention fran standan-i-
ized products to specialty prcxlucts. The brass mills that produce
"high-wlume bread-and-butter products" 5) seem to have becrnie m~re
vulnerahle than the producers of specialties. This develoixnent oould
be of i~ortance for potential developing country exporters.
The structure of the sector
Prain's statement that there are thpusarris of copper fabricating
plants in the world, is most likely correct 6). The i~licit sugges-
tion that there are many atamistic suppliers in a tnarket with "per-
fect ccmpetition" is, hawever, not correct. Certainly, the copper
1) Copper Studies, October 3, 1975, p. 1
2) Copper Studies, i)ecember 16, 1975, p. 1
3) Copper Studies, December 16, 1975, p. 2
4) A Gern~z expert fran within the industry estimates that 90B of
the production of the brass mills oonsists of standard products
5) Copper Studies, Auqust 1984, p. 9
6) Prain, op.cit., 1975, p. 114-48-
fabricating industry is not as highly concentrated as m;n;ng, smelt-
ing and refining. Besides, there is generally not a high degree of
integration from mining through to fabricating. Nevertheless, it
seems justified to speak of an oligopolistic structure of the in-
dustry. In the subsectors (wire mills, general brass mills, tube
mills, rolling mills) the regional markets are dcaninated by a limit-
ed number of firms 1). There is also a farily high degree of vertical
integration between certain stages in the productíon chain. Hawever,
our findings have to be treated with sare caution. It is difficult
to gain a good kr~wledge on the market position of firms and on all
the linkages betw~een major firms and their respective subsidiaries.
Factors like these probably also explain why a study dealing exten-
sively with the structure of the oop~per fabricating sector, does not
exist.
Ca~aring the production capacity of t1~~e largest fabricating oce~a-
nies with those of mining~smelting~refining oa~anies, the conclus-
ion is easily reached that the level of concentration is smaller in
the copper fabricating sector. Soct~ ten years ago, for instance, the
nine largest eopper fabricating catq.ianies outside the USA had a pro-
duction capacity of 2.6 million tons, half the capacity of the nine
leading mining ea~anies 2). In 1974, the 25 major copper fabricat-
ors, including the US-cotr~anies, had a capacity of 4.3 million tons,
55 per cent of the estimated total of the market economies 3).
With respect to vertical integration, the situation is different in
the USA, Japan and E1~ope. "Of most direct interest are ownership
links between refineries and s~ni-fabricating establishments. Large
proportions of the production of Japanese and North American refiner-
ies and of the output of sa~ E~-opean refineries are sold to semi-
1) Regionalization of markets, in turn, is influenced by integrat-
ion, close seller-cu.stomer relationships and trade barriers; the
two last mentioned subjects will be dealt with belaw
2) Derived from Labys, op.cit., 1980, p. 87-89
3) See The General Aruiex, Table III-49-
fabricators within the same aFmership group, arx3 riearly all of the
firm.s engaged in such transactions are relatively large on both
sides" 1). In Japan the high level of vertical integration does mt
include (directly) the mining stage 2j. In the USA the vertical in-
tegration with mining oompanies is most important. In 1969, four of
the seven largest brass mills and four of the eleven largest wire
mills were controlled by integrated produoers 3). Anaoonda, Phelps
Dodge, Kenneoott and Asaroo together possessed at that time about 65
per cent of the fabricating capacity in the USA 4). Hawever, in the
USA, backward integration is also important, because "the majority
of the 'independent' mills are actually subsidiaries of such huge
manufacturing firms as Ganeral Ni~tors and Westinghouse" 5). In ELtro-
pe, vertical integration is rather limited ocnq~ared to Japan and the
USA; of greatest importance seems to be the integration between cus-
tom refiners and fabricators.
It is highly relevant to look at the copper fabricating industry as
a whole when analysing the market for refined oopper. Wt~e.n studying
the possibilities of partial (relative) relocation of fabrication
of semis to developing countries, the sec~nentation of the fabricat-
ing sector is more relevant. The sub-sector of the wire mills is
quite different from the brass mills. In the case of wire mills
there is only one hotrogeneous setni-Product and for the brass mills
a wide variety. The wire and cable inclustry is a separate sector,
not linked with the many sectors using the output of the brass mills.
A further subdivision of the brass mills would not be correct at
this juncture, because a number of firms produce bath shapes, tubes
and plates. For this reason we deal separately, but briefly, with
the structure of the brass mill sector and of the wire mill sector.
1) Gluschke, Shaw and Varon, op.cit., 1979, p. XXI
2) The inwlvement of Japanese smelters~refiners with mining over-
seas oould be considered as backward integration, but it is most-
ly in a rather indirect way with relatively little equity owner-
ship
3) Becker, op.cit., 1983, p. 75
4) ganks, F.: "The world copper market: an eooncmic analysis", Bal-
linger, Cambri.dge (Mass.), 1974, p. 27
5) Becker, op.cit., 1983, p. 75-so-
The brass mill sector
The major producing oountries of brass mill products are the USA,
Japan, Germany FR, Italy, the UK and France. In the USA, with a pro-
duction of about 1 million tons per year, the six leading coir~panies
presently are Aroo, Revere Copper and Brass, c.hase, Phelps Dodge,
Bridgeport Brass and Scovill 1). These ca~anies all produce a wide
range of shapes, plates and tubes. Another five large producers fa-
bricate one or two of the three product categories. Four of the six
largest fabricators and one of the next group are integrated with
míning~refining ax~anies. Several of th~n operate factoríes outside
the USA, but only to a limited extent in developing countries.
The major producers in Japan are S~,m~itomo, Fl~vkawa, Mitsubishi and
Kobe Steel. The first three ~anies are integrated with refining.
Their fabricating activities are (aLmst) ccR~letely oonfined to Ja-
Fan-
In Europe, Germ~ny is the largest producer country with an output
of about 600,000 tons per year. The three leading oa~anies are
Diehl, C~itehoffnungsh{itte and Metallgesellschaft. The t~ last men-
tioned oat~anies are (partly through links with the Norddeutsche Af-
finerie) integrated with refining. Seven other rather important pro-
ducers of brass mill produ~cts are not integrated with refining. In
FYance, Péchiney Ugine Kuhlman is the only major integrated fabrica-
tor. The two largest o~mpanies in this sector in the UK are Delta
Metal and r~rial Metal Industries (II~iI). General Electric, British
Insulated Callender's Cables (BIOC), Rio Tinto Zinc anci Péchiney al-
so produce brass mill products in the United Kingdom. IMI and BICC
are (partially) integrated with refining. In Italy the major fabri-
cators are Carlo C~utti and Metalli Industriale. They are not inte-
grated with refining.
A brief review of the major producers only can serve as a first in-
dication of the structure of the markets. The West European market
is the one with relatively the lowest degrees of inteqration and
1) Data on brass mills and wire mills have mainly been derived
f~xn an unpublished masters thesís by Jos Smeehuijzen-51-
concentration. ~ven in this ca.se, however, there seems to be an oli-
gopolistic structure. The tube market may serve as an e.xa~le.
"C,amm~ features of the West ~ropean tube inclustry include the
self-sufficiency of dcmestic markets in most cases and the daninat-
ion of such by a numbex of relatively large producers, located
close to the oonsimung centers" 1)-The relevanoe of ooncentration
and integration for partial relocation of the industzy to develop-
ing oountries is twofold. With a high level of concentration it is
difficult for an "outsider" to penetrate the market. Seoondly, in-
tegration, be it forward or backward, is a factor disoouraging re-
location of part of the production chain. Fbr prod~ers in develop-
ing oountries wanting to set up export~riented production in oo-
operation (a joint venture) with a Western oo[~iy,it would there-
fore seem to be most advisable to join forces with a non-integrated
fabricator.
The wire mill sector
------------------
In the wire and cable irxiustry, concentration ancl vertical integrat-
ion are at a higher level than in the brass mill sector; "the cable
industry is highly oligopolistic" 2j. The major producer countries
are the same as in the case of brass mills, plus Belgitan. The three
largest producers in the USA are Anaconda-Ericsson, Phelps Dodge
(very active abroad) arxi GEC Technologies (fornierly General Cable).
All three ccag~anies used to be integrated with mining oatqaanies.
EUr GEC Technologies this is no longer the ca.se. Atmng t]~e rsnainin9
producers several are either forward or backward integrated: Asarw,
Cerro Wire, t~IeHmnnt Mining, Scovill arr3 Westinghouse.
The wire and cable industry in Germany is daninated by Metallqe-
sellschaft and C~tehoffnungshiitte, both integrated with refining.
A~G and Philips are exat~les of backward integration. In France the
major producers are Courbevoie and Sté. Laminoires Tréfileries C~-
bleries de Lens; both cot~anies are not (directly) integrated with
1) Copper Studies, December 16, 1975, p. 1
2) Banks, op.cit., 1975, p. 9-52-
refining. The largest wire and cable co~any of the world is the
UK-based BICC, partíally integrated with refining and operating in
several countries. Other irt~ortant producers in the UK are the Del-
ta Group, General Electric and IMI. The tcro largest producers in
Italy are Colata Continua and Metalra~ie. The best knoum Italian pro-
ducer is Pirelli. Altrost all activities of this oo~any, txxaever,
take place outside Italy, particularly in South America, Canada,
the USA and the UK. The major producer in Belgium is Métallurgie Ho-
boken-Overpelt, belonging to the Société Générale Group. With a CCR-
capacity of 250,000 tons, ti~e ca~qaany is one of the largest produc-
ers of this product in the world. Hoboken-~verpelt is integrated
with refining and partially integrated with the wire and cable in-
dustry.
The six major producers of wire and cable in Japan are Sumitomo, F1i-
rukawa, Nianazu, Mitsubishi, Hitachi and Shawa. Except for the last
two c~rrpanies mentioned, they are all directly integrated with re-
fining. Sare of theqn (S~m~itomo, Hitachi) actively participate in
production abroad (South East Asia).
The OCR-technology has changed the structure of the wire and cable
sector to a certain extent. Traditionally, the hot rolling mills
were generally integrated~affiliated with the fabricators of insul-
ated wire and cable (the cable makers). CCR-mills could either be
integrated with the cable makers or with the refineries. For the
first time rod mills became to a significant degree integrated with
refineries. Particularly European custom refineries added CCR to
their facilities. Advantages of integration with refineries are:
large scale investments are better justified with a number of wire
mills as custcmers and refineries are more certaín of a regular
supply of high c;uality cathode that is required for CCR-production.
As a consequence, in 1979, custoan refiners and prin~y producers to-
gether acoounted for 46 per oent of CiCR-capacity, 40 per cent was
owned by fabricators and the remaining 14 per cent was under mixed-53-
awnership. It is therefore a~ncluded that "increasingly, continuous
cast rod is viewed as another refinery shape, rather than as a semi-
manufactured product" 1).
Fbr the mines~refineries in the developing oountríes CCR is apparent-
ly not (yet ?) a"refinery shape". Zambia participates in a joint
venture with Than.son-Brandt in France and Cocielco (Chile) became a
pa.rtner in a OCR-joint venture with Deutsche Giessdraht and in one
with Sté. Lensoise de C~ivre (France). For the E~urope.an oa~anies
concerned, these joint ventures offer the advantage of an assured
supply of high quality cathrxle. The advantage for Zambi.a and Chile
is an assured outlet for refined oopper and a share in the profits.
t~ver, it would have been mc~re advantageous for these countries
to have the CcR-plants located within their boundaries. In that case
the additional advantages would have been: the inocme earned and
the e~loyment created in the constniction stage, the local avail-
ability of wire rod, a broader tax base, creation of employment
and increased foreign exchange earnings.
So, the question rsna~nG: why is CCR not a"refinery shape" for the
developing countries ? May be technical factors are of i~ortance
in this case 2), but the institutional factor of the market struc-
ture also seems to be relevant. Fabricators wanted to continue the
production of wire rod when they had to switch fx~xn HRR to OCR.
C7astoen refiners and primary producers, (partly) integrated with fa-
bricators, of course preferred location at their refineries. Within
the logic of the structure of the sector, there was, in the absence
of important advantages of location in developing oountries, no
roan for attaching oCR-production to the refineries in the develop-
ing countries. Their position was further weakened by the stagnation
of the oopper market since 1974 and the resulting overcapacity in
the sector. These oountries had to give in (or did so willingly)
and they opted for the "seoond best" solution of participation in
production in the industrialized countries.
1) Copper Studies, Oci-~ober 1979, p. 2
2) We oane back to this point in Chapter V belaw-54-
III.3 Production of semis in developing countries: the dosninance
of import substitution ~
Of only four developing o~untries are fígures on production of cop-
per semis included in the global statistics 2). Besides, the data
on the use of direct scrap are only given for the continents and
not for individual countries (except for Brazil in recent years).
Consec~iently, the best indication of the distrubution of the pro-
duction of copper semis among the developing countries is to be
found in the fiqures on consumption of refined copper.
The production of copper semis in the developing oountries is al-
most campletely confined to Latin America and Asia (see also Par.
III.1 above). Four oountries acoounted in 1979~81 for two-thirds
of the fabrication of oopper semis: Brazil, Mexico, South Korea
and Taiwan 3). Adding twn trore countries, India and Argentina, the
share in the production of the developing countries passes the 80
per cent level. The share of the Asian countries, including those
in South East Asia, is on the increase. In oontrast, the production
of the traditional oopper exporting oountries (Chile, Peru, Zambia
and Za3re) acoounts for just over 8 per cent of the total.
The data show that import substitution has been the major tendency,
in those developing oountries that realized rapid industrialization
in the past decade and a half 4). As is well known, industrial
gro~wth has been m~st rapid in the export oriented so-called Newly
Industrializing Countries (NIC's) 5).Whatever definition is used, Tai-
wan, South Korea, Brazil and Mexico certainly belong to this group.
1) This phenomenonn is also being referred to as backward inte-
gration; this is correct when looked at from a national econo-
mic point of view; however, we do not use the term in order to
avoid confusion with integration between firms
2) See Table 9 of the Statistical Annex
3) 1979~81 is oonsidered to give a better i~ression of the struc-
rural situation than 1983, because of the severe recession in
Latin Am~erica
4) Analysed by Perlman, R.: "Kupferverbrauch in Entwicklungsl~n-
dern", in Metall, Januar 1982, and in Copper Studies, P,pril 30,
1981
5) Or: countries are oonsidered to belong to the group of the NIC's
because they realized rapid industrial growth-55-
In Taiwan and South Korea the oopper semis sector is cat~letely
based on i~Orted raw materials; the oountries do have some refine-
ry capacity but no mining. Brazil does have a relatively small min-
ing capacity and a sarewhat larger refinery output. Only in Mexico
the mine production (but not the refinery production) is larger
than the semis production.
In the NIC's, not only industrial growth as such, but also the oom-
position of that grexath has stimulated the demand for copper. Elec-
trification and the electrical and electronics sect~ors have general-
ly been grawing at above average rates. Consequ~ently, there has
been a very rapid grawth in demand for products from the wire and
cable industry and such an industry has usually been set up as soon
as domestic demand justified a sufficient level of production to a-
void diseconoinies of scale. Subsequently, CCR-production has been
started in many developing countries. Plants for continuous casting
of wire rod have been installed in Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia,
Iran, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexiw, the Philippines, Taiwan arxi
Thailand 1). Zambi.a is the only one of the traditional oopper wunt-
ries having a CCR-factory, be it a very small one.
In rapidly industrializing developing oountries, demand for brass
mill products has in all cases been stimulated by rapid growth of
the construction industry and in scxne cases by rapid growth of the
m~tor vehicle irxiustry. As regai~is brass mill products, the oount-
ries wncerned have, hawever, to a larger extent and~or for a long-
er period, been relying on imports. Perlman attributes this mainly
to the fact that the domestic end-users demarxi a wide variety of
brass mill products 2).
Chile has the largest semis sector of the traditional copper export-
i.ng countries. ArourY3 1970 production was at a level of 22 thousand
tons and this output figure daubled in the seventies, but production
has declined markedly in the early eighties. The major point, haw-
1) Metal Bulletin Monthly, August 1983, p. 34-37
2) Perlman, op.cit., 1982, p. 80-56-
ever, is that output expansion in the seventies did not even keep
pace with the average exgansíon in the developing countries. May be
this is partly explained by the fact that Chile decided to partici-
pate in joint ventures for CCR-production in E,~rope. Within Chile,
two firms operate in the wire and cable sector: Cobre Cerillos SA
(a subsidiary of Phelps Dodge) and Manufactura de Cobre SA (Madeco).
The last mentioned c~any also produces plates and tubes. The other
two oa~anies (rather small ones) in the brass mill sector are Armat
Metalurgica Saic, and Coplasa.
Ea Peru the constIInption of refined oopper increased five fold in
the seventies, but still did not yet reach 20,000 tons at the end
of the decade. The state cc~npany Centrnmin owns a wire rod (HRR) ca-
pacity of 22,000 tons. Cables y Conductores de Cobre SA ís a small
wire and cable manufacturer. The three oa~anies in the brass mill
sector are Coplasa-Industria MetalGrgica SA, Inamesa and Metales
Industriales del Perfi SF~. ?bgether they have a rated capacity of
24,000 tons.
Mexico, exporting a]imst 20~,000 tons of concentrates (Cu-content)
in 1983, is a special case. The country is a NiC and a new copper
exporter (large scale exports of concentrates only started in 1980).
Refined consumption (production of semis) reached a level of 130,000
tons in 1981, but dropped to 80,000 tons in 1983, resulting in a
surplus capacity that could be used for export production 1). With
an increased refinery capacity, e~orts of ooppex semis could be-
ocme a rrore structural feature of the Mexican copper sector.
The largest ca~any in the wire and cable sector in Mexico is Con-
dumex (CCR-production), with Pirelli as the major partner. Other
companies in this sector are Conelec (subsidiary of Phelps Dodge)
and Industrias Naoobre (40~ Atlantic Richfield). The last mentioned
oot~any also produces brass mill semis. 77ie other ca~any in this
sector is Cia de Real del Nbnte y Pachuca SA (a state oanpany).
1) See Chapter IV-57-
The only semis production of the African oopper exporters that is
worth mentioning is the 6,000 ton Outoktm~u CQ2-capacity of 7.amefa
in Zambia (1982). The ocaq~any is a joint venture of a state oca~any
with several foreign partners, of which Phelps Docige is the major
one 1).
Finally, mention is made of the oopper sanis production in the
"new" exporting Asian countries, Indonesia and the Philippines. Zn
the Philippines refined consumption was only 3,400 tons in 1979~81
and Indonesia is not even mentioned in the statistics. iiawever, in
Indonesia a CCR-plant has been installed in 1979 with an annual ca-
pacity of 36,000 tons. Furukawa is the majority awr~er. In the Phi-
lippines a CCR-plant (Outoktimtpu, 6,000 tons capacity) has very re-
ce-ntly been built by Phelps Dodge. American Wire and Cable (QC
~echnologies) is the other oa~any in this sector.
1) Víngerhoets arr.i Sannen, op.cit., 1985cF~r~x Iv
International trade in copper semis
The wltmie of international trade in copper semis is limited by se-
veral factors. The first factor is transport costs. The second sec-
tor o~ncerns the structure of the market; ooncentration and verti-
cal integration limit international trade. The third factor is that
of trade barriers i~osed by governments.
In this chapter we concentrate on the analysis of the international
trade flows and we include a brief review of the literature on
trade barriers. The structure of the sector has already been dealt
with above. The subject of transport oosts will be oonsidered in
the next chapter.
The oentral thesis to be found in the literature is that internati-
onal trade in oopper setnis is only of a limited nature and not very
i~ortant. It is asserted "that production of semi-fabricated pro-
ducts is only marginally trade~riented" 1) and that "world trade
in semi~iufactured copper products has been mostly intra-region"2).
Is this thesis still oorrect or is a certain revision in order ? In
addressing this question we focus our attention on the developing
oountries both as importers and as exporters of copper and oopper
alloy semis.
IV.1 The general pattern of world trade
In 1983 the total semis exports of the seventeen countries register-
ed in World Metal Statistics amounted to just aver 1.6 million
tons 3). Taking into account that countries like Yugoslavia, Taiwan,
1) Kirthisingha, op.cit., 1982
2) Copper Studies, Decanber 4, 1975, p. 1
3) The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the
Scandinavian Countries, FYance, Germany FR, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Spain, Sfaitzerland, ti~e United Kingdcm and the
USA-59-
Chile, Mexioo, Peru, etc. also export oopper semis, total exports
of the world market eoonoanies were certainly aver 1.7 millions tons
in 1983. Unfortunately there are no data available on the value of
these exports. The most recent figures on the valwe of exports re-
late to 1980 and 1981 arr3 are respectively 4.7 arxi 3.9 billion
US ~ 1). The value of exports in 1983 was probably in the onder of
4 billion US ~.
Figures on the distribution of exports and imports between develop-
ing oountries and developed market eoor~cmies are only available in
value terms 2). These data indicate clearly that the share of the
developing countries in world exports is very small: about 3.5~ in
1980 and 4.5~ in 1981. Presently, about 958 of the exports of the
market econanies originates in the industrialized oountries. In
contrast, the developing countries have a substantial share in the
i~orts of the market econanies: 24 per cent in 1980 and 27 per
cent in 1981. It is estimated that the developing wuntries present-
ly run a"trade deficit" in oopper semis of about US ~ 1 billion.
Despite data limitations, an analysis of available statistics indi-
cates that the copper semis industry has becon~ much more internati-
onally oriented over the past decade and a half. ~tports have in-
creased more rapidly than production. An increasingly larger part
of total production is being exported (Table 15). Besides, trade
in oapper semis has increased m~re rapidly than trade in refined
oopper.
In 1968 the international trade in copper semis was exactly equal
to one quarter of the international trade in refined oopper. Fifteen
years later the semis exports of the major Western pmduoer oount-
ries were equal to more than half the world trade in refined copper.
Confining the attention to the semis as such, the most i~ortant
1) Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1982, UN, New York,
1984; the oopper prices were in 1981 on average about 20 per
cent lawer than in 1980
2) Calculated fran International Trade Statistics, adding the
coimtry data on SITC 682.21, 682.22 and 682.25; adjusted for
Taiwan-6o-
TABLE 15
International trade in copper semis related to trade in refined copper
ánd to production of semis (percentages)
I
1968 1975 1983
F~cports of semis as per-
centage of trade in re-
fined cnp~per 25 36 53
F~cports of semis as per-
centage of production of
semis 9 14 20
Source: World Metal Statistics; data pertain to the 18 (for 1983: 17)
major Western producer countries; they produced alsn~st 8 mil-
lion tons of oopper semis in 1983
pher~nenon observed is the trend taaards more and more of the semis
production being exported. In 1968 this was still the case with less
than ten per cent, but in 1983 twenty per cent of the production ~ras
being exported. This is an average figure, with great differences
between countries. Bcports as a peroentage of production vary from
88 per cent in the case of Belgium to 2 per cent for the USA; in be-
tween these two extretnes are, for e~le, the Netherlands (58~),
F'rance (418). GermanY FR (368), tY~e United Kingdan (18~) and Japan
(12~) .
Ib these figures justify the quoted characterization that the sector
is "only marginally trade~riented" ? Zb us this judgement seems out
of date. When on average 20 per cent of production is being exported,
this can hardly be called "marginal", and this is certainly not the
case for a number of individual countries. Besides, the rapid in-
crease in exports seeins highly relevant. Over the period 1968-1983
the increase in exports of the major Western countries was almost-61-
equal to 808 of the increase in the production of these countries.
The expansion of production has been vezy heavily oriented towards
exports .
With CCR becaning a"refinery product", international trade in
wire rnd has expanded rapidly. Does this factor acoount for the in-
crease in oopper semis trade ? Ebr six major Western ootmtries da-
ta are available on both production and exports by product catego-
r~,: Canada, FYance, Germ~zy FR, the United Kingdan and the LiSA. To-
gether they produoed 6.4 million tons of oopper semis in 1983 (se-
venty per cent of the production of the market eoonanies).
In the six countries prociuction exFx~u~ded at a very modest pace,
but exports increased qu.ite rapidly (Table 16). ~q~orts of wire
(rod) expanded most rapidly, acooimting for about 50 per cent of
the total increase in exports (700,000 tons). Fiowever, also the ex-
ports of other semis increase3 much m~re rapidly than production;
while the pmduction of other semis increased by only 150,000 tons,
the e.xports of these products increased by 350,000 tons. Not only
the production of wire rod, but also the production of other semis
has beoane more oriented towaYds exports.
TASLE 16
Average annual grawth rates of production and exports of copper sem.is
in six Western countries, 1968-1983
Production ~cports
All semis 1.1 8.1
Wire 1.9 13.3 I
Other sPSnis 0.3 6.1 ~
Source: World Metal Statistics
The rapid increase in exports of wire rod has not resulted in the
production of wire (rod) being more export~riented than the pro--62-
duction of other semis (Table 17). The export-orientation of wire
md production has merely been catching up with that of the other
semis. Consequently, the oaY~osition of exports has become very si-
milar to the ocaq~osition of production.
TABLE 17







and strips 19 24
Tiil~es 12 15
Source: Table 13 above (production) and International Wrought Copper
Council; "World Trade in Copper and Copper Alloy Semi-m-inu-
factures, 1981" (exports)
IV.2 The exports of the industrialized oountries and the it~orts
of the developing countries
~rts of-industrialized-countries
Detailed data on exports and imports of oopper semis are available
to us for the year 1981. The data, oa~iled by the IWCC and includ-
ing detailed export~import matrices by product categories, are
based on e~ort and import figures for 24 countries (tl~e Western
exporting oountries plus South Korea and Taiwan). The exports of
each one of these oountries to Eastern E~u.~pe arrl to the develop-
ing countries have been added and the resulting figures for these-63-
oountries are being registered as their it~orts. This is oorrect,
but one has to be careful: whenever in this garagraph refer~enoe is
made to i~orts of developing wwltries, this is shorthand for
imports originating in the 24 oountries for which exports have been
recorded.
In 1981 the developed market econani.es (DME) exported more than 1.6
million tons of oopper and cop~er alloy semis (Table 18). E1~cin other
L]ME, they imported over 1.2 million tons. Consequently, a].tmst 40~,000
tons of their exports went to oountries outside the group of develop-
ed market econanies.
TABLE 18
Total exports of copper semis by the developed market econccnies (DN~)







bAestern Etiir. 1,285.3 79 997.0 79 -~.3
N. America 115.5 7 228.2 19 t 112.7
Japan 191.1 12 2.5 - - 188.6
p~r ~ 37.1 2 26.2 2 - 10.9
Zbtal 1,629.0 100 1,233.9 100 - 395.1
Source: IWCC, Fiorld Trade in Copper and Copper Alloy Se~n.i-~nanufactures
1981. South Korea and Taiwan have been excluded fran the im-
port matrix
The Western ~ropean countries taken together are the major exporters
of oopper semis and they also are the major importers fran other DME.
The net exports of Western E~iroi~e am~unt to over 30~,000 tons. In
contrast, Nortl~ern America is a major net i~orter of oopper semis.-64-
Canada is a small net exporter, but the USA has beocme the largest
i~orter of copper semis in the world (both gross and net). It se~ns
that it has been rather easy for outsiders to penetrate the American
market. This is definitely not the case with Japan. The market is
tightly closed and it~orts are negligible. But with exports approach-
ing 200,000 tons in 1981, Japan is one of the largest exporting
oountries in the world. Of the other DME (Australia, New Zealand and
South Africa) only Australia is a net exporter of any significance,
New Zealarr3 being its best custonier.
Of the net exports of the UME, some 30,000 tons went to Eastern E~-
rope and to "markets unkr~awn". This leaves 364,000 tons of exports
to the developing countries, 22 per cent of the total exports of the
developed mzrket econcmies.
Western Elzrope has been selected for a more detailed analysis be-
cause of two reasons. Western Blirope is the major net exporter of
copper semis in the wnrld. Besides, in Western E~rope we carie across
the pl~n of intra-regional trade. This gives an opportuni-
ty to-pay some attention to the question whether or not '~rld trade
in semi~nanufacture3 oapper products has been mostly intra-region"1).
7.tao thin~.s of the Western El~ropean exports are being taken care of
by only thnee countries: Germany FR, FYance arxi Belgium. Another 14
oountries aooount for the other one third, and all together they ex-
ported almost 1.3 million tons of coppex semis in 1981. Of these ex-
ports a]lrost 758 went to other oountries in Western Etiirope. To get a
global picture of intra-regional trade of the developed market econo-
mies, one could add to the intra-Ehropean exports the exports of the
USA to Canada and vice versa, the exports of Japan to South Korea
and the exports of the USA to Mexico. Adding all these export and
ocx~4~aring thetn with the total e.xports of the I~1E, it turns out that
63~ of the exports is intra-regional. Phrased differently, and this
1) Copper Studies, Dec~iber 4, 1975, p. 1-65-
gives another perspective: 37 per oent of the exports, or 600,000
tons is extra-regional.
I-Iowever, this picture seems to exaggerate the occurrence of intra-
regional trade. All exports withi.n Western Elirope are namely consi-
ciered to be intra-regional, but the region nuis from Greece to Por-
tugal, to Ireland and Finlarxi. It sesns therefore trore appropriate
to substitute the figure on intra-Etiuopean trade for the figure on
intra-IDC trade (the IDC of the ten) . Not only are these ootmtries
geographically closer together, they also fonn a custans union. Fbl-
lowing this procedure it turns out that the figure for intra-region-
al exports of tYie DME is reduced to 42~.
From a vezy careful analysis of intra-regional trade, it would pm-
bably be ooncluded that the figure of 63 per oent is too high and
that of 42 per cent too low. May be more than half of total wr~rld
trade is intra-regional, but a very substantial part of total trade
is extra-regional.
In 1981 Western E~rope exported 150,000 tons of copper setais to de-
veloped oountries outside Ei~rope (of which 135,000 tons to the USA),
18,000 tons to Eastern E~rope and 160,000 tons to developing count-
ries. Of these 160,000 tons just over 10~ was exported to Iatin Ame-
rica and 35g to Africa. The developing oountries of Asia were the
m~st important markets for Western Europe; these countries took 55g
of the Western E1~ropean exports to developing countries.
The exports of Western Etzrope to the developing ootmtries oonsisted
in 1981 for a very large part out of wire (rod), aver 100,000 tons
or 64 per cent of the total (Table 19). Consequently, m~re than 70
per cent of the exports consisted of sanis made of pure oop~per. Be-
sides, it is rather striking that the category of plates, sheets
and strips figures quite pnxninently in the exports.-66-
TABL,E 19
Composition of the copper semis ecports of Western E~urope to developing







Wire 96.5 61 4.9 3 101.3 64
Shopes
(rods, etc.) 4.5 3 13.6 8 18.1 11
Plates,etc. 8.7 6 17.8 11 26.6 17
Tt.ibes 5.0 3 8.0 5 13.0 8
Total 114.7 73 44.3 27 159.0 100
Source: Calculated fran the i~ort~export matrices in IWCC, World Trade
in Copper and Co~pper Alloy Semi-manufactures - 1981
The exports of the industrialized coimtries are to a certain extent
being limited by tariff arxi non-tariff barriers. In the literature,
hr~wever, not much attention is being given to trade barriers. This
is particularly the case with respect to non-tariff barriers. Only
in passing reference is nade to "the stringent technical and quality
specifications for copper s~nis which are often set by developed
oowztry goverrunents, and which may be changed radically over time"1).
It is highly unlikely that those developing co~tries that do not
produce (certain) oopper s~i.s than.selves, impose trade barriers on
imports. It is, after all, in their own ewnomic interest that im-
ports reach their consuners (manufacturers)at the lowest possible
price. The situation is different for those developing countries that
have practiced import-substitution in copper semis. Protection of the
1) Copper Studies, Oct.ober 1975, p. 5-67-
domestic fabricator(s) is in that case very likely, as is apparent
in Brazil 1) . Consequently, i~orts frctn irr3ustrialized ooimtries
(and other developing oountries) are being limited or even almost
prohibited for certain product categuries.
Trade in copppx semis between the industrialized oountries is defi-
nitely being limited by i~ort tariffs. In this respec. ~t there is a
great difference between the IDC and Japan on the one hand arxi the
USA on the other. In Japan, naninal tariffs are generally at a level
of 15 per cent and in the IDC at a level of 8 per cent 2). Sowever,
these quite modest naninal tariffs result in very high effective ta-
riffs for certain products. In the case of wire rod, the resulting
effective tariffs are in the order of 125 to 150 per oent 3). They
certainly prohibit it~orts of wire rod. The effective tariffs for
the other products are significantly lower. Pbr a product líke sheet,
ho~wever, they still are at a level of around 20 per oent. These ef-
fective tariffs sean an i~ortant inq~ediment to it~orts in the IDC
and Japan. They also throw scme additional light on the intra-region-
al trade in Western Europe. In the IDC 868 of all i~rts in 1981
originated in other countries of the custans union. Most likely the
tariff barriers were among the factors limiting the imports frcm
third cotmtries.
Tariff protection is much lower in the USA. The effective tariff on
wire rod (pre Tokyo Round) is about 15 per cent. The effective ta-
riffs on other semis are generally appreciably lower. Because of
these modest tariffs, already some years ago it was ooncluded that
in the USA trade barriers hardly play any role 4). May be this part-
ly explains why the USA has beooaie an important net importer of o~p-
per semis and why Western E~rope is in the position to export a
substantial amount of oopper semis across the Atlantic.
1) See Chapter II, above
2) UNCTAD, op.cit., 1982, p. 55-64; reference is made to pre Tokyo
Roiu~d tariffs; presently these tariffs are in the process of be-
ing reduc:ed by, generally, betweP.n 15 and 50 per cent
3) UNCTAD, op.cit., 1982; the tariff is related to the value added
in the production of wire rod
~~
4) Sheer, H.: Der Markt f{ir Halbzeug aus Kupfer und -legierungen in
Europa tuid Ubersee", in Metall, Novettiber 1981, p. 1154-68-
~rts of the-develo~i.ng-oo-untries
Measured in value terms, the developing oountries had in 1969 a
share of about 10 per cent in the imports of cop~per semis by the
market economies. In the early seventies the import share of the
developing countries increased rapidly and reached almost 20 per
cent in 1974 1). In the following years the increase in the import
share was less spectacular, but reached nevertheless a level of 27
per cent in 1981. The developing countries have becotre an imgortant
export market for the producers of copper semis.
In 1981 the developing countries imported 384,000 tons of oopper se-
mis from the 24 countries for which IWCC reoon~ied the e~orts. A1-
most 70 per cent of this total, well over 250,000 tons, was being
ic~orted by Asi.an developing countries (Table 20). Both in Latin
America and Africa imports w~ere at a level of about 60,000 tons.
In Asia, the four major importing countries were Hong Kong, Iran,
Taiwan and Singapore; together they ~~orted altrost 50~ of the Asian
total. Another five oountries i~orted 25~ of the total: Israel, Ma-
laysia, India, Thailarr3 arid South Korea.
Mexico and Venezuela acoounted in 1981 for 60 per cent of the cop-
per semis it~orts in Latin America. Other i~orting oountries of
some importance in the Latin American oontext, were Cuba, Colombia
and Brazil (but the last mentioned oountry i~orted only 1,500 tons
of oopper semis from the industrialized countries in 1981).
Ii~orting 19,000 tons of copper semis, Algeria acoounted for a]most
one third of the African imports in 1981. Egypt and Nigeria imported
together about the same amount. Next came Nbmcco, Libya and Tunesia.
The six mentioned oountries i~orted almost 95 per cent of the Afri-
can total.
The total imports of the developing countries are estimated to con-
1) Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics; data pert-
ain to the SIZC-oodes 68221 and 68225 only. For 1981 the data
are oomplete, because they also include SITC~ode 68222TABI~E 20
rts of r semis the devel in countries; ori in and share in the ' rts of LDC
Volumes x 1000 tons)
Latin America Developing Asia Developing Afr. Developing Count. ~ig~
Volimie Percent. Volimie Percent. Volume Percent. Volwne Percent.
West. Eiirope 17.0 30 86.9 33 55.1 90 159.0 41
N. America 34.2 60 12.6 5 1.9 3 48.7 13
Japan 5.4 9 134.1 50 3.9 6 142.4 37
Other countr. ~) 0.4 1 33.3 12 0.5 1 34.3 9
7bta1 57.0 100 265.9 100 61.4 100 384.4 100
Share in the im-
ports of the de-
veloping ooimtr. 15~ 69~ 16B 100~
Source: IWC)C, World Trade in Copper and Capper Allol' semi-m~znufactures - 1981
~) Australia~ South Korea and Taiwan-7o-
stitute alrmst 40 per oent of their own production 1). Also in this
respect the situation is very different in Africa, Asia and Latin
America. In Africa the volume of imports is m~re than two times as
large as domestic production. In Asia, danestic production appears
to be rapidly approaching a level that is almost double the wlume
of imports. Latin America, finally, is, in oomparison with the other
oontinents, largely self-sufficient: the wlume of imports amounts
only to just over 10 per cent of domestic production.
Western E~rope and Japan each acoounted for about 40 per cent of the
i~orts of the developing oountries in 1981 (Table 20). Another 20
per cent was being supplied by the USA, Canada, Australia, South Ko-
rea and Taiwan. In Latin America almost 50~ of the í~orts came fran
Northern America (mainly the USA), but, despite the long distances,
30 per cent originated in Western Ftirope and almost 10 per cent in
Japan. In Asia, Japan was, as might be expected, the major supplier,
taking care of exactly 50 per cent of the imports. Again it is quite
surprising that one thin9 of the imports (87,000 tons) originates in
Western E1u.rope. These exports riot only go to markets in the Middle
East, but quite substantial amounts are being exported to oountries
lik,e Iran, India, Indonesia, Singapore and even Hong Kong. The im-
ports in Africa are almost oar~letely mcnopolized by the Western ~-
ropean oountries; in 1981, exactly 90 per cent of the i~orts in
Africa originated in the continent to its North.
The i~orts of the developing oountries taken together (Table 21)
are very similar to the ooc~g~osition of the production of the indus-
trialized countries (Table 13, above). The only exception is the ca-
tegory of shapes (rods, bars and sections). The imports by developing
countries of this category are rather limited. Fiow~ever, for Africa
and Latin America the patterns vary widely f~xn the average. In
Africa a large part of the imports oonsists of wire and for Latin
America the opposite is the case.
1) The reader is once mr~re reminded that ruit all imports are being
taken into account, because, apart fran South Korea and Taiwan,
exports of other developing oountries have not been recorded in
the statistics that are being used here-71-
TABLE 21
sition of the ' rts of semis of the devel countries,
981 (percentage shares)
Iat. America Asia Africa Developing C.
Wire 36 53 61 51
Shapes
(rod.s, etc. ) 22 13 11 14
Plates, etc. 16 23 20 22
~~s 26 11 8 13
Total 100 100 lo0 1~
Source: IWC-C, World Trade in Copper and CopPer Allay semi-nianufactures
1981
IV.3 The exports of the developing countries
27ue share of the developing oountries in the world oopper selnis ex-
ports is very small and this is particularly the case for the copper
producing developing countries. Notwithstanding these facts, three
questions are relevant in the context of this study. First: are the
exports of developing countries (almpst) exclusively going to other
developing oountries or also to industrialized countries ? Secondly:
to what extent are the semis sectors in the oopper produ~cing develop-
ing countries oriented towan-is exports ? And thirdly: is there or is
there not an upward trend to be found in the exports originating in
the copper producing developing countries ?
The exports of oopper semis by the developing oountries are estimat-
ed to have amounted to 185 million c~ollars in 1981 1). Based on an
average unit value for world exports of US ~ 2,300, this wnuld be
equi.valent to 80,000 tons 2). I-Iowever, it is very likely that the
unit value of exports fran developing oountries is lower than the
1) The most recent year for which fairly ocmplete data are available
from the Yearbook of International Trade Statistics; export val-
ues for Taiwan were estimated
2) The unit value is based on the value of world exports aryd an es-
timated volimie of world exports of 1.7 million tons-72-
world average, because these oountries probably export mostly rather
si~le products. Taking this factor into account it is estimated
that the exports fran the developing countries were in the order of
magnitude of around lO0,Q00 tons in 1981.
The share of Africa in the exports of the developinq oountries is
very small, less than 2~ in 1981. The resnainder is about equally
shared by developing Asia and Latin America, each acoounting for al-
irost 50~ of the exports of the developing oountries.
The African exports are presently still snall, but they have increas-
ed considerably since 1981. This is mainly due to the fact that Zam-
bia has beoome an exporter of OGR 1). In 1983 an Outoku~u installat-
ion with an initial capacity of 6,000 tons, started pnoduction. In
1984 production reached a level of about 5,000 tons. Given the limited
danestic market, the wire rod production is necessarily export~rient-
ed; a]most 70 per cent (3,500 tons) was being exported. These exports
went exclusively to other developinq countries: India (2,500 tons),
Kenya (300 tons), and Malaysia, Pakistan, Egypt and Tanzania (together
70o tons). It seems quite likely that the Zambian production and ex-
port of continuous cast wire rod will increase further in the years
to cane.
Taiwan and South Korea, exporting more than 26,000 tons in 1981, are
(apart fran Japan) the major exporting countries in Asia. Their pro-
duction is not export~riented; approximately 10 per cent of product-
ion is exported. The exports to Western E1~rope are a].most zero. Limit-
ed am~unts are being exported to the USA and Japan. More than 10 per
cent of the exports goes tA Australia. However, the major destination
of the exports of South Korea and Taiwan is the countries of South
East Asia.
Of the oopper producers in South East Asia (the Philippines, Indone-
sia, and Papua New (~iinea) only the Philippines has a refinery capa-
city since 1983. The output of this refinery could possibly become
1) Vingerhoets and Sannen, op.cit., 1985-73-
the basis for an export~riented oopper sanis industxy. This oould
particularly be successful in case production could be geared to the
regional market in the fran~ework of an Asean-arrangement 1).
The exportinq countries of i~rtance in Latin America, are Chile,
Peru, Mexico and Brazil. Chile is the only one of the four oountríes
that exports oopper semis for many years already. In 1970 the ex-
ports amounted to a]most 10,000 tons 2). In the follawing years they
expatuled rapidly and reached a level of over 30,000 tons in 1976 arr3
1977. In 1978 the exports decli.ned by 408, but in 1980 (the most re-
cent year for which data on exports are available) they again atrount-
ed to 25,ppp tons. The productíon of copper seinis in Chile declined
by about 50 per cent between 1979 and 1983. Cons~ently, exports al-
so must have declined, particularly in 1983.
The Chilean copper semis production is quite heavily oriented tawands
exports. In the last four years for which data are available, exports
averaged a]most 60g of refined oonsu~tion 3). It has been reported
that around 197o the Chilean exports went "principally tawards other
Latin American countries" 4). In 1978 the situation was sarewhat dif-
ferent 5). In that year 45~ of the exports went to the developed mar-
ket economies, of which more than half to the USA and 30~ to EUrope.
The resnainíng 558 of the exports went to other developing coimtries,
mainly in Latin America. The two major itt~orters of Chilean semis in
the region are Colanbia and Venezuela, together absorbing (in 1978)
almost 75g of the Chilean exports to developing oountries. In a se-
oond echelon cane Ecuador, Uruguay and the Dcminican ReP~ublic.
Since 1978 the Latín American coimtries seem to haVe regained their
earlier relative position as i~orters of semis frcxn Chile. In 1982
the value of the US i~orts fran Chile had declined to less than 20
1) Perlman, op.cit., 1982, in Metall, p. 81
2) Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, Countzy tables
3) i3owever, this percentage varied between 368 atxl 74~
4) G~eronik, op.cit., 1974, in Metal Bulletin Nbnthly, p. 44
5) 1978 is the only year for which data on the destination of Chile-
an semis exports can be derived fran the UN Canrodity Trade Sta-
tistics-74-
per cent of the value in 1978. Besides, the Chilean atte~ts in the
second half of the seventies to penetrate the market of the IDC,
seem not to have succeeded. In 1980 the it~orts of the EDC from
Chile still exceeded 3,000 tons; in 1983 they had dropped to exactly
700 tons 1). Since Chile had been the only developing country ex-
porter to the EEC of any importance, the imports of the EDC fran
the developing oountries had again declined to a triffle.
Exports of copper semis from Peru sean only to have started in 1971.
They expanded rapidly and reached a level of aLrost 12,000 tons in
1978. F~cports peaked in 1979 at 16,500 tons. In the next year the
exports a].m~st halved to less than 9,000 tons. In 1982 they rewver-
ed and reached aLrost 12,000 tons, the level of 1978. In the period
1980~1982 the exports averaged 50 per cent of refined consu~tion.
So, the production is quite heavily oriented taward.s exports.
The peak in Peruvian copper semis exports in 1979 is almost complete-
ly due to a sudden substantial increase of exports to the USA. In
1978 only 7g of the total exports (in value terms) went to the USA;
in 1979 almost 408 and in 1980 the figure dropped to 25~. In 1980
about 75~ of the Peruvian exports went to the regional Latin Ame-
rican market. Colanbia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Costa Rica and E1 Salvador
were the major countries of destination.
Since 1980, Ixrw~ever, the USA seans to have beoane an important market
for Peruvian oopper semis on a more pern~ient basis. According to US
import data and total Feruvian export figures (in value terms) the
USA acoounted for about 70 per cent of total exports from Peru in
both 1981 and 1982 2). It is not unlikely that this situation is go-
ing to be continued in the years ahead. Recently a new brass mill
was opened in Feru 3). The capacity of the mill is small: about 5,000
tons per year. It is interesting to note, hawever, that 70 to 75 per
cent of the production is planned to be exported, mainly to the USA.
1) Derived fran Eurostat, analytical tables of foreign trade, EEC,
Brussels, several issues
2) Source: the UN Qot~m~dity Trade Statistics
3) American Metal Market, June 27, 1985-75-
Brazil and Mexico are by far the largest producers of copper semis
in Iatin America. Before Brazil's production pltamieted in the depres-
sion of 1983, its refined consu~tion reacitied a peak of 250,000 tons
in 1982. Refined wnsu~tíon in Mexico peaked in 1981 at a level of
130,000 tons. The rapid exparision of production in these countries
during the seventies has oa~letely been ba.sed on damestic demand
(compare Chapter III)~cports of oopper semis have been very limited,
particularly when related to total production. Brazilian exports
aTrounted to only 3,000 tons in 1980. In the saane year, Mexico export-
ed only 5,000 tons and, inq~orting a larger atrount, net imports were
about 8,000 tons.
In 1981 imports of brass mill products in the USA reached a new level
of 200,000 tons, 15g of apparent consu~tion 1). The upsurge in these
imports is being linked with the stnictural changes in the coP'Per in-
dustry: the concentration on specialty products by a number of brass
mills, apparently leaving part of tYbe "bread-and-butter products" to
cc~panies in foreign countries.
In the context of the present study it is interesting to note that
Brazil and Mexioo have managed to capture a share of over 10 per cent
of these US it~orts, exporting respectively a]smst 11,000 arbd 8,000
tons to the USA in 1983. The Brazilian and Mexican exports are con-
nected with the export drive of these ooimtries against the background
of their debt problems and with an enorn~us overcapacity due to de-
pressed dcmestic markets. Are these exports going to get a tmre per-
manent character ? Particularly in the case of Mexico this oould be
possible, if the country maintains its export orientation and if the
production of refined copper is being expanded. Haw~yver, an even mcre
i~ortant question is whether Peru and Chile could follow Mexico and
Brazil in this respect. There are indications that Peru is already
heading into that direction. This is not surprising, because with
proper econcmic policies stimulating an outward~rientation of their
1) Copper Studies, August 1984, p. 3-76-
manufacturing iridustries, there seem not many reasons why Chile and
Peru could not participate in the increased imports in the USA. After
all, these coLmtries do have the advantage of local availability of
refined copper 1).
Trade barriers
F~sports of developing countries enoounter the same trade barriers in
other developing o~untries as the exports originating in the indus-
trialized countries. The situation is also identical with respect to
non-tariff barriers in the irydustrialized countries. The situation
is different, hawever, as regarcl.s tariffs on i~orts in the indus-
trialized oountries. The copper semis exports from developing count-
ries are in all major industrialized oountries eligible for duty-
free importation under the Generalized Sj~stem of Preferences (GSP).
On this ground, it is tempting to conclude that "the effect of tariff
ba.rriers on the location of the further stages of oopper processing
and on the oai~osition of exports from each oopper-exporting develop-
ing country is minimal" 2j. However, this oonclusion seems to be
based on a very superfici.al look at the application of the GSP-system.
In Japan, the IDC and the USA, duty-free imports under the GSP are,
in almost all cases, being limited by ceilings 3). In Japan these
ceilings on i~orts of individual developing countries are very low.
In the USA a country is no longer entitled to GSP treatment for a
oertain product when imports into the USA from that country exceed a
certain atmunt (the "a~npetitive need limitation"). This amount is
defined as m~re than 50 per cent of all developing countries' exports
of a certain product to the USA, or as a value which varies with the
US C3~IP. This value was set at ~ 50.9 million in 1981 4). In the ~C
1) 7fiis point will be elaborated upon in Chapter V, below
2) Kirthisingha, op.cit., 1982, p. 299
3) Data mainly derived frcm UNCrAD, op.cit., 1982, p. 60-64
4) ODCD: "The Generalized Systgn of Preferences; review of the first
decade", Paris, 1983, p. 34both Plates, etc, and ~tabes have been placed on the so called sen-
sitive list of the GSP, meaning that preferential i~orts of iridi-
vidual exporting countries are being limited ar~d that limits apply
for exports to each individual F.~C manber countty. S~ecial arxi more
restricted limits have been i~osed on i~orts frcm Chile aryd Bra-
zil. Besides, the ccRq~osition of the "sensitive list" can change
fran year to year.
Because of the system of ceilings in the GSP it is always highly
uncertain how much can be exported duty-free to a certa.in market.
When an investmP-nt decision has to be made in a developing oountxy,
it can never be counted upon that a certain (substantial) atrount
could be exported under a GSP-regime. And this does r„ot only apply
when ceilings have already been inq~osed explicitl~ The case of OCR
and the IDC may serve as an exa~le. Given the vexy high protection
in the IDC and the usual application of the GSP, for Chile the lo-
cal production of wire rod and export to the IDC was no real alterna-
tive to participation in production within the F~IC. In case exports
fran Chile to the IDC would have reached a certain armunt, restrict-
ive ceilings would most probably have been inq~osed, limiting the ex-
p~rts to the F.EC .
It is tentatively ocncluded (but a more detailed analysis is in
order) that exports of copper semis fran the developing ootmtries
tA the major industrialized countries are being limited by the
system of in~ort tariffs, including ceilings in the framework of
the GSP.The viability of export~riented oopper fabrication in oopper produ-
cing developing countries
Based on the foregoing chapters, we naa face the question of the
viability of export~riented oopper fabrication in oopper producing
developing countries. The argLanents and oounterarguments that have
been analysed in previous chapters, are systematically being brought
together. Besides, a few additional factors are being dealt with.
The initiatim or expansion of export-oriented copper fabrication is
only viabl.e in case this is both desirable and feasible in the eco-
nranic context of the oountries concerned.
V.l The desirability of export~riented copper fabrication
The general question to be acidressed is whether export-oriented fa-
brication of oopper(alloy) semis oould fit into an iridustrialization
strategy of copper producing countries, while s ific questions are
related to the e~ntribution of such an export-oriented sector to in-
oane, employment, etc..
At the general level we touch upon the merits of a resource based in-
dustrialization (RBI)-strategy. Despite vexy limited research on
RBI-strategies, it is clear that RBI could be the sole industriali-
zation strategy in only a very limited number of developing count-
ries. In most countries "i~ort substitution and development of la-
bor-intensive manufactures for export are likely to be integral c~n-
ponents of their industrialization strategies" 1). fíowever, typical
mineral-exporting~oopper-exporting oountries have neither been very
successful in i~ort substitution nor in labor-intensíve manufactu-
ring. I~ort-substituting manufacturing has more often than not been
1) Nank~.~ni, G.: "I~eveloFment problems of Mineral-F~cporting oount-
ries", World Bank Staff Florking Paper, No. 354, August 1979,
p. 19-79-
a high cost sector, stagnating after the easy p~hase of substitution
was over. On the other hand, it is han3 to imagine that mineral ex-
porting oountries - with relatively high wages in the formal sectror,
due to the wage leadership of the mi.ning sector - oould break into
the world market for labor-intensive manufactures.
Neither ic~ort substitution nor labor-intensive e~orts seem to of-
fer a viable industrialization strategy for the mineral exporting de-
veloping countries, including the oopper countries. A pranising al-
ternative has recently been advocated by Irtna Adelma: agricultural-
demarxl-led industrialization (ADLI) 1). The essential features of
such a strategy are a public investment prograttme in agriculture arxi
neutrality in policy with respect to export pramtion or inq~ort sub-
stitution. The activities of the manufacturing sect.or would primari-
ly be based on linkages with the agricultural sect.or: production of
inputs and processing of agricultural raw materials. ESttending this
rmdel to the mining sector, there would be a similar role for tibe
manufacturing sector as with respect to agriculture: production of
inputs for the mining sector and processing of raw materials.
In many cases the processing of locally available resources for do-
mestic oonsumption will have to be canbined with exports because of
the required minim~an scale of production. Local pxocessing of raw
materials seems to offer the best opportunities for many a mineral-
exporting oountry to start or expaixi exports of manufactured pro-
ducts. The oountries concerned are generally not well suited t~o ex-
port labor-intensive products. In efforts to turn import substitutes
into exports, there are no particular advantages over other cotuit-
ries. In the proc.~essing of raw materials the availability of cheap
raw materials of good quality should be canY~ineri with efficient pro-
cessing. Nbst of the processes involved, and this also holds true
for copper and copper alloy semis, are not particularly labor inten-
sive arx3 they may require the developnent of specialized skills.
1) Adelman, I.: "Beyond làcport-Isd-(~owth" in World Developrent,
Vol. 12, No. 9. 1984-80-
P,part from the direct positive effects of a processing irxiustry on
e~loyment and inoane, the contribution of such an industry to de-
velopment oould be twofold: be one of the spaerheads in the build
up of an internationally oc~}~etitive manufacturing sector and, se-
oondly, to save and earn foreign exchange, to be used particularly
for agricultural development.
Addressing the question of the desirability of export~riented fa-
brication at the specific level, we deal swccessively with capital
intensity and e~loyment, inoa~, linkages with other sectors of
t1~e econa~ and finally with foreign exchange earnings.
Ca~ital intensit~arr3 1 M t
One of the major hesitations regarding the desirability of copper fa-
brication in a developing countxy usually is the rather capital-in-
tensive nature of the production processes. Ztvo factors are relevant
in this respect: t1~e capital-intensity oanpared with earlier product-
ion stages in the sector and the sources of investment capital.
As was noted earlier in Chapter III, fabrication of oo~er (alloy)
semis is, measured in terms of the capital~output ratio, less capi-
tal-intensive than the earlier stages in the copper sector. In mining
the capital~output ratio is in the order of magnitude of 5 to 6, in
smelting the ocmparable figure is in the order of 6 to 8, in refining
2 to 3 and in CQ2-production about 1 to 1,5 1). In brass mills the
variation of capital-intensity can be quite wide, depending on the
product mix, but in several cases the capital~output ratio seems
even to be smaller t~ian in OCR-pmduction. It is concluded that,
from the point of the capital~output ratio, fabrication of semis is
more suitable for developing countries than mining, smelting or re-
fining of copper.
Another, but similar, argument against copper fabrication in develop-
ing countries could be that the capital~labor ratio is relatively
1) Based on large scale production; with production at a smaller
scale, the capital~output ratio can easily increase to a value
of 2 or even 2.5-81-
high. It is simply a fact that the whole oopper sector, including
production of semis, does not create much e~loyment. In oC:R-pro-
duction, for exa~le, the investment oosts per person e~loyed are
about ~ 150,000. However, in both mining and smelting the invest-
ments per e~loyee are even higher. In mining the capital~labor ra-
tio is estimated to be 3 to 4 times as high as in OCR, and in smelt-
ing the ratio is 2 to 3 times as high. In refining and OCR-prvduction
the capital~labor ratios seem to be of the same order of magniturle.
Despite the fact that fabrication of oopper (alloy) semis is less
capital-intensive than the earlier stages of the oopper sect.or, pro-
duction of semis can never oontribute substantially to a solution of
the employment problem in a developing coimtry. Assuming that the
estimates given above are about oorrect, that the capital~labor ra-
tio in brass mills is on average about the same as in CCR~production
and that processing is equally divided between OCR and brass mills,
it turns out that processing of 100,000 tons refined copper would
create employment for less than 500 persons 1). Even if, connected
with law wages, labor intensity could be doubled, the copper semis
sector still would only contribute marginally t~o employment creation
in the oountries ooncerned.
In developing ooi.mtries, investments in sectors creating little or
very little e~loyment, can only be justified under oerta.in cortidi-
tions. One justification for a capital-intensive imiestment can be
that for that purpose, and not for alternative ones, capital can be
raised fran abroad. When a feasible investment opportunity in fabri-
cation of copper (alloy) semis exists, additional funds could be
raised abroad (either direct investments or loan capital). Given the
high capital-intensity in the copper sector (including fabrication
of semis), it seems i~erative that a substantial part of investments
in this sector is financed by ca ital ' rted fran abroad.- In that
1) 100,00o tons is almost 208 of the refined production in Zambia
and almost 50~ of the production in Peru-a2-
case the capital-intensity is irrelevant, because those funds can
not be u.sed for alternative investments. The national economic
gains derived fran these investrrents are sort of a"windfall profit"
for the co~mtry.
Ino~~
Pi-nduction of o~pper (alloy) semis in oopper exporting cotmtries is
first of all desirable because inocme can be derived frrxn such acti-
vities: wages, profits, goverrmient inccme. Wages generate demand
for oons~r goods originating in agriculture arr3 other industrial
sectors. Profits will, with external financing of investm~.nts, at
least partly be repatriated. The goverranent tax-base could be broa-
dened and consequently the developrent e,xpenditures of the gavern-
ment could be increa.sed.
When processing only a part of the refined production and fabrica-
ting relatively si~le semis, the eoonanic situation of a copper ex-
porting cotmtry could never be it~roved dramatically. However, with
processing of, for instance, 208 of the refined production and with
wages, profits (capital inccme) and taxes at a level of 258 of the
value of refined oopper, the income derived from this sector w~uld
increase substantially 1).
Linkages
It is te~ting to be optimistic on the linkage effects of local pro-
duction of c~pper (alloy) semis. One should be careful, however,
and distinguish clearly specific linkages and general ones 2). Back-
ward linkages will be negligible or non~xistent. Pbrward linkages
due to the availability of locally produced semis, will only be at
work in case semis beo~ne available at lower prices than in the
1) The relative increase depends on the share of wages, profits and
taxes in the value of refined copper
2) A warning to be careful can, for instance, be derived from Zorn,
op.cit., 1985, p. 39-40-83-
case of itt~orts. For a landlocked country like Zambia, such a link-
age effect could have a positive i~act on the production of finish-
ed products like electric motors, generators and transfo~aners; nuts,
bolts, taps, valves; lampfittings and electrical apparatus. In coimt-
ries like Peru or Chile, where transport oosts weight much less
heavily on i~orts, a forward linkage effect due to lower prioes,
is likely to be (much) smaller.
At a general level, the establishment of a copper (alloy) semis in-
dustry could of course have a positive effect on the pace and pattern
of industrialization: industrial experience can be gained, skills
developed, etc.. S~h effects could, l~nwever, also be derived fran
the establishment of other industrial sectors. Generalizations are
therefore meaningless. In each oountry the alternatives will have
to be studied carefully.
Foreiqn exchange earnings
With local production of copper semis, foreign exchange is being
earned or saved. Wíth an avarage value added of 258 (an assumed
average for CCR and brass mill products) gross additional export
earnings could be substantial. When processing, for instance, 40~
of the raw material production, gross export earnings could be in-
creased by 10~. This is not a panacae for the balanoe of payments
problems of the oountries ooncerned, but it could mean a signifi-
cant improv~nent of the situation.
~cports of copper semis instead of raw (refined) copper, also would
mean a diversification. The product diversification is within the
copper sector. The country is not diversifying aw-ay from the ups
and downs in demand for copper produc:ts. iiawever, it seenLS that the
relative price fluctuations for refined oopper are wider than in
the case of copper semis. The price for the value added in fabri-
cation is comparatively constant. This means an advantage in case
of fabrication and export of semis: the export proceeds frcm the
oopper sector would be less volatile.-84-
A diversification with respect to markets would materialize when ex-
ports of semis to other developing countries would replace exports
of refined copper to ODCD-oountries. Since developing countries are
the m~st dynamic copper consimiers arid because oountries like Zambia
and Peru have the greatest ocaq~etitive advantage when exporting to
nearby developing countries, such a diversification is most likely.
It wvuld make the copper countries less dependent on the markets in
the industrialized countries.
V.2 The feasibility of export-oriented copper fabrication
It is not the intention of this study to establish definitely the
feasibility of the production of certain oopper (alloy) semis in
certain oopper oountries. That would require detailed studies in
the countries concerned. The objective is rather to get a clear idea
of the possible feasibility and of the factors that are of critical
i~ortance .
V.2.1 The Technical Factors
1. TYve-products and the-inputs
One of the argtmients against export-oriented production of brass
mill semis in the copper oountries is that "the products themselves,
after the first stage of rod~sheet~tube manufacture, beoome highly
specialized and often made to wnsLm~er specifications" 1). This ar-
gisrent does not seem to be valid (any mcre) . Ac~nittedly, brass
mills produce a wide variety of products. Hawever - as is, by the
way, hidden but implicit in the quotation cited above - most pro-
ducts are, or are based on, 5tandard products. Recent develo~-nts
in the irr3ustry accentuate the distinction between standard products
and specialty products. Sane oort~anies ooncentrate catgiletely on
specialties, while others procluce only standand products. Our best
1) Co~er Studies, October 3, 1975, p. 5-85-
estimate would be that about 90 per cent of all brass mill products
are, at least initially, standard products.
Rejections by users of oopper semis and new scrap originating in the
further processing of semis, are usually returned to the ssnis fa-
bricator. In the case of overseas exports this would be veYy costly.
This situation is being used as an argtane-nt against prooessing in
oopper exporting developing coimtries. Linked with this question of
new scrap, is the availability and price of old scrap: "The lawer
cost of scrap vis-a-vis prin~y refined oopper gives a oa~etitive
advantage to those plants, located in iridustrialized are.as, that
have access to a scrap feed" 1).
It is strange that there is a discrepanc.y betwee.n the price of virgin
copper and scrap. One would expect that the price for the same mate-
rial is the same, independent of its origin. It is a fact that
scrap can not be used for all purposes. Fbr production of OCR, for
inStance, high quality primary refined cathodes are required. This
being the case, one would, hawever, still expec.-t. that the price of
primary refined is equal to scrap for use in that part of the market
where either one can serve as an inPut. With an only marginally lawer
price for scrap, no primary metal would be used. On1y artificial
trade barriers can explain a discrepancy between scrap arxi virgin
metal. In the IDC, for instance, there are export quota for copper
2)
scrap to stimulate recycling and to reduoe impoí~t dePendence '
Consequently, the alleged disadvantage of fabrication in developing
countries is not due to technical factors but caused by institutional
arrangements. With remaval of this artificial trade barrier, this
disadvantage of location of brass mills in developing coimtries
would most likely disappear 3).
1) Co~?r SttXlies, nct~~r 3, ]q75, n, 5
2) Vingerhoets, J.: "Ontwilckelingslarxien als Grondstoffenexporteurs",
1982, p. 360
3) pnly i,n case the scrap supply surpasses the demaixl for purposes
Where both materials can be used, the scrap Price would be lower-86-
On the other hand, oopper producing developing oountries do have the
advantage of a secured supply of feedstocks for semis production.
This does not only pertain to oopper, but also to brass, because
irost oopper producing ootmtries, e.g. Zambia and Peru, also have
zinc mines.
2.-The-~- rocesses
The processes for the standard products (CCR, sheet, tubes, shapes)
are also standard ones and freely available. Orae can buy the equip-
ment from and have ít installed by the fabricators of the machinery.
Of course, adequate metallurgical and mechanical skills are needed
to operate and maintain the equipment properly. Because of the
existence of the mining sector and a related machinery industry,
these skills are usual.ly relatively well developed in the copper
exporting coimtries.
Recent developtrents in continuous casting could be advantageous for
oopper piroducing developing countries. Continuous casting and rol-
ling of rectangular sections and strips seems to beca~ feasible 1).
There is no reason why these productions should only be attached to
refineries in the industrialized oountries. Like in the case of cCR,
the attaci~mtient to refineries in the developing countries merits at
least detailed investigation.
Our ]mowledge regarding eoonanies of scale in the production of copper
semis is limited.~r investigatíons are required to establish
for different production lines the disadvantages (costs) of product-
ion at a small scale and how, at what speed, these disadvantages
disappear when ttbe scale of production is being enlarqed. Serious
diseconcmies of scale must be awided. It seems that this does not
require a very large scale of production, since countries líke Chile,
Zambia arxi Peru, producing at limited scales, have succeeded in ex-
porting certain amounts of oopper (alloy) semis.
In the literature no mention is made of the advantage of low wage
1) Copper '83, op.cit., 1983, p. 3.8 and 3.10-a7-
levels in developing muntries. The pmduction of oopper (alloy) se-
mis is rather capital intensive, but this dces not mean that the ad-
vantage of law wages is by definition negligible. In the production
of CCR in the industrialized coimtries, for instance, the share of
wage costs is estimated at about 20 per cent of total ~sts. When
wages in a developing oountry are 25 per cent of the wages in an in-
dustrialized countxy, this would i~ly a potential reduction of to-
tal costs of 15 per cent. Such a potential oost saving will oertain-
ly be reduced by a lower level of lahor efficiency. Labor efficiency
will vasy frem country to country and fran sector to sector. Detail-
ed research is needed to be able to estimate the likely (or actual)
labor efficiency in copper (alloy) semis production in irxiividual
developing countries. An advantage in semis production is that the
process is machine-pac~d. In such processes relative labor efficien-
cy is usually higher than in labor-paced processes. When in the
example given above, relative labor efficiency wnuld be 50~, the sa-
vings on labor costs wc~uld be reduced to 10~ of the total costs. This
is not enormous, but not negligible either.
3.- Trans~ort oosts
A starxiard argimient against export-oriented production of oopper (al-
loy) semis in the o~pper countries is that the transport oosts are
higher than for cathr~des 1). As a"proof" for the validity of this
argianent, reference is made to the fact that the voltune of interna-
tional trade would be limited and largely confined to intra-regional
trade. In the foregoing chapter we have shown already that this
"proof" is no longer valid: in recent years international trade in
copper (alloy) semis, including long-distance trade has increased at
a rapid rate.
However, the fact r.~mains that transPort costs are higher for oopper
semis than for cathodes. Freight rates don't necessarily have to be
higher, because in both cases we are dealing with "close weight car-
1) Copper Studies, Deceznber 16, 1975, p. 4-88-
go". The higher transport costs in the case of semis are (or: should
be) due to packing, handling arxl insuranoe costs. Tt~e semis have to
be packed to protect thHn against the inflwence of salt air. These
costs should, i~owever, not be exaggerated, as is scmetimes being
done in the literature. In Zambia, for instance, the CCR-coils are
si~ly, but effectively, packed in plastic foil.
At present, we do riot (yet) have data on freight, packing, handling
and insurance oosts of semis, adding up to the total transport o~sts
fmn a number of origins to different destinations. TYuese data will
have to be collected in order to be able to assess the importance
of transport oosts for the location of semis prodwction in the cop-
per wuntries. What can be done at the marent, is to define exactly
the problem at hand, taking into acoount a special feature of the
price setting in the w~rld oopper market.
It is custon~sy in the world oopper market, that buyers pay a price
independent of the oosts of transport fran the mine~refinery to the
fabricator. The prices for refined oopper are based on the quotations
on the Lprr3on Metal Ekchange (IME). A buyer pays that price and the
transport costs are being paid for by the primary producer. Fbr a
fabricator, there is no advantage in buying from a nearby mine~re-
finery, and for a mine~refinery it is very costly when the product
has to be transported aver a long distance.
With local production of copper semis in a oopper mining country,
one saves the oosts of transporting the refíned metal. It is there-
fore justified to give a discount to a local fabricator equal to the
saving on transport costs. It is ingiossible to determu~e these sa-
vings on a case-by-case basis. The best solution seems to be to give
a discount equal to the average oosts of transporting the refined
metal. In Zambia, for instanoe, such a disaount system is in operat-
ion 1). As an average for transport oosts, one has taken the oosts
of transporting cathodes to Western Eti~xvpe.
1) This situation prevailed at the end of 1984-89-
Depending on the location of the buyer of semis arr3 the location of
potential oa~etitors, the discount for savings on transport costs
of refined will be of greater or smaller ing~ortance for a fabricator
in a oopper producíng develaping country. Zb get a better idea of
the ic~ortance of this factor we discuss, only as an exa~le, brief-
ly three cases of (partly imaginary) Pxports of oopper semis fran
Zambia.
Case one. When a Zambian fabricator would try to export oopper sanis
to Western Etiuope, he has to pay for the higher transport oosts of
semis. This is a disadvantage vis-a~vis the fabricators that produce
senus within Western Europe .
Case two. When exporting to a regional market, for instance Kenya,
the advantage for the Zambian fabricator depends on the location of
the canq~etitor. In case the fabricator would have to oa[q~ete with a
coRq~etitor fran Western Elirope, the situation is as follaws. The
Zambian fabricator gets the disoount, but he has to incur the oosts
of transporting the semis to Kenya. These costs are most probably
lawer than the discount for the saving of the transport costs of re-
fined. The Western F~ropean fabricator, on the other hand, pays
the full I~-price and he also has to pay for the transport of the
semis to Kenya. The advantage for the Zambian fabricator is substan-
tial.
In case the ccRq~etitor would be located in Kenya, the adv'antage for
the Zambian fabricator would, of course, be smaller. Hawever, the
costs of transporting semis to Kenya are rrost li3cely to be
lawer than the disoount on the IME-price. The Zambian fabricator en-
joys a cost advantage over a Kenyan conq~etitor.
~ase three, Wt~en producing for the local Zambian market, the cost
advantaqe for the local fabricator is very substantial: the discount
on the IME-price plus the costs that oa~etitors have to bear for
transporting semis to landlocked Zambia.-90-
4. Conclusion
Considering the technical factors, there appear to be two positive
and two negative factors of iitg~ortance with respect to local proces-
sing of oopper. The positive factors are relatively low wages in com-
parison to the irxiustrialized wuntries and savings on transport
costs when producing for the local arri regional market. The possible
negative factors are diseoonomies of scale and relatively law labor
efficiency. At a scale of production of any substance, the advantages
could easily outweight the disadvantages. Our preliminary conclusion
is that, based on the technical factors, one w~uld expect export-
oriented processing in the copper o~untries to be (much) further de-
veloped than is actually the case. Negative institutional factors
have probably been at wr~rk.
V.2.2 Institutional factors
1. NThe structure of the sector
The existence of exceas capacity in the industrialized oountries is
sometimes being used as an argtarent against (expansion of) semis pro-
duction in developing countries 1). This pl~menon is related to
the stagnation of detnarri in the irxiustrialized countries, technolo-
gical develo~me.nts (CCR) arrl the structure of the sector (oligopolists
ooaq~eting for market shares). This factor is not likely to hamper
stnicturally nor severely export~riented production in developing
countries, because the excess capacity is likely to be of a tempo-
rary nature and because the most rapid expansion of demand is taking
place in developing oountries.
The struc.~ture of the semis sector in the ODCD-countries limits the
feasibility of export-oriented prooessing in the oopper countries.
In the brass mill sector, concentration is quite high and most of
the leading oa~anies are integrated backward with refining. In the
1) Copper Studies, December 4, 1975, p. 4-91-
wire and cable sector, concentration arrl vertical (fori,rard) integra-
tion are at an even higher level. Concentration and integration limit
access to a sector for newoarers. Fbrwar.d integration directly limits
the "free" market arxi integration always disoourages relocation of
part of the production chain.
Fbr a"newoaner" from a developing country, it wuuld be vexy diffi-
cult to break into the oligopolistic market in North America, Western
EZzrope or in Japan, on its awn strength. Besides, also when tzying
to export to other developing countries, strong oa~etitors are tA
be enoountered. Marketing will therefore be a cruaial issue. Of
wurse, in the long run these problems could be eased by mprasures
like stri~cter anti-trust laws in OF~-countries and better inter-
national regulation against dumping. In the meantime, hawever, it
seen~s more or less necessary to join forces with a Western ca~1y.
Making use of the marketing experience, the custcmer relations and
the marketing network of a reoognized Western fabricator would be
the best way to solve the marketing probleqn. Othexwise it would be
vexy wstly and very difficult to build up an effective marketing
network.
For a Western fabricator, a joint venture with a fabricator in a de-
veloping oountry could mean a(Partial and relative) relocation of
production. Hav.x. yver, there have never been strong incentives for Wes-
tern copper fabricators to relocate (part of) the production process
to developing cow'itries. The technical factors have apparently (like
in ttbe case of copper refining) never been of overriding ing~ortance
and other institutional factors (see below) have disoouraged reloca-
tion of production to oopper producing developing oountries. A joint
venture will have to be (made) attractive for a Western oanpany. The
general investment climate in a developing oountxy and specific
(te~orary) incentiv~es are of i~ortance. Besides, it seen~s that the
trade policies of both i~rting and exporti.ng countries are highly
relevant .-92-
2. Trade barriers in ~ort~ooimtries
The conclusion reached by Kirthisingha, that the effect of tariff
barriers on the oa~osition of exports fran copper oountries "is
minimal" 1), is oertainly wrong. Only a review of the literature
on trade barriers already shows that they limit the feasibility
of export-oriented processing.
In the industrial countries the most significant non-tariff barrier
consists of technical and quality specifications which may be changed
over time. With respect to tariffs, the functioning of the Generalized
S~stem of Preferences is of ing~ortance. In the major ODC~narkets,
ceilings and tariff quotas limit the amounts that can be imported
with preferential treatment. Besides, the extent of preferential
treatment can be changed overnight. The unoertainty inherent in the
GSP means that a potential investor can never be sure of preferential
treatment. It has hap~pened too often that preferences are no longer
granted when an exporting oo~txy succeeds in exporting only a li-
mited atrount to an ODC~-inarket. Conseqtyently the irost-fawured-na-
tion tariffs seeqn to be more i~ortant than the GSP-margins. The ge-
neral tariff protection is higher in the IDC and Japan than in the
(ISA. In the first twu markets mentioned they prohibit or severely
limit i~orts fran developing ootmtries and other ODLD-countries.
In developing countries that have been practicing import-substitution,
the situation with respect to trade barriers is similar to the situ-
ation in the irriustrialized oountries. The local industry is some-
times heavily protec. ~ted against imports by tariffs and non-tariff
barriers, like quotas and import licencing. In the absence of a pre-
ferential system for other developing oountries, the (potential) im-
ports fran irxiustrialized and developing oountries are affected
alike.
It is concluded that trade barriers in both irr3ustrialized countries
and a nLUnber of developing countries, are an institutional factor
1) Kirthisingha, op.cit., 1982, p. 299-93-
limiting the viabilíty of semis fabrication in oopper piroducing de-
veloping countries. iir.~aever, more research is needed to establish
firmly the siqnificance of this factor in the various markets.
3;-Trade~olicies of-~r-ex.~orting-develoPinci countries
It has been observed "that the oamiercial policies of developing
oountries restrict their exports of processed goods" 1). Import-
substitution policies typically imply an anti-export bias. Locally
purchased inputs becane expensive. IiYq~ort-substitution many times
goes together with ovezvalued currencies (exchange rates), thus re-
ducing the real proceeds from exports.
These general observations also seem to be applicable to oopper ex-
porting countries. Countries like Peru, Chile and Zambia have fol-
lawed itrq~ort-substitution industrialization policies during all or
most of the past decades. Besides, in times of fawurable danarri
and prices for copper, devaluation could, without damaging effects
for the balance of payments, lag behind inflation. Prices of imports
could be kept relatively low. However, this severely limited the
possibilities to export manufactured products.
It is a simple fact, that an anti-export bias of the trade policy
of a country is not compatible with the objective of exporting ma-
nufactured products, including processed raw materials. A neutral
trade policy, as defined above, is the minim~IIn requireme.nt. It has
not been investigated in the framework of this study, to what ex-
tent the policies of the countries concerned have changed in recent
years. However, it seems that recent general adjustznent policies
have diminished the irnaard~rientation of several copper exporting
countries. The need for further adjustment, particularly for deva-
luation (depreciation) has to be oonsidered on a country-by~ountry
basis.
1) Wall, D.: "Irr3ustrial processing of natural resources", in i~lorld
Development, Vol. 8, 1980, p. 309-94-
V.3 Conclusions
In conclusions regarding the viability of export~riented setnis fa-
brication in copper countries, a distinction can be made between
substantive oonclusions and ídentified further research reqLU.re-
ments.
The desirability of oopper fabrication can in the first place be
established in terms of an ADLI-strategy in which processing of
agricultural and mtneral raw materials, rather than export-oriented
production of labor-intensive manufactures, is part and parcel of
the industrialization strategy. Specific advantages of fabrication
of copper semis are: the relatively limited capital-intensity with-
in the copper sector; the generation of wages, profits and taxes;
possible forward linkages arid, last but not least, increased foreign
exchange earnings.
As regards the feasibility of sanis fabrication, the balance of po-
sitive and negative technical factors is, under certain oonditions,
likely to be in favour of a copper exporting country. Particularly
when producing for local and regional markets, the savings on
transport costs can be significant. Law wages can be an advantage
wt~en oontemplating exports to industrialized countries. On the other
hand, diseconcmies of scale can be at wurk. Besides, relative labor
efficiency is probably very important and may even be a decisive
factor.
Turning to the institutional factors, the best way to overcane the
problem of the oligopolistic nature of the structure of the sector
in the market econcmies, seems to be to join forces with an esta-
blished fabricator fran an industrialized country. Secondly, trade
barriers in both industrialized arxi developing countries limit the
viability of export-oriented o~pper processing. Finally, the trade
policy of the potential exporting oountry itself must not be a
barrier t,o exports of copper (alloy) semis.
In future research on the feasibility of e~ort~riented semis pro-
duction in the oopper countries, priority should be given to four
technical factors and two institutional ones. The technical factors-95-
are: labor efficiency in local processing, eooncmies of scale,
transport costs, and (forward) linkage effects. The institutional
factors are: trade barriers in both industrialized and developing


















1 Chile Chile Chile.~n State 16.8 16.8
2 Zambia Zambia Zambian State 10.8 27.6
3 Zaire Zaire Zaïrois State 7.5 35.1
4 Britain Canada~S.Afr.~ Rio Tinto Zinc 6.8 41.9 10.5 10.5
I
S~ainjN .Gtiiinea
S USA USA~Australia~ Asaroo 6.0 47.9 9.2 19.7
i Peru~Mex.~Nicar.
I 6 USA USA Kennecott Copper 5.4 i 53.3 8.3 28.0
7 Japan Canada~Peru~ Consortium: Dow-a,Flaru- 5.1 58.4 7.9 35.9
Philipp. kawa,Mitsubishi,Mitsui
Nippon, Siani.taro
8 USA USA Phelps-Dodge 4.9 63.3 7.5 43.4
9 USA Canada~S.Afr.~ Newnent Minin9 3.7 67.0 5.7 49.1
USA
10 USA Canada(USA Anaconda 3.4 70.4 5.2 54.3
d C IN00 2.4 72.8 3.7 58.0
11 Canada ana a
12 S. Africa Canada~Namibia~ An91o-American (Youp 2.1 74.9 3.2 61.2
S.Afr.~Zimbabrae
13 USA USA Duval Cop~per div. 1.9 76.8 2.9 64.1
Pennzoil-98-
TAffi~E II
Major Western World Primary Refined Co~er Producers, 1977 (Asterisk
designates custom refiners)





1 USA, Australia A.sarcn (USA) 9.8 9.8
2 Zambia Zambian State (Zambia) 9.1 18.9
3 Chile Chilean State (Chile) 7.9 26.8
4 USA, Canada Keruiec~tt Copper (USA) 6.1 32.9
5 USA Phelps-Dodge (USA) 5.8 38.7
6 Canada Noranda Mines (Canada) 5.2 43.9
7 Several Nippon Mining ~) (Japan) 4.3 48.2
8 Belgium Metallurgie Hoboken-
Overpelt ~) (Belgiian) 3.9 52.1
9 Several ANII~X ~) (USA) 3.3 55.4
10 Zai.re Zairos State (Zaire) 3.0 58.4
11 Several Rio Tinto-Zinc (Britain) 2.9 61.3
12 W.Gesm-~~y Nordeutsche Affinerie~) i
(W. Germany) 2.8 64.1 '
i
13 Japan Onahar~~ Smelting 8~ Refi- i
ning (Japan) 2.8 66.9 ,
14 USA, Canada Anaconda (USA) 2.7 69.6 ~
15 Peru Peruvian State (Peru) 2.3 71.9 ~
16 Canada INCO (Canada) 2.3 74.2
17 Séveral Newimnt Mining~) (USA) 2.1 76.3
18 Several Sumitomo Metal Mining~)
(Japan) 2.1 78.4
19 Several Mitsubishi Metal Mining~)
(Japan) 1.9 80.3
20) Yugoslavia Rudarsko Top}onicarski ~
Basen, Bor 1(Yugosl.) 1.8 82.1
Source Tables I and II: Becker, D.: "The new bourqeoisie and the limits
to dependency: mining, class and power in 'Rewlutionary' Peru", Prince-
ton University Press, Princeton, New Yersey, 1983TABLE III The maZor copner fabricato.rs
-99-
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1 British Insulated Cal-
lender's Cables, Ltd. UK 475 6.1
2) Anaconda Canpany USA 362 4.6
3 Drawn Metal Tube Co. USA 315 4.0
4 ! Sumitam Nletal Mining Japan 295 3.8
5 I Pirelli Intern. SA Italy 250 3.2
6 Ftiu~)cawa Electric Japan 240 3.1
7 ~ Delta Metal UK 234 3.0
8 MIM UK 190 2.4
9 Hitachi Japan 187 2.4
10 INII UK 180 2.3
11 PLJK UK 164 2.1
12 AT and T(West Elec.
Co. Inc.) USA 150 1.9
13 Sté. Generale Belgium 150 1.9
14 Mitsui Min.B~ Stnelting Japan 142 1.8
15 Mitsubishi Met.Mining Japan 120 1.5
16 Noranda Canada 117 1.5
17 Zbshiba Denko Japan 96 1.2
18 Gutehoffnungshtitte AG FR of Germ. 80 1.0
19 Metallgesellschaft AG FR of Germ. 80 1.0
20 Sta.Metallurgica
Italiana Italy 80 1.0
21 Continental Copper 8~
Steel Ind. Inc. USA 80 1.0
22 Direccion General de
Fabricaciones Milit. Argentina 79 1.0
23 Sdad.Espanola de Con-
strucciones Elec.Me-
canicas SA Spain 76 1.0
24 Diehl Metal Works FR of Germ. 75 0.9
25 W Industries Inc. USA 67 0.9
Other 3537 45.3
Zbtal Ident.Se~mi-fa-
bricating Capacity 7821 100
Source: Metals Bulletin, special issue, 1974STATISPICAL ANNf~{-101-
:na1.F
bbrld m~ne pra?ucci~r: li~ i.-c-i~~ MIi
Cowtry 49~51 59;61 69~71 ~ 79~81 82 83
OME Finland ~ 17.3 30.3 ~ 30.8 ~ 38.7 38.2 37.7
Norway I 14.8
I
14.6 20.9 ' 28.6 27.9 26.2
Spain I 17.3 17.8 24.2 ; 49.3 I 58.1 ~ 63.9
Sweden 15.6 17.7 27.2 ~ 46.4 ~ 55.4 l 64.0
Ul( ~ -
i
- - I 0.3 0.6 0.7
Yugosl. 39.3 35.3 89.0 113.1 119.3 ', 129.5
Other
I
~ Eiuvpel) 7.3 16.4 . 19.0 ~ 9.1 5.6 ~~ 5.5
~ Total ~ '
6urope11 ~ 111.6 132.1 211.1 285.5 . 305.1 . 327.5
Canada ~ 241.2 385.1 . 594.9 681.4 ~ 606.3 625.0
USA 783.3 928.4 ~ 1447.4 ~ 1387.6 1139.8 ~ 1038.1
N.Anerica 1024.2 1313.5 2042.3 2069.0 1796.1 1663.3
5. Africa 32.7 51.3 144.6 208.5 207.1 ~ 211.8
Japan .. 38.4 90.3 Í 120.5 54.4 51.0 ' 46.0
~ Austrilia 15.3 101.6 155.3 237.5 241.8 264.6
I Tbtal 1225.0 1688.8 I 2673.8 2854.9 , 2551.1 i 2513.0
LDC Namibia 11.1 25.6 24.7 41.8 48.8 ~ 52.1
Ugarxia - 13.4 16.7 - - ~ -
Zaire 169.8 293.3 ~ 386.1 454.8 502.8 I 502.2
Zambia 292.0 504.8 ~ 685.0 590.5 ~ 529.6 578.3
Zimbabwe - - ~ - 26.2 i 24.8 23.7
~r2'3! 1.4 18.2 28.8 26.2 I 39.6 44.8
TOtal
I Afr. L1 474.3 915.5 1141.3 1139.5 1145.6 1201.1
Chile 371.6 541.4 696.0 1070.6 1240.7 1257.1
Mexicv 62.1 55.6 63.5 171.0 239.1 206.1
L`eru 30.0 ]14.0 208.8 363.8 356.3 322.2
Iat.JVn. 4R8.5 759.1 987.4 1615.4 1863.5 1820.8
India 7.0 8.6 10.3 26.8 24.0 43.8
Irxlonesia - - - 60.6 75.1 78.6
Malaysia - - - 26.6 30.9 28.5
Philipp. 10.0 48.5 163.1 301.7 293.1 271.4
Turkey 13.5 29.5 28.0 28.6 31.4 24.9
~~y1,3,4) 24.7 44.7 33.6 5.5 49.4 80.2
Dev.
Asia 1'41 55.2 131.2 235.0 449.8 503.9 527.4
Pap.N.Guin - - - 161.0 170.0 183.2
7bta1 1015.2 1805.9 2363.7 3365.7 3683.0 3732.5
CPE Bulgaria - 12.1 40.4 61.3 70.0 80.0
M~ngolía - - - 45.8 95.0 95.0
Poland 1.461 10.6 84.5 325.9 376.0 402.3
USSR 224.0 496.7 930.0 1133.3 1180.0 1180.0
China and
oth.Asia 19.1 93.9 165.4 243.5 259.7 185.0
Tbtal 244.5 613.3 1220.8 1809.8 1980.7 2009.5
CIPFC 5) 863.4 1543.5 1975.9 2701.3 2874.5 2921.6
t4E 2240.2 3494.7 5037.5 6220.6 6234.1 6245.5
Nbrld 2484.7 4108.0 6258.3 8030.4 8214.8 8255.0
Source: Metall Statistik; for 1983: world Metal Statistics
1) Excluding CPE
21 Excluding South Africa
31 Cacposition of restgruips is not the same in all periods mnsidered
4) Ekcluding Japan ard China
5) CIPEC - Chile, Peru, Zambia, Zaire, Irtiionesia, Papua New (~inea
6) 50~51-102-
~rrwi.E: 1. z
World mi.m production ( percentac~ shares of ME)
Country 49~51 59~61 69~71 79I81 82 83
~ME Finland 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.6 ~ 0.6
Norway 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.5 j 0.4 Í 0.4
Spain O.B O.5 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0
Sweden 0.7 O.5 O.5 0.7 0.9 1.0
Yugosl. 1.8 1.0 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1
~rr 1) 0.3 O.5 0.4 0.1 I O.1 O.1
1bta1
blir. 1) 5.0 3.8 4.2 4.6 4.9 5.2
Canada 10.8 11.0 11.8 11.0 9.7 10.0
US~A 35.0 26.6 28.7 22.3 18.3 16.6
N.Htcierica 45.7 37.6 40.5 33.3 28.0 26.6 S. Africa 1.5 1.5 2.9 j 3.4 3.3 ~ 3.4
Japan 1.7 2.6 2.4 0.9 0.8 0,7
nustralia 0.7 2.9 3.1 3.8 3.9 4.2
1bta1 54.7 48.3 53.1 45.9 40.9 40.2
IDC Natnibia O.5 0.7 O.5 0.7 0.8 0.8
04az~ - 0.4 0.3 - - -
Zaire 7,4 8.4 7,7
I
7.3 8.1 8.0
Zart~ia 13.0 16.2 13.6 9.5 8.5 9.3
Z~~ - - - 0.4 0.4 0.4
other
Afr.2~3) O.1 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.7
1Uta1
Afr. 2) 21.2 26.2 22.7 18.3 18.4 19 2 C'hile 16.6 15.5 13.8 17.2 19.9
.
20.1
rlexico 2.8 1.6 1.3 2.7 3.8 3.3
Perv 1.3 4.1 4.1 5.8 5.7 5.2
Iat. Am. 21.8 21.7 19.6 26.0 29.9 29.2
India 0.3 0.2 0.2 O.4 0.4 0.7
Irdonesia - - - 1.0 1.2 1.3
Malaysia - - - 0.4 0.5 O.5
Philipp. 0.4 1.4 3.2 4.9 4.7 4.3
Tlirkey 0.6 0.8 0.6 O.5 O.5 0.4
~
r
1,3,4) Asia 1.1 1.3 0.7 O.1 O.8 1.3
Oev.
1,41 Asia 2.5 3.8 4.7 7.2 8.1 B.4
Pap.N.C~ain. - - - 2.6 2.7 2.9
1bta1 45.3 51.7 46.9 54.1 59.1 59.8
CPE Bulgaria - 0.3 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.3
Mongolia -
6)
- - 0.7 1.5 1.5
Poland 0.1 0.3 1.7 5.2 6.0 6.4
U.SSR 10.0 14.2 18.5 18.2 18.9 18.9
China and
oth.Asia 0.9 2.7 3.3 3.9 4.2 3.0
Rbtal 10.9 17.5 24.2 29.1 31.8 32.2
CIPDC 5) 38.5 44.2 39.2 43.4 46.1 46.8
ME 100 lOD 100 100 100 100
Mbrld 110.9 117.5 124.2 129.1 131.8 132.2
Source: Metall Statistik; for 1983 world Metal Statistícs
1) FJCC1u31rxJ CPE
2) Ekcluding Sarth Africa
3) Conpositirn of restgroups is not the sm[e in all periods oonsidered
4) F~ccluding Japan ard (htna
5) CIPDC -(hile, Ppru, Zanbia, ZaizE, indcriesia, PaFn;a New (;vinea
6) 50~51TN3LE 1 . ;
Wor1d mi-:~ ::~~x?uction (4ro~wth rates)
Country Sol6o I 60170 70~60 50~80
5.8 DME Finland I 0.2 2.3 2.1 ,
Norway i - O.1 3.7 3.2 2.2
Spain 0.3 3.1 7.4 3.6




I 8.4 EL ~irr 1) 1.5 - 7.1 0.7
7bta1 ~
Qyr. 1) 1.7 4.8 3.1 3.2
Canada 4.8 4.4 1.4 3.5
C~ 1.7 4.5 - 0.4 1.9
N.America 2.5 4.5 O.1 2.4
S.Africa 4.6 10.9 3.7 6.4
Japan 8.9 2.9 - 7.6 1-2
Australia 20.8 4.3 4.3 9.6
lbtal 3.1 9.3 0.7 2.9
IDC Nart~ibia 8.8 - 0-4 5.4 4.5 i
Uganda . - 2-2 - - I
Zaire 5.6 2.8 1.7 3 3




Afr. 2~3) 29.2 4.7 - 0.9 10.3
Rtrt~l
Afr. z) 6.8 2.2 O.O 3.0
~],l I~~ 1.8 2.5 4.4 3.6
htexlea~ - I. I I. i IO.4 3.4
R~ru 17,U 3.8 5.7 8.7
lat. Fvn. 4.5 2.7 5.0 4.1
India 2.1 1.8 10.0 4.6
Philipp. 17.1 12.9 6.3 12-0
7urkey 8.1 - O.5 0.2 2.5
~x}K~r
Aaal . i ~4) f.. l
~
-.'.H -16.G - 4.9
~~ 1,4) Asia 9.1 6.0 6.7 7.2
Tbtal 5.9 2.7 3.6 4.1
CPE Bulgaria - 13.0 4.1 -
~7a~ - 23.1 14.5 -
i1SSR 8.3 6.5 2.0 5.6
China and
crth.hsla 17.3 5.8 3.9 9.1
Tbtal 9.6 7.1 4.0 6.9
C1pEC 5) 6.0 2.5 3.2 4.1
pg 4.5 3.7 2.1 3.5
World 5.2 4.3 2.5 4.1
Source: h)ntall Statistik
1) Excluding CPE
2) Excluding South Africa
3) Conpositio~n of restgroup is not the same in all Perlods oonsiáereà
4) Excluding Japan ard China
5) CIPDC - Chile, Peru, Zambia, Zalre, Indonesia. PaRia New (Uinea~rt~r.~ ~ .1
trFirld :;mr.i!,-:. „r-:c:uccion ( in ]OClO MI')
Ccwntiv 49~51 59~61 69~71 79~81 82 83
C~ff' Finland 16.6 33.0 ~i 33.5 51.9 66.2 70.1
Norway 9.0 20.8 ~ 31.6 31.0 ~ 24.4 26.5
Spain 8.1 15.0 54.8 100.4 : LO5.0 89.0
SWeden 15.4 18.A I 34.4 I 52.7 Í 72.5 78.8
UK 22.0 5.7 i - - - -
Yugosl. 35.5 34.0 85.2 ~ 98.3 84.0 86.8
Germ. FT2 46.7 63.6 87.7 I 163.1 161.8 159.1
Eurl 1) 168.7 217.5 346.7 499.6 ~ 517.9 515.9
Canada 209.2 351.0 430.3 448.8 366.6 336.9
USA 876.4 992.7 1429.4 ; 1220.3 975.4 927.7
N.America 1087.6 1343.7 1859.7 1669.1 1342.0 1264.6
S.America 32.0 50.2 145.2 184.5 191.8 192.3
Japan 39.8 184.3 493.1 891.1 946.2 944.6
Australia 13.7 68.4 123.6 166.2 165.3 173.6
1bta1 1341.8 1864.1 2968.3 ~ 3410.5 3165.2 3091.0
117C Namibia - - 27.8 40.8 49.8 54.2
lklard.i - 13.4 16.5 O.L - -
zaIre 2) ~ 166.2 292.3 383.8 421.4 466.4 465.8
7.ambia 286.1 ï61.2 676.7 592.0 580.7 562.7
zimbabwe - - - 27.5 30.5 31.2
r ~ 3~4) 33.1 55.3 21.8 - - -
Af trl 3) 453.4 872.0 1126.6 1081.8 1127.4 1113.9
Chile 352.1 515.5 639.7 951.9 1046.8 1058.1
Me)cioo 55.1 49.5 62.1 80.9 61.7 66.9
Peru 22.9 125.6 170.6 331.5 269.7 295.9
Brazil - - - - 4.8 63.1
Iat. Pm. 430.0 692.2 876.7 1363.8 1407.8 1484.0
India 6.9 8.6 9.4 25.3 32.6 35.4
Philipp. - - - - - 38.8
74irkey 13.5 23.7 18.6 21.8 25.3 18.3
~ A.sial'4'S) 0.8 3.0 10.0 102.7 156.8 206.5
Oev.
Asia 1,5) 21.2 35.3 38.0 149.8 214.7 298.0
1bta1 1) 904.6 1599.5 2041.3 2595.4 2749.9 2895.9
CPE Bulgaria - 15.4 42.2 59.7 70.0 60.0
Poland - 16.3 70.3 309.3 3C8.0 320.0
USSR 224.0 496.7 930.0 1160.0 1220.0 1280.0
China ard
oth.Asia 4.3 64.0 111.3 195.7 222.0 230.0
4bta1 246.1 619.6 1206.1 1799.8 1698.0 1969.7
CIPl;C 6) 627.3 1494.6 1870.8 2296.8 2383.6 2382.5





6215.7 7805.7 7813.1 7956.6
Source: hletall Statistik; slnelter prnduc.-tion fiYaroxes only
11 Excluding CPE
2) Includes leach catt~odes
3) F~ccludirg South Afria
4) Caq~oeitian of restqro~s is not the sare in all periods oonsiàered
S) LJccludinq Japan ard C7iina
6) CIPEC :(7ille, Peru, Zatnbia, Zaire, Indonesla, Papuea New (liinea-105-
TASI.E 2.2
Fbrld smelter production (pe..rcentage shares of ME)
Country 49~51 59~61 69~71 79~81 82 83
Otg Finland 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.2
Norway I 0.4 0.6 0.6 O.5 0.4 0.4
Sgiin 0.4
I
O.5 1.1 1.7 1.6 1.5
~ Sweden 0.7 O.5 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.3
UK I 1.6 0.2 - - - -
Yugosl. 1.6 ' 0 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.4
Germ. FFt ' 2.1 l.ti 1.8 2.7 2.7 2.7
'Ibtal ~
Eur. 11 7.5 6.3 6.9 8.3 8.8 8.6
Canada ' 9.3 10.1 8.6 7.5 6.2 5.6
USA 39.1 28.7 28.5 20.3 16.5 15.5
N.Airerica , 48.4 38.8 37,1 27.8 22.7 21.1
S. Africa ,' 1.4 1.4 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.2
Japan 1.8 5.3 9.8 14.8 16.0 15.8
Australia ~ 0.6 2.0 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.9
2hta1 59.7 53.8 59.3 56.8 53.5 51.6
T17C Namibía - - 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Uganda - 0.4 0.3 -
Zalre 21 7.4 8.4 7.7 7.0 7,9 7.8
Zarnbia 12.7 16.2 13.5 11.3 9.8 9.4
Zimbatx.e - - - O.5 O.5 0.5
~~r3'4) 1.5 1.0 0.4 - - -
1bta1
Afr. 3) 20.2 25.2 22.5 18.0 19.1 18.6
Chile 15.7 14.9 12.8 15.8 17.7 17,7
Mexico 2.5 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.1
Peru 1.0 3.6 3.4 5.5 4.9 4,9
Iat.Am. 19.1 20.0 17.5 22.7 23.8 24.8
India 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6
PhiliPP- - - - - - 0.6
Turkey 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
4 5) ~1 , , - O.1 0.2 1.7 2.7 3.4
Dev.
p~íy 1,5) 0.9 1.0 0.8 2.5 3.6 5.0
1bta1 1) 40.3 46.2 40.7 43.2 46.5 48.4
CPE Bulgaria - 0.4 0.3 1.0 1.2 1.0
Poland - 0.5 1.4 5.1 5.2 5.3
USSR 10.0 14.3 18.6 19.3 20.6 21.4
China arcl
oth.ASia 0.2 1.8 2.2 3.3 3.8 3.8
7bta1 11.0 17,9 24.1 30.0 32.1 32.9
CIPE7C 6) 27.9 43.2 37.3 38.2 40.3 39.8
ME 100 100 lOD 100 100 100
world 111.0 117.9 124.1 130.0 132.1 132.9
Source: Metall Statistik
1) Excluding CPE
2) Includes leach catlndes
3) Excluding South Africa
4) Cot~osition of restqmups is not the same 1n all periods caisidered
5) Excluding Japan arrl Quna
6) CIPEC - Chile, Perv, Zambia, Za.Ire, Uidaiesia, Papua New (~irea-106-
~,~
'.rc,r-,: ~c: s.-'.-..r.-~~..r-t i ~r: -,~c~r. ~. rates)
Country SO160 60I70 70I80 50,~80
OME Finland 7.1 0.2 4.5 ~ 3.9
Norway 6.7 4.3 - 0.2 4.2
Spain 6.8 13.4 6.2 8.8
St.eden 1.6 6.7 4.4 4.2
UK . - 12.9 - 100 - - 100
Yu9os1. - 0.4 9.6 1.4 I 3.5
Germ. FR 3.1 3.3 6.4 4.3
~1 1) 2.6 4.6 3.7 3.7
Canada 5.3 2.1 O.4 2.6
USA 1.2 3.7 - 1.6 1.1
N.Merica 2.1 3.3 - 1.1 1.4
5. Africa 4.6 11.2 2.4 6.2
Japan 16.6 10.3 6.1 10.9
Australia 17.4 6.1 3.0 8.7
7bta1 3.3 4.8 1.4 3.2
LDC Namibia - - 3.9 -
Ugarda - 2.1 -40.0 -
Zalre 2) 5.8 2.8 0.9 3.1
2ambia 7.0 1.9 - 1.3 2.5
~ Afrr 3~41 5.3 - 8.9 - 100 - 100
~~l 3) 6.8 2.6 - 0.4 2.9
Chile 3.9 2.2 4.1 3.4
Me)cioo - 1.1 2.3 2.6 1.3
Peru 18.6 3.1 6.9 9.3
Iat. Am. 4.9 2.4 4.5 4.0
India 2.2 0.9 10.4 4.4
Ttirkey 5.8 - 2.4 1.6 1.6
~ ~ 1,4,5) ~ q0.3 12.8 26.2 17.6
Dev.
Asia 1~5) 5.2 0.7 14.7 6.7
4bta1 1) 5.9 2.5 2.4 3.6
CPE Bulgaria - 10.6 3.5 -
Poland - 15.7 16.0 -
USSR 8.3 15.7 2.2 5.6
China ard
oth.l~sia 47.6 6.5 5.8 13.6
Zbtal 9.7 6.9 4.1 6.9
CIPéx 6) 9.1 2.3 2.1 4.4
t4E 4.4 3.8 1.8 3.3
World 5.1 4.3 2.3 3.9
Source: Metall Statistlk
1) Ekcluding CPE
21 Includes leech catlndes
3) Ekcluding South Africa
4) Ca~pOSition of restgroups is rot the same ln all perio3s oonsidered
5) óccluding Japnn ani China
61 CIPE7C ~ Chile, Peru, Zembia, Zalre, Indonesia, Papua New (litriea-107-
'ï,yF;L- '.,. i.
wo-1d .--i-~? production (1000 MI'1
Country 49.51 59I61 G9;71 79181 82 83
Dh1E Bclgium 137.6 192.5 312.4 403.2 437.9 404.6
Finland 16.6 32.6 33.4 39.1 48.0 55.4
Norway 6.6 16.7 25.2 24.6 18.0 22.7
Spain 14.4 48.0 77,9 148.7 171.9 158.6
S..~eden 25.0 38.2 50.9 59.8 62.3 63.4
UK 194.3 211.5 194.0 139.7 134.1 144.4
Yugosl. ld.t 34.1 88.0 133.8 126.9 123.7
Germ. FR 183.1 298.4 402.7 381.2 393.6 420.3
Total
Elu. 11 637,4 958.0 1257.8 1437.1 1505.1 1514.7
Canada 214.6 359.5 461.9 459.7 312.4 464.3
USA 1217.3 1509.2 1941.4 1882.4 1672.2 1583.7
N.America 1431.9 1868.7 2403.3 2342.1 1984.6 2047.0
S. Africa 12.0 14.6 71.9 148.3 142.5 157.7
Japan 83.6 239.7 ti82.0 1016.0 1075.0 1091.9
Australia 23.0 75.4 148.6 181.6 182.7 201.9
7bta1 2187.5 3156.4 4564.2 5152.1 4889.9 5013.2
IDC ZaIre 2) BB.S 150.5 193.6 132.8 175.1 226.9
Zambia 83.0 397.4 572.8 578.2 587.0 575.4
Total
Afr. 3) 172.1 552.5 790.0 723.8 790.2 B30.1
Chile 309.0 237.2 461.9 788.8 851.6 833.4
Mexico 15.9 28.1 54.4 91.5 74.4 80.3
Peru 21.5 30.3 34.4 223.3 224.9 190.6
Lat. Am. 345.9 298.9 566.8 1136.9 1196.2 1192.7
India 6.8 8.3 9.6 21.9 26.2 28.1
Philipp. - - - - - 38.8
1ltrkey 2.8 11.2 13.6 21.2 32.2 31.8
~~a1,4,5 - - 15.0 114.0 164.2 186.6
[kv.
Asia 1'S 9.6 23.7 38.2 157.1 222.6 285.3
Total 527.6 875.1 1395.0 2017,8 2209.0 2308.1
CPE Bulgaria - 12.4 38.5 62.3 65.0 62.0
Polard 10.7 20.5 73.2 340.1 348.0 360.1
USSR 288.3 606.7 1081.7 1463.3 1520.0 1500.0
China and
oth.Asia 4.6 93.3 141.7 315.0 319.0 345.0
7bta1 334.3 784.9 1434.3 2343.5 2404.7 2412.0
CIPDC 6) So2.0 606.3 1262.7 1723.1 1838.6 1826.3
ME 2715.1 4031.5 5959.2 7142.9 7098.9 7322.3
kbrld 3049.4 4816.4 7393.5 9486.4 9503.6 9734.3
Source: Metall Statistik
1) Excluding CPE
2) Excludes leach cathodes
3) Excluding Sovth Africa
4) Co~osition of restgroups is not the same in all periods considered
5) Excluding Japan and China
6) CIPEC - Chile, Peru. Zambia, Zaire, Indonesia, Papua New C~iinea-108-
- -.-`i:ied production (percentage shares)
Gountry 49~51 59I61 69~71 79~81 82 83
DME Belgium 5.1 4.8 5.2 5.6 6.2 5.5
Finlard 0.6 0.8 0.6 O.5 0.7 0.8
Notway 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
Spain 0.5 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.4 2.2
Sweden 0.9 0.9 0.9 O.8 0.9 0.9
UK 7.2 5.2 3.3 2.0 1.9 2.0
1'ugos:. 0.7 0.8 1.5 1.9 1.8 1.7
Germ. FR 6.7 7.4 6.8 5.3 5.5 5.7
1bta1
Eur. 1) 23.5 23.8 21.1 20.1 21.2 20.7
Canada 7.9 8.9 7.8 6.4 4.4 6.3
USA 44.8 37.4 32.6 26.4 23.6 21.6
N.America 52.7 46.4 40.3 32.8 28.0 28.0
S. Africa o.4 0.4 1.2 2-1 2.0 2.2
Japan 3.1 5.9 11.5 14.2 15.1 14.9
Ausualia 0.8 1.9 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.8
1bta1 80.6 78.3 76.6 71.8 68.9 68.5
L[7C 2aYre 2) 3.3 3.7 3.2 1.9 2.5 3.1
2ambia 3.1 9.9 9.6 8.1 8.3 7.9
Total
Afr. 3) 6.3 13.7 13.3 10.1 11.1 11.3
Chile 11.4 5.9 7.8 11.0 12.0 11.4
Nlexico 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.4 1.0 1.1
Peru 0.8 O.8 0.6 3.1 3.2 2.6
Lat. Am. 12.7 7.4 9.5 15.9 16.9 16.3
India 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4
Philipp. - - - - - O.5
Turkey O.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 O.5 0.4
~a1,4,5) - - 0.3 1.6 2.3 2.5
Dev.
Asia 1~51 0.4 0.6 0.6 2.2 3.1 3.9
1bta1 19.4 21.7 23.4 28.2 31.1 31.5
CPE Bulgazia - 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.9 O.8
Poland 0.4 O.5 1.2 4.8 4.9 4.9
USSR 10.6 15.0 18.2 20.5 21.4 20.5
China arrl
oth.ASia 0.2 2.3 2.4 4.4 4.5 4.7
7bta1 12.3 19.5 24.1 32.8 31.1 32.9
CIPDC 6) 18.5 15.0 21.2 24.1 25.9 24.9
ME 100 100 100 100 100 lOD
World 112.3 119.5 124.1 132.8 133.9 132.9
Source: Metall Statistik
1) Ekcluding CPE
2) Excludes leach cathodes
3) Dccluding South Africa
4) Con~oaition of restgroups is not the same in all periods oonsidered
5) i7ccluding Japan ard China
6) CIPEC - Chile, Peru, Zambia, 2aire, Indor~esia, Papua New GUinea-109-
ïASLE
htrld rei~rk.ï rrcw~xtion (4rowtr1 rates)
Country' SOi60 6Q~70 70~80 SOI80
Dt4E Belgíum 3.4 5.0 2.6 3.6
Finlancl 7.U 0.2 1.6 2.9
Dbrwav 9.7 4.2 - 0-2 3.4
Spain 12.8 5.0 6.7 8.6
S~den 4.3 2.9 1.0 3.1
~ 0.9 - 0.9 - 3.2 - 1.1
1'uqosl. 6.5 9.9 4.3 6.9
Germ, F'ft 5.0 3.0 - 0.4 2.5
Total
E~r. 11 4.2 2.8 1.3 2.7
Canada 5.3 2.5 - 2.6
USA 2.2 2.6 - 0.3 1.5
N.America 2.7 2.5 - 0.3 1.7
S. Africa ~ 2.0 17.3 7.5 8.7
11.0 Japan 39.8 4.1 8.7
I
Australia 12.6 7.0 2.0 7.1
Total ~ 3.7 3.8 1.2 2.7
i7c 2aíre 21 5.5 2.6 - 3.7 2.3
Zambia 17.0 3.7 0.1 6.7
Total
Afr. 3) 12.4 3.6 - 0.9 5.2
Chile - 2.6 6.9 5.5 3.4
Mexico 6.2 6.8 5.3 5.4
peru 3.5 1.3 20.6 8.1
iat. Am. - 1.4 6.6 7.2 4.2
India 2.0 1.5 8.6 4.6
Turkey - 2.0 4.5 -
~ ~a1,4,5) - - 22.5 -
Dev.
Asia 1,5) 9,5 4.9 15.2 11.0
T`otal 5.2 4.8 3.8 4.9
CPE Pola~ 6.7 12.0 4.9 12.3
USSR 7.7 13.6 16.6 5.7
China and
oth.Asia 35.1 6.0 3.1 15.2
Total 8.9 6.2 5.0 6.8
CIPDC 6 1.9 7.6 3.2 4.4
ME 4.0 4.0 1.8 3.3
World 4.7 4.4 2.5 3.9
Source: Metall Statistik
1) Excluding CPE
21 Excludes leach cathodes
3) Excluding South Africa
4) Caig~osition of restgroups is not the saone in all periais considere
5) Excluding Japan and Chile
6) CTPEC - Chile, Peru, Zambia, ZaIre, Indonesia, Papua New t~ineaTAHLE 4.1.1
Production of seoondary refined oopper (in 1000 (Kr)
Countsy 49~51 59~61 69~71 79~81 82 83
Belgiian 1) 65.3 60.7 60.0 71
Erance 27.7 33.7 27.0 41
Gerniany FR 113.9 126.8 180.0 184.5 177.1 182
Italy 19.0 14.1 19.6 31
UK 73.5 97.9 129.1 80.8 71.0 77
Yugoslavia 2.8 39.9 44.4
Europe 464.1 490.2 489.8 491
Japan 45.5 58.0 104.4 125.0 126.8 147
South Korea 13.6 4.0 12
Canada 35.3 24.0 35
USA 196.8 249.1 399.3 459.0 947.1 399
North America 494.3 471.1 434
Brazil 14.0 33.2 35.7 25
Mexico 6.0 11.1 12.7 6
Australia 37.9 32.7 17.8 44
ME 454.7 641.7 1082.7 1200.2 1157.9 1159
Source: Metall Statistik, 1983, World Metal Statistics
1) Including LuxembourgTABLE 4.1.2
Production of seoondary refined copper (percentage shares and growth rates)
Pcrcentactes shares Growt.h rates
Country 49~51 59~61 69~71 79~81 82 83 50~60 60~70 ~ 70~80 50~80
Belgiwn 1) 6.0 ~ 5.1 5.2 6.1 - 0.7
FYance I 2.6 ~ 2.8 2.3 3.5 I 2.1
Gerniany FR 25.0 ~ 19.8 16.6 ~ 15.4 : 15.3 15.7 1.1 3.6 ~ 0.2
I
1.5
Italy Í 1.8 ~ 1.2 I 1.7 I 3.7 ' - 2.9
UK 12.6 ~ 15.3 11.9 ~ 6.7 I 6.1 6.6 2.9 2.8 - 4.0 - 0.1
Yugosl. I 0.3 3.3 ~ 3.8 I 30.4 .




Jagan 10.0 9.0 9.6 10.4 11.0 12.7 2.5 6.1 Í 1.8 3.5 I
S.Korea 1.1 0.3 1.0 ~
~a~ 2.9 2.1 3.0
pSA 43.3 38.8 36.9 38.2 38.6 ~ 34.4 2.4 I 4.8 1.4 2.8
N.America 41.2 40.7 I 37.9 I
Brazil 1.3 ~ 2.8 3.1 2.1 9.0
~i~ 0.6 ~ 0.9 1.1 0.5 0.3
Australia 3.5 ' 2.7 1.5 3.8 - 1.5
ME 100 100 100 100 100 100 3.5 5.4 1.0 3.2
Source: Metall Statistik
1) Including Luxenibourg17~ffiE 4.2.1
Ditect scrap used by manufactures (in 1000 PII')
Camtry 49~51 59~61 69~71 79~81 82 83
Netl~erlarYis 5.3 13.0 26.0 18.3 21.0
Belqiun 26.7 ' 33.1 35.3 1) 29.3 1) 29.1 1~
28
FYanoe 41.8 103.8 136.2 119.5 113 104
Gerneny FR 66.8 123.7 177.9 236.6 222.2 251
Italy 26.1 74.0 159.3 200.3 183.0 192
[~ 127.7 165.9 130.4 122.3 127 110
n~~~ 30.3 44.3 49.0 50
E~uvpe 351.4 591.4 810.4 887.0 853.2 879
South Africa 15.0 28.3 3D 27
~r ~r~ 5.0 4.3 4 4
Ja~nn 79.7 190.0 351.7 417.0 476.0 S1B
~h ~ 23.7 18.0
T~~ 15.7 12.0
~- ~~ . 98.0 120.0 150
Canada 30.3 b.3 42.7 21.6 9.0 24
USA 675.7 686.5 870.9 910.9 698.0 784
North Noerlca 706.0 726.8 913.6 932.5 707.0 B08
Ba~azll 14.8 23.0 21.0 17
~t~ ~r1~ 70 96.3 104.0 68
Australla 37.7 44.3 43.0 42
IE 1137.1 1508.1 2219.2 2507.8 2334.2 2496
Souroe: Metall Statistik ard world Metal Statistlc (Nbrld Metal Statistics inc udes scrap in irrgot fozm)
1) Includinq IanrnmóoianTABLE 4.2.2
Dimct scrap used by manufact.ure~. Ipercentages shares and growtJ~ rates)
Percentages shares rrowth rates
country 49~51 59~61 69~71 79~81 A2 83 50~60 60170 70I80 io 50
Netherl O 5 0 9 2 1 7 0 0.9 9.4 7,2 - 3.5 4.2 . . . . . 1 1
Belq. 11 2.3 2.2 1.6 1.2 1.2 2.3 0.6 - L.R 0.3
FYanoe 3.7 6.9 6.1 4.8 4.8 4.2 9.5 2.8 - 1.3 3.6
Germ.FR 5.9 8.2 8.0 9.4 9.5 10.0 6.4 3.7 2.9 Í 4.l
Italy 2.3 4.9 7.2 8.0 7.8 7,7 11.0 7.9 2.3 I 7.0
UK 11.2 11.0 5.9 4.9 5.4 4.4 2.7 - 2.4 - 0.6 Í - 0.1
rugsl. 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.0 3.9 i
Etirope 30.9 39.2 36.5 35.4 36.6 35.2 5.3 3.2 0.9 3.1
S.Africa 0.7 1.1 1.3 1.1 6.6
Oth.pfr. 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 - 1.5
Japan 7,0 12.6 15.8 , 16.6 20.4 20.8 9.1 6.4 1.' S.'
5,~~ 0.9 0.8
Taiwan 0.6 O.5
pey,Asiy 3.9 5.1 6.0
Canada 2.7 2.7 1.8 0.9 0.4 1.0 2.9 0.6 - 6.6 - 1.1
OSA 59.4 45.5 39.2 36.3 299.9 31.4 0.2 2.4 O.5 1.0
N.Amerlca 62.1 48.2 41.2 37.2 30.3 32.4 0.3 2.3 0.2 0.9
9razil 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.7 4.5
Iat,pmer, 2.8 3.8 4.2 2.7 3.2
p~ustralia 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6
I4E 100 100 100 100 lOD 100 2.9 3.9 1.2 2.7
Souxoe: Netall Statistlk aa~lerented with Fbrld Hetal Statistics (4brld Metal Statistics incl.scrap in
11 Partly includlny I.tttanbasg iiKpt form)TAffi~E 5 .1.1
World trade in ores and concentrates, exports (in 1000 NQ C~ contents)
Countzy 59~61 69~71 79~81 82 83
DME Nozway - 9.2 20.6 9.5 19.4
Spain 2.0 - 4.7 - -
Sweden - - - 11.3 8.4
Yugoslavia - - 1.6 - -
Canada 37.1 169.9 293.7 252.8 313.8
USA - 21.4 100.7 195.3 42.7
South Afr. - - 24.0 14.5 15.2
Australia 107.9 24.7 49.3 63.3 71.9
LDC Zaire - - 35.1 36.0 36.0
ZaQnbia - 12.7 - - -
Chile 21.0 52.6 112.3 200.9 I 196.2
Mexiw 9.31) 4.81) 76.1 132.0 195.1
Peru 16.7 34.5 24.6 I 38.4 41.0
Indonesia - - 60.1 76.4 76.9
Malaysia - - 26.7 30.9 29.1
Philipp. - 163.0 296.0 280.0 211.7
Turkey - 12.1 8.0 - -
Pa.N.Guinea - - 160.8 173.3 182.5
DME 225.2 499.3 558.6 472.6
LDC 297.1 822.7 980.5 1012.6
Total 522.2 1322.0 1539.1 1485.2
Source: Metall Statistik and World Metal Statistics
1) Gross weightsTABLE 5.1.2
World trade in ores and ooncentrates, exports (percentage share of ME)
~~~, 69~71 79~81 82 83






0.6 ~~ - .
Yugoslavia - 0.1 - -
~a~ 56.2 22.2 16.4 21.1
U~ 19.3 7.6 12.7 2.9
South Africa - 1.8 0.9 1.0
Australia 4.7 3.7 4.1 4.8









~i~ - 5,8 8.6 13.1
Pe~ 6.6 1.9 2.5 2.8
Indonesia - 4.5 5.0 5.2
Malaysia - 2.0 2.0 2.0
Philippines 31.2 22.0 18.2 14 3
Turkey 2.3 0.6 -
Pa.N.C~,i.inea - 12.2 11.3 12.3
p~,~ 43.1 37.8 36.3 31.8
~ 56.9 62.2 63.7 68.2
Total ME 100 100 100 100
Source: Metall Statistik and World Metal StatisticsTABLE 5.1.3
World trade in ores and concentrates, exports (average annual gmwth rates)
Country 60~70 70~80
~ ~~Y - 8.4
C.anada 16 . 4 5. 6
U~ - 16 . 8
Australia - 7,2
I.aC Chile 9.6 7.9
Peru 7.5 - 3.3
Philippines - 6.1
Turkey - - 4.1
~ - 8.3
~ - 10.7
Zbtal I4E - 9. 7
Source: Table 6.1TABI,E 5.2.1
World trade in ores and concentrates, ' rts (in 1000 NII'
-117-
Country 59~60~61 69~70~71 79~80~81 82 83
Austria o.41) - - 4.0 -
Helgiiun O. 92) 5. 9 1. 8 - 2. 7
France - - 7.1 - -
Finland - - 21.8 15.6 23.9
Gerniany FR 135.5 85.4 137.4 150.3 139.6
~~aY - - - 18.6 3.2
Spain 24.81) 24.9 47.3 63.0 58.3
Sweden 25.7 10.8 19.0 28.5 26.4
Yugoslavia - - 5.7 - 2.5
USA 63.4 31.2 39.3 110.7 109.2
Japan - 382.7 842.7 979.5 846.5
S. Korea - - 71.8 118.3 111.4
Taiwan - - 34.0 21.4 33.5
~ - 540.9 1122.1 1370.2 1212.3
~ - - 105.9 139.7 144.9
Total - 540.9 1228.0 1509.9 1357.2




World trade in ores and concentrates, ' rts ( centage shares)
Country 69~70~71 79~80~81 82 83
Austria - - 4.0 -
Belgiian 1.1 O.1 - 0.2
France - 0.6 - -
Finland - 1.8 1.0 1.8
Gezmany FR 15.8 11.2 10.0 10.3
~~aY - - 1.2 0.2
Spain 4.6 3.9 4.2 4.3
Sweden 10.8 1.5 1.9 1.9
Yugoslavia - 0.5 - 0.2
USA 5.8 3.2 7.3 8.0
Japan 70.8 68.6 64.9 62.4
S. Korea - 5.8 7.8 8.2
Taiwan - 2.8 1.4 2.5
~ 100 91.4 90.7 89.3
IDC O.O 8.6 9.3 10.7
Zbtal 100 100 100 100
Source: World Metal StatisticsTABI,E 6.1.1
World trade in unrefined copper (blister and anode copper), rts (in 1000 Nfr
Countxy 49~50~51 59~60~61 69~70~71 79~80~81 82 83
DME Belgiinn ; - - 1.7 ~ 7.2 11.9 11.3
Finland - - - ~ 12.3 13.8 15.0
France - 6.0 8.4 4.3 3.5 6.6
Oe~. ~ - 0.6 0.9 22.1 18.8 17.0
i Italy - - 2.1 , 0.1 0.3 0.2
~ ~~ay - - 6.4 ' 6.5 6.7 6.2
( Spain - - 0.8 ~ 0.4 - 1.0
Sweden - O.1 2.8 5.2 25.7 40.2
~ UK 27.7 - - - - -
~ USA
~
0.3 5.6 12.3 6.8 2.0 7.5
S. Africa
I
- - 97.3 ~ 35.6 39.1 34.7
Australia - 6.0 7.1 21.2 7.3 8.4




Zaire 80.1 110.3 192.7 i 272.1 323.3 231.8
Zambia 198.2 158.6 103.4 ~ 8.1 - -
Zimbab.l) - - - ~ 9.0 22.7 24.9
C:hile - 277.0 182.8 ~ 163.0 198.9 224.4
Mexio~ - 26.2 7.3 ~ 5.1 9.5 11.9
Peru - 92.6 139.2 ~ 123.3 97.0 92.7
Turkey - - 4.6 ~ - - 8.4
1~IE - - 140.0 ~ 86.0 129.1 148.1
LDC - - 646.4 662.4 695.8 632.5
Total - - 786.2 798.4 824.9 780.6
Source: World Metal Statistics and Metall Statistik
1) Incl~ing refinedTASLE 6.1.2
World trade unrefined copper, exports (percentage share
of ME
Country 69~70~71 79~80~81 82 83
DN~ Austria - - - -
Belgitun 0.2 1.0 1.4 1.5
g~and - 1.6 1.6 1.9
EYance 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.8
Gertn.FR 0.1 3.0 2.2 2.2
Italy 0.3 - - -
Norway 0.8 6.3 0.8 0.8
Spain O.1 O.1 - 0.1




USA 1.6 0.9 2.0 2.0
S.Africa 12.4 4.8 4.6 4.4
Austral. 0.9 2.8 0.9 1.1
I~CC Namibia - 5.6 5.3 6.0
Uganda 2.1 - - -
Zaire 24.5 36.4 38.4 29.7
Zambia 13.2 1.1 - -
Z~, 1) - 1.2 2.7 3.2
Chile 23.3 21.8 23.6 28.7
Mexico 0.9 0.7 1.1 1.5
Peru 17.7 16.5 11.5 11.9
Turkey 0.6 - - -
L1ME 17.8 11.5 15.7 19.0
I,pC 82.2 88.5 84.3 81.0
Total 100 1G0 100 100
TABT~E 6.1.3
World trade unrefined rts (annual
average gr rate
50~60 60~70 70~80 50~80
- -100.0 - -
- - 15.5 -
- 3.4 - 6.5 -
- 4.1 37.7
- - -26.2 -
- - - 0.2 -
- - - 6.7 -
- 39.5 6.4 -
-100.0 - - -
34.0 8.2 - 5.8 6.5
- - - 9.5 -
- 1.7 11.6 -
- - -100.0 -
3.3 5.7 3.5 4.8
- 2.2 - 4.2 - 22.5 -10.1
- - 4.1 - 1.1 -
- -12.0 - 3.5 -
- - 4.2 - 1.2
- - 11.0 -
- - - 1.0
- - 1.2
Source: World Metal Statistics and Metall Statistik
1) Includes refinedTARI,E 6.2.1
World trade in unrefined o~pper (blister and anocie oopperl, u~orts (in 100o hs)
~~~Y 49~50~51 59~60~61 69~70~71 79~80~81 82 83
Austria 3.9 5.7 8.6 8.7 ~ 8.5
BelqiLUn 186.6 188.7 213.8 I 194.3
~an~ 10.8 7.1 16.2 19.0 22.5 14.4
~rn~y ~ 133.1 144.6 60.1 81.2 68.9
Italy 10.3 2.5 3.4 1.1 2.7
Pt~rtugal 1.6 1. 4 1.5
~~ 11.5 37.3 22.0 17.9
S~aeden 2.7 4.9
UK 121.0 117.8 39.5 67.3 68.1 83.7
Yugoslavia 13.5 29.6 21.9 5.9
U~ 156.8 274.2 187.2 63.6 106.2 82.1
J~~ 134.0 80.3 77.9 55.5
~ 747.9 559.2 624.9 533.4
LDC
~~ 747.9 559.2 624.9 533.4
Sources: World Metal Statistics and Metall StatistikTABI.E 6 . 2 . 2
World Trade unrefined copper, i~orts (perc.shares of ME)
Country 69~70~71 79~80~81 82 83
Austria 0.8 1.5 1.4 1.6
Belgiun 24.9 33.7 34.2 36.4
grance 2.2 3.4 3.6 2.7
Genn. FR 15.1 10.7 13.0 12.9
Italy 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.5
Portugal 0.3 0.2
~~ 6.7 3.5 3.4
Staeden 0.4
UI( 15.8 12.0 10.9 15.7
Yugosl. 5.3 3.5 1.0
~~ 36.7 11.4 17.0 15.4
Japan 14.4 12.5 10.4
~ 100 100 100 100
~ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 100 100 100 100
TABLE 6.2.3
World trade wirefined r, ' rts
annua average rate
50~60 60~70 70~80 50~80
3.9 4.2 ~
0.1
- 4.1 8.6 ~ 1.6 J 1.9







- 0.3 -10.4 ~ 5.5 i -1.9
~ 8.2 ~




Sources: World Metal Statistics and Metall StatistikTAgLE 7.1.1
World trade in refined copg~er, rts (in 1000 MP)
Country 49~50~51 59~60~61 ~ 69~70~71 79~80~81 82 83
DME Austria 0.9 1.2 ~ 5.5 ~ 18.9 ' 17.2 21.3
Belgitun 117.81~2) - 274.3 ' 293.1 287.9 221.2
Finland - - 5.7 2.9 4.4 11.7 I
~ance - 6.5 4.3 14.8 j 5.9 17.6
Germany FR 31.7 83.3 114.3 79.7 ~ 71 5 90 0





~~Y - - 24.3 23.3 ~ 18.1 20.3
SPa~ - - 12.1 53.6 ! 68.0 71.5
St~den 5.0 1) 15.4 28.0 20.1 i 28.4 23.3





30.4 32.1 7.3 3.5
Canada 109.9 231.9 246.4 276.7 232.6 298.5
S. Africa - - 28.6 64.9 66.9 91.6
Japan 22.9 1) 1.5 24.3 97.0 44.6 177.5
Australia - 13.3 37.8 51.2 44.3 79.3
USA 125.4 310.5 188.9 50.0 31.6 82.0
LDC Zaire 87.3 131.5 187.3 125.0 156.6 218.5
Zambia 81.2
1)
385.8 574.8 598.6 602.6 570.5
Chile 328.2 216.5 434.4 755.8 808.5 830.3
Peru 20.9 27.9 31.1 204.5 204.1 161.8
~ - - 1316.4 1094.4 947.9 1251.6
~ - - 1227.6 1683.9 1771.2 1781.1
Total - - 2544.0 2778.3 2719.1
~
3032.7
---- - - - - J
Source: Metall Statistik and Alorld Metal Statistics
1) Incltules unrefined
2) Includes LuxembourgTABLE 7.1.2
World trade in refined copper, exports (percent. shares)
Country 69~70~71 79~80~81 82 83
DME Austria 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.7
Belgiinn 10.8 10.5 ; 10.6 7.3
Finland 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4
France 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.6
~ennany FR 4.5 2.9 2.6 3.0
Netherl. O.l 0.1 -
~
-
Norway 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7
Sgain 0.5 0.9 ; 2.5 2.4
Saeden l.l 0.7 , 1.0 i 0.8
~ 1.9 1.0 ' 0.6 Í 0.6
Yugosl. 1.2 1.2 0.3 0.1
Canada 9.7 10.0 8.6 ; 9.8
USA 7.4 1.8 1.2 ~ 2.7
S.Africa 1.1 2.3 2.4 ~ 3.0
Japan 1.0 3.5 1.6 5.9
Australia 1.5 1.8 ~ 1.6 ~ 2.6
IDC Zaïre 7.4 4.5 5.8 ~ 7.2
Zambia 22.6 21.5 22.2 18.8
Chile 17.1 27.2 29.7 27.4
Peru 1.2 7.4 7.5 5.3
~ 51.7 39.4 34.9 41.;
~ 48.3 60.6 65.1 58.~
Total loo loo loo la,
TASLE 7.1.3
Annual average growth rates
50~60 60~70 70~80 50~80








66.0 - 5.1 - 5.4 14.2
0.5
1.2 3.1 I




4.2 ~, 3.6 - 4.0 2.0
16.9 4.1 0.4 6.9
7.2 5.7




Source; Njetall Statistik and World Metal StatisticsT119t.E 7.2.1
tebrld trade in refined cq~per, i~orts (in l00o t~Il')
Camtry 49~50~51 59~60~61 69~70~71 79~80~81 82 83
Austria 4.4 18.2 25.1 4.3 4.9 1.3
Belqiun 152.01'2) 186.2 312.9 255.3 141.7
~k 2.1 - 0.3
F~a~ 10.7 18.4 18.4 18.7
FYarae 101.3 196.8 313.4 382.3 367.3 339.0
Germany FR 55.3 301.2 379.1 430.2 423.2 403.8
~~ 22.6 17.7 19.3
Italy 57.1 1) 157.7 254.3 342,8 318.9 297.2
Netherlands 11.1 1) 29.5 1) 41.3 23.8 20.6 25.6
Spain 3.4 11 24.1 ~ 21.2 11.6 19.8
~ 38.3 1) 65.0 62.7 68.6 73.7 71.5
tM 212.1 394.3 397.6 268.1 255.4 200.7
Yucpslavia 23.6 27.0 23.3 18.0
Oar~da 16.5 23.6 28.0 24.6
[1E21 262.7 128.1 129.1 342.7 284.8 483.0
S. Africa 3.4 1.8 0.2 0.2
Jepan - 59.4 1) 172.6 258.1 295.8 190.4
Brazil 58.6 183.8 204.7 56.4
I~a 46.2 51.6 56.7 61.3
S. Korea 17.3 30.1 35.1
Tai~ 52.8 26.5 61.8
~~ 89.3 110.9 485.9
~ 2075.4 2507.4 2418.5 2270.5
~ 104.8 309.2 320.5 216.6
Total ME 2180.2 2816.6 2739.0 2487.1
Source: world htetal Statistics and Metall Statístik
11 Inculdes blister
2) Includes Lux~d~ourGTABI.E 7.2.2
world trade in refined oq~er i~ort (percent.shares of ME
Country 69~70íï1 79í80I81 82 83
p~vstria 1.2 O.1 0.2
Belgiun 8.5 I 10.5 9.0 5.7
Dermark 0.1
pjnland O.5 I 0.6 0.6 0.8
~~ 14.4 I 12.9 12.9 13.6
Gernuny FR 17.4 14.5 14.9 16.2
Greec,e 0.8 0.6 0.8
Italy 254.3 11.5 11.2 11.9
Netherl. 1.9 O.8 0.7 1.0
~ain 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.8
S1.eden 2.9 2.3 2.6 2.9
~ 18.2 9.0 9.0 8.1
yugpsl, 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.7
~~ 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0
~ 5.9 11.5 10.0 19.4
S. Africa 0.2 O.1
Japan 7.9 8.7 10.4 7.7
Brazil 2.7 6.2 7.2 2.3
~ia 2.1 1.7 2.0 2.5
S. Wjrea 0.6 1.1 1.4
.~~ 1.8 0.9
~~ 3.0 3.9 19.5
p~ 95.2 89.0 88.3 91.3
~ 4.8 11.0 11.7 8.7
~gl ME 100 100 100 100
TABLE 7.2.3
Mnual averagc qrowth rates
SOI60 60í70 70I80 SO180
15.3 3.3 - 16.2 - O.1
5.3
5.6
6.9 4.8 2.0 4.5





6.4 0.1 - 3.9 0.8
1.4
3.6








Spurce: hbrld Metal Statistics ard P1eta11 StatistikTABIr 8.1




























































































































































































































































































































































istiJc 2) Source; World Metal Statistlcs 31 Data fran Metall Statistik 4) Including New Zealand ~~ ~. of restgr,is rot the s~re in all per. 6) Excluding South Africa ~~ a~ (oonsidered-127-
r„~:: -
~.w~rl:? rr-:r.~ïi ccros~.rrq~tion as perc~ntage share of ME
Countsy 49i51 54~61 69~71 78~81 82 83
11 11 21 21 2) 21
DAti Austri U.5 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.3
Belq.3~ 2.3 2.2 1.0 4.0 4.1 3.8
Finland O.5 O.8 0.6 O.B 0.8 1.0
Franc~ 5.1 5.9 5.9 6.8 6.2 5.8
Germ. FR 6.8 13.3 ll.0 10.5 10.8 10.9
Ital}~ 2.6 6.4 4.6 5.1 5.1 4.8
Netherl. 0.4 O.8 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.4
Portuaal i - - 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Spain 0.7 1.3 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8
S~eden ' 2.3 2.3 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7
Switcrl. . 0.8 1.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 O.1
UH , 16.0 13.7 9.4 5.7 5.3 5.3
Yugosl. O.B 1.1 1.3 1.8 2.1 2.0
Tot. Eur. 39.3 48.3 41.4 38.0 39.3 38.3
Canada 4.1 3.1 3.9 3.2 2.2 2.9
USA 97.a 33.7 32.9 27.7 24.6 26.2
N.America 51.5 36.8 36.9 30.9 26.8 29.1
Australia 1.4 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.7
Japan 2.7 7.6 14.3 17.1 18.4 17.9
S. Africa 0.7 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.1
Total 4) 95.5 95.3 95.1
--
89.0 87.6 88.1
LDC' Algcria ---- - - U.1 -
~;m,T~t - - - O.1 O.1 O.1
Zuntk~2,w~~ - - U.1 O.1 O.1 U.1
cnhtr
Afr. 5) 0.3 0.7 O.1 - - -
Tot:il
Afr. 6) U.3 U.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3
Irdia 1.2 1.6 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.4
Iran - - - - O.1 O.1
Philipp. - - - - O.1 O.1
S. Korea - - - 1.4 2.0 2.2
Taiwan - - - 1.1 1.1 1.5
Turkey - - 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.9
~ ASia5~7) U.2 0.5 - 0.3 0.4 0.7
Dev. Asia 1.4 2.1 1.5 4.3 5.4 7.0
Argentina 0.3 O.5 0.6 0.7 O.8 O.5
Brazil 0.9 0.8 1.1 3.0 3.7 2.2
Chile 1.2 0.6 0.4 0.6 O.S 0.4
Mexioo 0.4 O.5 1.0 1.7 1.3 1.2
peru - - O.1 0.3 0.3 0.3
Other
Iat. Am. - O.1 - 0.2 - -
lat. Am. 2.8 2.4 3.2 6.4 6.6 4.6
Total 4.5 4.7 4.9 11.0 12.4 11.9
CPE Bulgazia - - - 0.8 0.9 0.9
CzecMsl. - - - 1.2 1.3 1.3
Germ, FF2 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.7
polazd - - - 2.7 2.5 2.6
Ronania - - - 1.1 1.1 1.0
USSR 12.7 16.9 17.1 18.2 19.8 20.1
China and
oth.ASia 0.2 2.8 3.7 5.2 6.1 6.3
Tbtal 15.4 23.5 25.7 31.3 34.1 34.4
CIPDC 8) - - - U.9 0.9 0.7
ME 100 100 lU0 100 100 100
world 115.4 123.5 125.7 131.2 134.1 134.4
Source: Mbrld Metal Statistics and Metall Statistik
1) Source: Metall Statistik 21 Source: World Metal Statistics
3) ~ata fran Metall Statistik 4) IncludSn9 New Zealard
5) Crnp.of restgr. os rot the same in all per. 6) Excluding South Africa
leonsidered 71 EXCluding Japan-128-
TABi.E b. 3
World refined cons~.rc~uor, av~~rac~ a-~,~..a1 -ates
Countr}~ SOI60 11 60~70 21 ?0~80 ~) 50 80 1,2)
~ Austria 9.3 3.5 - 5.1 2.4
Belgiun 31 3.6 3.0 10.0 5.3
Finland 8.2 0.7 5.5 4.9
Franc~e 5.6 4.1 1.9 3.9
Germany FR 11.5 2.7 1.4 5.1
Italy 10.1 4.0 3.5 5.8
Nctherlands 10.4 3.2 - 2.8 's.4
Syain 10.7 7.7 1.8 6.7
Sweden 4.4 6.1 1.8 2.1
Switzerland 7.0 0.3 - 10.2 - 1.2
UK 2.6 0.2 - 2.6 O.1
Yugoslavia 7.3 5.9 5.9 6.3
~btal bUrope 6.4 2.4 1.6 3.5
Canada 1.3 6.6 0.3 2.7
USA 0.7 3.8 0.7 1.7
N. Im~rica O.B 4.1 0.7 1.8
Au::tralia 6.6 4.8 1.9 4.4
.7al..ui 15.9 10.6 4.3 10.2
South Africa 3.9 4.2 8.3 5.5
TUtal 41 4.2 4.0 1.8 3.3
LDC Algeria - - 7.2 -
Zimtabwe - - 8.3 -
Other Afr.5) 2.1 - 1.5 - 100 - lOG
Tot. Afr. 6) 2.1 3.5 6.9 4.4
India 7.1 - 1.3 3.1 2.9
Turkey - - 8.3 -
~~a 5,7) 14.3 - - 5.2
Dev. Asia 8.3 0.6 14.0 ï.5
Argentina 11.3 4.4 5,q 7.0
Brazil 3.0 8.0 13.1 8.0
Chile - 3.3 O.1 6.9 1.2
Mexico 5.5 12.2 7.5 8.3
Peru - - 17.0 -
Other
Lat. Am. - - 19.2 10.6
Iat. Atrerica 2.7 7.0 9.8 6.4
2bta1 4.7 4.4 11.1 6.7
CPE Germany DR 9.3 3.8 3.0 5.4
USSR 7.8 4.2 3.1 4.8
China and
other Asia 37.6 7.0 6.1 16.0
Zbtal 8.7 5.0 4.6 6.1
CIPDC 8)
ME 4.2 4.0 2.5 3.6
World 4.9 4.2 2.9 4.0
Source: Mbrld Metal Statistics and Metall Statistik
11 Source: Metall Statistik
2) Source: Fbrld Metal Statistics
3) Data frrni Metall Statistik
4) Including New Zealand
51 Carq~osition of restgroups is not the same in all periods considered




Production of copper semis in developing oountries; oonsw~tion of re-
fined and production data (x 1000 tons and percentage shares)
Refined constmq~tion Production data
Countzy
1969~71 1979~81 1969~71 1979~81
Volimie Volu~ne ~ Voltm~e Volimme
Argentina 32.0 54.1 6.7 n.a. n.a.
Brazil 62.8 215.8 26.8 97.3 209.2
Chile 22.3 43.6 5.4 9.1
~)
n.a.
Mexico 59.6 122.7 15.3 n.a. 177.3
Peru 3.9 18.7 2.3 n.a. -
Other L.A. 2.1 12.2 1.5 n.a. -
Lat.America 182.7 464.4 57.8 n.a. n.a.
Algeria 1.7 3.4 0.4 n.a. n.a.
ggypt - 9.7 1.2 - n.a.
Zaire - 2.4 0.3 - n.a.
Zambia - 2.0 0.2 - n.a.
Zimbabwe 3.3 7.3 0.9 n.a. n.a.
Other Africa 7.7 - - n.a. n.a.
Africa 12.7 24.8 3.1 n.a. n.a.
India 54.0 73.4 9.1 n.a. n.a.
Iran - 2.4 0.3 - n.a.
Philippines - 3.4 0.4 - n.a.
South Korea - 104.4 13.0 - 81.3
Taiwan - 82.2 10.2 - 67.2
Turkey 12.1 26.9 3.3 n.a, n.a.
Other Asia - 22.2 2.8 - n.a.
Asia 84.8 314.9 39.0 n.a. n.a.
Total 280.4 804.1 100 n.a. n.a.
Direct scrap 101.1 198.7
TpTAL 381.5 1002.8
Source: Statistical Annex and World Metal Statistics
~) The most recent figure available is 38.6 thousand tons in 1979-13o-
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